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DISSENT

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AUTUMN 1962

95c.

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*An Appeal
to Help
DISSENT
on
Its Tenth
Anniversary*

TO OUR READERS:

With its next issue (Winter, 1963) DISSENT will reach its tenth birthday! That seems to us a notable achievement. Over the years the magazine has become increasingly an acknowledged spokesman for American democratic radicalism. Its circulation and influence today are higher than ever before; and so are its needs!

Our readers and friends should realize that the material situation of DISSENT is precarious, more so than ever before. Once again, following our need and custom every two years, we ask your help in keeping DISSENT alive. A few facts will explain this:

- Printing, distribution, and mailing costs have risen faster than income.
- Without commercial backing or significant advertising income, DISSENT meets only about 50 per cent of its costs through regular income; the balance is deficit that can only be met by contributions.
- Editors and writers continue to receive no salary or pay for their work and contributions.

Past deficits have been met through the sacrifice of friends and editors. Once again we must turn to our friends and readers who believe in the purpose and value of DISSENT, who appreciate its receptivity to radical views and opinions, and who wish the magazine to survive. We need, this time, a survival minimum of

\$7,500

The editors, as before, have already pledged sums ranging up to several hundred dollars each. We ask you to pledge generously, remembering that the pledge may be paid out over a two-year period starting now, and that—as in the past—we shall not make any further appeals for the next two years. We do need immediate cash badly, so make your first pledge payment as generous as possible.

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DISSENT

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A QUARTERLY OF
SOCIALIST OPINION

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Devoted to Latin America
and prepared by
Irving Howe, Stanley Plastrik
and Bernard Rosenberg*

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JOURNAL OF THE QUARTER

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS?

A ten-year plan that will be a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools ... transform the 1960s into an historic decade of democratic progress ... every American republic the master of its own revolution and its own hope and progress ... mobilize their resources, enlist the energies of their people, and modify their social patterns so that all, and not just a privileged few, share in the fruits of growth.—PRESIDENT KENNEDY, March 13, 1961.

For their part, the countries of Latin America agree to devote a rapidly increasing share of their own resources to economic and social development, and to make the reforms necessary to assure that all share fully in the fruits of the Alliance for Progress.—“Declaration of the Peoples of America,” adopted mid-August 1961, at Punta del Este, Uruguay, by the OAS.

The Alliance for Progress is a stupendous undertaking... The United States is literally proposing a revolution to be brought about voluntarily and democratically by vast social and economic reforms. What is required is a transformation of Latin-American society, governmental administration and economy.—New York Times editorial.

... This task is nothing less than an effort to compress into a “decade of development” the continuous revolutionizing process that has taken almost two centuries in the United States. We—Latin and North Americans—have undertaken to change the southern continent’s social and political institutions; to bring about crucially needed agrarian reforms, not just equalizing the ownership of arable land but teaching the people to make this land productive; to provide housing for millions who live under conditions few North Americans can conceive of, and to build up the one-sided or rudimentary national economies and turn them in dynamic, regionally integrated directions.—TEODORO MOSCOSO, Administrator of the Alliance for Progress, Sunday Times, August 12, 1962.

At first, there seemed to be *two* Alliances for Progress: One, resounding and rhetorical (see above); the other, more limited and practical, with realistic aims which anyone could decently, if critically, support. Now—October 1962—there seems to be *no* Alliance for Progress. An Administra-

tion already noted for the gap between its words and deeds seems to have committed an even greater blunder—inflating and launching a balloon that failed to rise from the ground. It is understandable that on the first anniversary of the Alliance for Progress instructions went out from top admin-

istrator Moscoso not to celebrate but to—meditate.

On the surface, the status of the Alliance for Progress program does not look quite as bad as we suggest. On March 13, 1961 President Kennedy made his initial proposal to launch a 10-year plan "for homes, work and land, health and schools" to the assembled diplomats of Latin America, urging the Latin American nations to prepare to "modify their social pattern." In August 1961 the Organization of American States (OAS) meeting at Punta del Este in Uruguay formally adopted the program.

According to the most optimistic estimates, by February 1962 the United States had already invested over \$1 billion in long-term loans (50 years), in outright grants and in other forms of aid. The investments were channeled through an elaborate setup which, presumably, would only grow in efficiency and effectiveness: the Agency for International Development (AID); the Export-Import Bank; the Social Progress Trust Fund administered by the Inter-American Development Bank; the Food for Peace program and other agencies including the Peace Corps. The billion dollars, divided into 87 per cent loans and 13 per cent grants, took the form largely of economic infra-structure investments in housing, road-building and other basic necessities of backward economies. The rhetoric of early optimism had it that, once an early momentum was underway, the major problems of Latin America would fairly rapidly dissolve before the avalanche of dollars and progress. These problems, according to the rhetoricians of the Administration, were — not necessarily in *that* order of priority:

1. Castroism

2. Military coups—new style (Argentina, etc.)

3. Inflation

4. Backward economic systems

The reader of this special issue of *DISSENT* will discover the difficulties presented by the above problems; under the best of possible circumstances one might have expected only a beginning of their solution. For example, instead of the comparatively piddling \$10 billion American aid proposed, wiser calculations are that \$100 billion is a more realistic sum required to make a substantial dent in Latin American poverty alone. Yet the President, we note, admitting the slow progress of the Alliance program complained about the general "lack of funds and resources" available to him for the foreign-aid program. The other issues of political and economic structure, land reform, Communism and Castroism, are subjects developed at length in the pages that follow.

The question remains: What *did* happen to the Alliance in such a short span of time? Did it suffer from some basic flaw in conception, or did it simply fall victim to combined Latin American and United States bureaucratism and blundering? Is there any hope that it will move, if not in the direction of the rhetorically revolutionary objectives, then at least in the limited direction of doing *some* good?

The resurgence of the "Cuban crisis," thanks to a calculated Russian provocation, has revived talk about the "Monroe Doctrine." The notion that the United States has by some "divine right" special privileges, responsibilities and powers over Latin America dies a hard death; it is, in fact, this notion that flawed the Alliance for Progress from the start. We ought to

have launched the Alliance with a clear and categorical renunciation, once and for all, of any belief in or recourse to this notorious "Doctrine." We ought to have wiped the slate clean and proposed a fresh start. The American failure to do this has meant, in practice, that the Alliance program is basically an extension of the historic trend the "Monroe Doctrine" represents—a relation between superior and inferior. We leave aside whether or not the Alliance program accurately reflects Latin America's major economic needs (it can well be argued that the best terms of trade for Latin America lie rather in the development of its trade relations with Europe); what cannot be dismissed is the continuation of a state of mind frozen into the "Doctrine." It exists among all but the most democratic-minded of the program's administrators, it dominates the present Congress, it is unhealthily widespread among the American people. It poisons the program at its source. In this issue, you will find proposals which originate in relations of equality and the total self-determination of independent nations, i.e., rejection of any Monroe Doctrine approach, no matter how modified.

Contrast this with certain specific political developments in Latin America since the start of the Alliance program. For a brief period, it appeared that an end of Latin America's misfortune—the military *junta* regime—was in sight and that democratic forces were on the move. Then, the rise of the *fidelista* school of Communism, plus the incapacity of the United States during the Eisenhower days in encouraging democratic movements, gave the military and oligarchic forces a respite in which to develop new techniques of holding power. Argentina

and Peru illustrate this unexpected development in 1962. The United States under both Ike and JFK proved unable to block this retrogression to an even more sinister and dangerous suppression of democratic life. In the case of Peru, the tie-up between the new Peruvian military *junta* that nullified the elections and American private business interests that opposed the initial response of the Kennedy Administration caused one of the most embarrassing retreats of recent American diplomatic history. An American ambassador renounced, a healthy response of indignation shamefully withdrawn (the United States will now recognize the Peruvian dictatorship and grant 60 to 70 per cent of the loans already committed), and a tip-off given to the oligarchies of the southern republics that they need fear nothing.

The New Republic (August 13, 1962) writes:

Will the military, which so hates the reformist party of Haya de la Torre, really permit free electioneering and a free ballot within a year? It was to prevent Torre's party, APRA, from governing that the military took power. The *junta* presumably hopes that it can find ways of preventing APRA from winning a majority of the popular vote and of Congress for a second time. And in this endeavor, the military will have the backing, as it has today, of influential private American investors in Peru. . . . Here again, one sees two diplomacies at work; the official diplomacy of U. S. government and the private diplomacy of business. It is true in the Congo; it is true throughout Latin America.

We need add only that Haya de la Torre and his reform Aprista party were popularly known as the "Alliance for Progress" supporters of Peru. U.S. investment in Peru is \$800 million.

Or consider the scandalous story of powdered milk—part of the Alliance's "program for underfed children"—reported in detail in the May issue of *Atlas* magazine which, in turn, cites the detailed account of the daily "Estado de Sao Paulo" of Brazil. In brief, a story of how tons of powdered milk benefited everyone but the children for whom it was destined, of how it went on sale at sky-high prices and was made available only to supporters of the distributing authorities who were about to undertake a campaign for political reelection, etc. Such tales can be duplicated in many countries.

Early in 1962, important policy makers in the Administration felt that confusion had arisen over the Alliance which needed straightening out or the program would fail before it got off the ground. In their minds the question was, which comes first: United States aid or Latin-American reforms? Whether this was ever a true representation of the Alliance dilem-

ma is doubtful; at any rate, it is now superseded by more striking difficulties. There is no longer any pretense that the Alliance is our answer to the Cuban revolution. Rather, the trend is to downgrade and minimize the importance of what—yesterday—was hawked as the most daring and imaginative program ever presented by United States diplomacy. Ironically, at the very moment when the Cuban revolution has entered such a stage of disintegration that the Russians must act even at the risk of extreme provocation, at a moment when the stock of *fidelismo* is far lower throughout Latin America than it has been for years, the United States resorts to outmoded tactics and measures: The posture of toughness and menace toward Cuba, of capitulation and cringing before the militarists and oligarchies, of reinvocation of the "Doctrine," of pressure upon its associates of the OAS. If this continues, who will remember the Alliance for Progress a year from now?

STANLEY PLASTRIK

ABOLISHING THE OCTOPUS

A Proposal to Buy Good Will for Less Money

We should like to make a proposal which might not solve the problems of Latin America but might remove an obstacle to good relations within the Western Hemisphere. The problem haunting U. S. policy makers is, to use professional language, "the image" this country casts on the minds of Latin Americans. "The image," of course, is a polite word for hate. Wholly devoted to the Madison

Avenue approach of "selling America," our policy makers think of a manufactured image which has no relation to the one actually existing in people's heads. They would like to create the image of a benevolent and helpful big brother who, almost unselfishly, or perhaps through enlightened self-interest, extends aid and defense contributions to his weaker neighbors. But even if successful, this campaign will not sub-

stitute a "new" for an old image of the United States; it merely will create a second image alongside the first one. The U. S. government is all right, people may be heard to say, but unfortunately it is helpless against the big American companies which are all too conspicuous in Latin America.

Foreign aid not only is costly in terms of money; it also is arbitrary and involves a political price. It makes the U. S. responsible for conditions which the aid program means to overcome. The contradictions into which the *Alianza para Progreso* is running shows how difficult it is to bribe a ruling class for its own good. Just as a good product will not reach the market unless the distributor's margin is sufficiently "incentive," so our foreign aid reaches its destination only after the Latin American ruling classes have taken their cut. Worse, we have maneuvered ourselves into a situation where they can extort more foreign aid for their own benefit without giving anything in return. The "image" which results is of a U. S. government enmeshed in an ugly intrigue of monopolists to despoil and deceive both our people and theirs. An image which does not supersede but rather reinforces the original image of the U. S. as the seat of large corporations exploiting all nations of this Hemisphere.

The question is not whether this image is true or incorrect or maybe partly correct. The problem is that the image exists, and the question is how to cut through the vicious circle of aid which perpetuates those in power and gives them claim to more aid. Actually we are paying a sort of forfeit money on behalf of companies which underpay the producers and overcharge us, thereby confirming our complicity

rather than denying or making up for it. The image of the U. S. in Latin eyes is firmly bound up with this condition, and instead of thinking up new "images" we should seriously analyze the origin and nature of the hateful image we wish to remove.

These companies are too conspicuous; they operate in key industries, notably in mining and in the public utilities, services which in the public mind are connected with the notion of sovereignty. They also are being accused of making too much profit; they certainly have been able to prosper by reinvesting their profits. They have become so big that a large part of the rest of the economy has become dependent upon their prosperity. In some countries their political influence is paramount. If we search for a comparable experience of our own, we only have to look at the mining and railway empires in our own semi-colonial West—the companies were called "the Octopus" because they seemed to engulf the entire economy and to reduce independent producers to peonage. Fortunately this was not the end of the story. The power of the Octopus was broken partly by political action and partly by competition. As the economy of the West developed and reached its own "take-off" point, the monopolists were unable to maintain their power.

The basic idea of the Alliance for Progress is to lead the Latin economies to the take-off point where the present monopolies will lose their importance. It is true that the Octopus will lose its grip if rapid economic development can confront it with competition. But the process is not automatic. The economy may develop not on lines of competition but within the framework of

the present monopolistic structure: the ruling compound of a native and foreign oligarchy may continue and even strengthen its monopolistic power. This certainly will happen unless the monopolists are challenged by political action. The planners who thought up the *Alianza para Progreso* forgot that in the American experience political action was the second necessary ingredient in liberating Western economy.

Today this political action is directed against the companies and clothes itself in an anti-American ideology. This is natural because the local oligarchy also finds it expedient to deflect the agitation against the Americans. This identification of certain economic interests with the American flag is highly embarrassing. Like naval bases, these companies no longer are assets but liabilities, things to worry about, traps. The U. S. government should declare that it no longer feels bound to defend every business interest of a U. S. citizen abroad, and that its prestige is not involved if such companies, be they interested in sugar, bananas, mines, transportation or electric power, are nationalized.

It may be very costly to defend these interests. They may cost us politically and financially. They may become responsible for the loss of an ally or even for a war. The military expenditure to support them may exceed the worth of the shares. So why not get out cheaply? Let's indemnify the owners now and get rid of properties which envious and proud nations will not leave in U. S. hands much longer anyway?

We even might get credit for a nice gesture. It is better to be generous than to be forced to yield.

How much is the operation likely to cost? Castro has expropriated a billion dollars' worth of property. U. S. investments in other Latin American countries amount to 8 billion dollars, half of which is in the mining and oil industries or in other vulnerable spots. Suppose about 4 billion dollars' worth of properties are in danger of being expropriated in the next ten years. This is Latin America's share of our foreign aid over the next five years, judging by present appropriations and programs. If, instead of spending this aid money over five years, we were to amortize the compensation for the owners over ten years, the taxpayer would be better off by half. The proposal is fair to the public and to the government. It also is fair to the companies because it involves no expropriation. The U. S. government only needs to announce that it will not protect American corporations in litigation against foreign governments, and they may choose between various ways of protecting themselves—taking native partners into the business, selling to Latin governments, continuing to operate under management contracts with foreign governments, repatriating or reinvesting the money elsewhere. The one condition which is essential is a clear divorce between U. S. interests and company interests, and a clear return of economic sovereignty to the Latin countries.

HENRI RABASSEIRE

Octavio Paz

THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION TODAY

The revolutionary movement, as a search for—and momentarily finding of—our own selves, transformed Mexico. To be oneself is always to become that other person who is one's real self, that hidden promise or possibility. In one sense, then, the Revolution has re-created the nation; in another sense, of equal importance, it has extended nationality to races and classes which neither colonialism nor the nineteenth century were able to incorporate into our national life. But despite its extraordinary fecundity, it was incapable of creating a vital order that would at once provide a world view and the basis of a really just and free society. The Revolution has not succeeded in changing our country into a community, I mean a world in which men recognize themselves in each other, and in which the "principle of authority"—that is, force, whatever its origin and justification—concedes its place to a responsible form of liberty. It is true, however, that no known society has ever achieved this state, and it is no accident, of course, that the Revolution has not given us a vision of man comparable to that of colonial Catholicism or the liberalism of the last century. It is our own phenomenon, but many of its limitations result from circumstances that have been determined by contemporary world history.

The Mexican Revolution was chronologically the first of the great revolutions of the twentieth century. To understand it correctly, it is necessary to see it as part of a general process that is still going on. Like all modern revolutions, it proposed to liquidate feudalism, transform the country by means of industry and technology, put an end to our economic and political dependence, and establish a genuinely democratic society. In other words, to make the leap that our most forward-looking liberals had dreamed about, and convert Mexico into a modern nation. And to do all this without betraying ourselves. On the contrary, the changes were to reveal our true being, the face that was both known and unknown to us. The Revolution was going to create a Mexico that would be faithful to itself.

The most advanced countries, except for Germany, turned from the

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ancien regime to modern bourgeois democracy in a way that could almost be called natural. Their political, economic and technical transformations seemed to be inspired and guided by some superior coherency. History has its own logic, and if we can discover the secret of its functionings, we can control the future. This notion, false as it is, still causes us to regard the history of the great powers as the unfolding of some majestic logical proposition. In fact, capitalism gradually developed from a primitive accumulation into more and more intricate forms, until it reached the stage of high finance and world imperialism. The transition from primitive to international capitalism produced radical changes within each country and in the world as a whole. On the one hand, the differences between a worker and his boss (after the colonial and semi-colonial peoples had been exploited for a century and a half) were less great than the differences between that same worker and a Hindu pariah or Bolivian peon. On the other hand, imperialist expansion unified the planet: it seized all its riches, converted them into merchandise, and cast them into the stream of international trade; it universalized human labor (the textile worker, perhaps thousands of miles away, continues the work done by the cotton-picker), making real for the first time, as a fact rather than a moral postulate, the oneness of the human condition; and it destroyed the eccentric cultures and civilizations, forcing all the world's peoples to orbit around two or three suns, from which radiated all political, economic and social power. At the same time, the peoples thus annexed were assigned a merely passive role. Economically, they were nothing but cheap manual labor and producers of raw materials; politically, they were colonials or semicolonials; spiritually, they lived in barbarous or picturesque societies. "Progress" brought them certain material benefits, but it also required them to accede to historical "normality": to be, that is, mere phantoms. This was the background of the Mexican Revolution and, in general, of the revolution of the twentieth century.

We can now see more clearly what the Revolution undertook to accomplish. It tried, within a short time and with a minimum of human sacrifices, to complete a task that had taken the European bourgeoisie more than a hundred and fifty years. To do so, we had first to secure our political independence and recover control of our natural resources. And it had to be done without infringing on the social rights guaranteed by the Constitution of 1917, especially the rights of the workers. In Europe and the United States these conquests were the result of over a century of proletarian struggle, and to a considerable extent they represented (and represent) participation in earnings from abroad. In Mexico we had no colonial income to distribute; we did not even own the oil, minerals, electric power and other resources with which we had to transform the country. Therefore the Revolution's problem was not merely one of beginning at the beginning: we had to begin before the beginning.

The Revolution made the new state the principal agent of social change. Its first job was to recover and divide up the land, open other lands to cultivation, and establish irrigation projects, rural schools and agrarian banks. There are experts who hold forth on the technical errors that have been committed, and moralists who decry the continuing power of our traditional rural bosses and greedy politicians. They are quite right. And it is also true that the danger of a return to monopolization of the land still exists. Our gains have to be defended constantly. But at least the feudal regime has disappeared: to forget that is to forget much too much. Also, the agrarian reforms not only benefited the rural population but also broke up the old social structure, making possible the birth of new and productive forces.

Despite these accomplishments, however, thousands of our rural citizens live in dire misery, and other thousands have no recourse but to emigrate to the United States each year as temporary laborers. Our population increase—a circumstance the first revolutionary governments failed to take into account—is partially responsible for the present imbalance. The greater part of the country suffers from rural overpopulation. Or to be more exact, we simply do not have enough cultivable land. New farming areas have been opened up, and new industries and centers of production have been established, but they have not been sufficient to absorb the growth in population. With our present resources we are unable to create even the minimum amount of industrial and agricultural employment required by our excess of hands and mouths. It is clear that the problem is not only one of increased population but also of insufficient economic progress. It is equally clear, however, that we are faced with a situation that is beyond the capabilities of the government and even of the nation as a whole. Where and how can we obtain the necessary economic and technical resources? This question, which I will attempt to answer a little later, should not be asked in isolation, but rather in connection with the whole vast problem of economic development. Industry is not growing with the speed which our growing population demands, and the result is underemployment. At the same time, rural underemployment is retarding industrial development, because it is not increasing the number of consumers.

The Revolution also proposed, as noted earlier, to recover our natural wealth. The revolutionary governments, that of Cardenas in particular, called for the nationalization of oil, the railroads and other industries. This policy brought us into conflict with economic imperialism, and the state had to back down and suspend its expropriations, though without surrendering what had already been recovered. (It should be mentioned in passing that our industrial growth would have been impossible without the nationalization of the petroleum industry.) The Revolution did much more than expropriate: it created new state industries by means of a network of banks and credit institutions, gave financial and technical assistance to others (private and semiprivate),

and in general tried to guide our economic development rationally and for the benefit of the public. All these things, and many others, were accomplished slowly and not without a certain amount of blundering and corruption. Yet the face of Mexico began to change, despite the difficulties and contradictions. Little by little a new working class and a bourgeoisie arose. Both classes lived in the shadow of the state and have only now begun to achieve an autonomous life.

Government protection of the working class began with a popular alliance: the workers supported Carranza in exchange for a more advanced social policy. They also supported Obregon and Calles for the same reason. The state rewarded them by protecting the labor unions. Unfortunately the alliance became a surrender on the part of the union leaders, who were given high political offices. The process reached its zenith during the Cardenas administration, which was the most radical period of the Revolution. And the leaders who surrendered their unions to the government were the very same leaders who had fought hardest against all forms of corruption in the labor movement. As for the claim that since the policies of the Cardenas administration were revolutionary, it was very natural for the unions to support them, the fact is that the labor leaders permitted their unions to become merely one more segment of the Party of the Revolution, that is, of the government party. This frustrated any possibility of a workers' party or, at the very least, of a labor government like that in the United States, apolitical but autonomous, and free of government meddling. The only persons to gain anything were the leaders, who became professional politicians.

In the last few years, however, there has been something of a change. The labor groups are winning more and more autonomy; they are getting rid of their corrupt leaders and are fighting for more democratic unions. This new movement could be one of the decisive forces in the rebirth of democracy in Mexican life. In view of our country's social characteristics, the labor movement cannot be effective unless it avoids the sectarianism of some of its new leaders and seeks an alliance with the rural workers and with a sector that was also born during the Revolution: the middle class. Until recently the middle class was a very limited group made up of small businessmen and the members of the traditional "liberal professions": lawyers, doctors, teachers, etc. Our industrial and commercial development, along with the increase in public works, has caused the middle class to expand considerably. It is still crude and ignorant from a cultural viewpoint, but it is full of vitality.

Now that the bourgeoisie has grown more powerful and is more in command of itself, it is attempting to enter the government, not as a protected group but as its sole director. The banker is replacing the revolutionary general; the industrialist hopes to replace the technician or politician. They are trying to change the government more and more into a political expression of their interests. But the bourgeoisie does not form a homogeneous whole. Some of its members, heirs of the Rev-

olution (though sometimes they do not know it), are striving to create a national capitalism; others are simply agents or intermediaries of international capital. Finally, the government contains many technicians who still champion—with varying success—a policy respectful of the revolutionary past and dedicated to the public interest. All this explains the rather zigzag progress of the state, as well as the desire of its leaders not to upset the “equilibrium.” Since the Carranza epoch, the Mexican Revolution has been a compromise between opposing forces: nationalism and imperialism, the labor movement and industrial development, a regulated economy and “free enterprise,” democracy and state paternalism.

None of our gains could have been won within the framework of classical capitalism. What is more, without the Revolution and its leaders we would not even have any Mexican capitalists. National capitalism was not merely a natural consequence of the Revolution: to a great extent it was actually a creation of the revolutionary state. If it had not been for land redistribution, major public works, government-formed enterprises, public investments, direct or indirect subsidies to industry and, in general, state intervention in the economy, our bankers and businessmen would not have had the opportunity to perform their work or to become part of the “native personnel” of foreign-owned companies. It was indispensable, in a country whose economy had been stagnant for over two centuries, to accelerate the “natural” growth of our productive powers. This acceleration took the form of state intervention in the economy and partial direction of it. Thanks to this policy, our evolution has been the most rapid and constant of any in America. It was not brought about by a temporary bonanza or by the prosperity of one isolated industry—such as oil in Venezuela or sugar in Cuba—but rather by a fuller and more general development. Perhaps the most significant sign is the attempt to create a “diversified economy” and an “integrated” industrial structure (that is, one which takes into account our resources and their limitations).

It must be added, however, that we are still far from achieving everything that is needed. We do not have any basic industries except for the beginnings of a steel industry; we do not make machines that make machines, and do not even make tractors; we are still short of roads, bridges and railways; we have turned our backs on the sea, and lack ports, vessels and a fishing industry; our foreign exchange is balanced only because of tourism and the dollars our seasonal workers send back from the United States. And the fact that North American capital, despite our nationalistic legislation, is increasingly more powerful in the vital centers of our economy is even more decisive. Essentially, then, we are still a country producing raw materials, despite a certain amount of industrial growth. This means that in foreign trade we are subject to the fluctuations of the world markets, and that at home we suffer instability, poverty and a cruel difference between the lives of the rich and the poor.

The question of whether our social and economic policies have succeeded is a standard topic of debate. There is no doubt that it has to do with more than techniques or the errors and corrupt practices of certain groups. The truth is that the resources of our nation as a whole are insufficient to finance our development or even to create what the experts call an "economic infrastructure," the only solid basis for real progress. We lack capital, and the rhythm of internal capitalization and reinvestment is still too slow. Thus our essential problem, according to the experts, is to obtain the resources vital to our growth. But where, and how?

One of the facts that characterize world economy is the imbalance between the low cost of raw materials and the high cost of manufactured products. Countries like Mexico—which is to say, the greater part of the world—suffer from the continual and unforeseen changes in the world market. As our delegates have stated in many inter-American conferences, it is impossible even to sketch out any long-range economic programs until this instability is remedied. Also, the growing gap between the "advanced" and "underdeveloped" countries cannot be lessened if the former refuse to pay a just price for raw materials. These materials are our principal source of income, and thus constitute our best chance of financing our economic development. For obvious reasons, we have made practically no gains whatever in this field. The "advanced" nations reply very calmly that it is all a matter of "natural economic laws" over which human beings have very little control. They talk as if we were living at the beginning of the last century. Actually, of course, the law they are talking about is the law of the lion's share.

One of the remedies most frequently offered to us by the "advanced" nations—especially the United States—is that of private foreign investments. In the first place, everyone is aware that the earnings from these investments leave the country in the form of dividends. In the second place, the result is bound to be economic dependence and, in the long run, political interference in our domestic affairs. There is also the fact that private capital is not interested in the sort of investments we need: those offering long terms and accepting small profits. On the contrary, it searches for opportunities that promise better and more rapid earnings. The capitalist cannot and will not involve himself in a general plan for economic development.

No doubt the best—and perhaps only—solution lies in the investment of public capital, either as direct government loans or through international organizations. The former entail political and economic conditions, hence the latter are preferable. One of the purposes for which the United Nations and its specialized organizations were founded was to assist the economic and social development of the "underdeveloped" countries, and the charter of the Organization of American States includes analogous principles. Considering the unstable situation in the world today (basically a reflection of the imbalance between the "great" and "underdeveloped" countries), it might seem that a good deal would

be accomplished in this area.) But in reality the sums devoted to these ends have been a mockery, above all in the light of what the great powers spend for military preparations. They are so busy winning the next war by means of military pacts with ephemeral or unpopular governments, so busy conquering the moon, that they forget what is happening in the rest of the world. Clearly we are faced with a wall that by ourselves we can neither leap over nor break down. Our foreign policy has been a just one, but doubtless we could have achieved more if we had joined with other countries whose problems are similar to our own. In this regard, Mexico's situation is no different from that of the majority of countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa.

Our lack of capital could be remedied in another way. As we know, there is a method whose efficacy has been proved. Capital, after all, is simply accumulated human labor, and the extraordinary development of the Soviet Union is nothing but an application of this formula. By means of a controlled economy, which avoids the waste and confusion inherent in the capitalist system, and the "rational" use of an immense work force, directed to the exploiting of equally vast resources, the Soviet Union has become, in less than half a century, the only rival of the United States. In Mexico, however, we have neither the population nor the natural and technical resources required by an experiment of such proportions (not to mention our proximity to the United States and other historical circumstances). Above all, the "rational" use of workers and a controlled economy signify—among other things—forced labor, concentration camps, the displacing of races and nationalities, the suppression of the workers' basic rights, and the rule of a bureaucracy. The methods of "socialist accumulation," to use Stalin's phrase, have turned out to be much more cruel than the "primitive accumulation" which aroused the justified anger of Marx and Engels.) No one doubts that totalitarian "socialism" can change the economy of a nation: what is doubtful is whether it can give men freedom. And this last is all that interests us, and all that can justify a revolution.

It is true that certain authors—Isaac Deutscher, for instance—believe that as soon as abundance has been achieved, the state will almost imperceptibly move in the direction of true socialism and democracy. They forget that classes or castes with absolute political and economic power have been created in the meanwhile. History demonstrates that no class has ever voluntarily surrendered its gains and privileges. The notion of an "imperceptible" turning toward socialism is as fantastic as the myth of the "gradual disappearance of the state" on the lips of Stalin and his successors. There is always the possibility of changes in Soviet society, of course. Every society is historical, by which I mean that it is subject to transformation. But, at the moment, both systems are characterized by their resistance to change, their unwillingness to respond to external or internal pressures. The danger is that they will choose war in preference to change.

From the viewpoint of traditional revolutionary thinking, or even

from that of nineteenth-century liberalism, the existence of historical anomalies like the "underdeveloped" countries or a totalitarian "socialist" regime, here in the middle of the twentieth century, is absolutely scandalous. Many of the prophecies and even dreams of the nineteenth century have been realized (the great revolutions, progress in science and technology, the transformation of nature, etc.), but in a paradoxical or unexpected manner, defying the well-known logic of history. From the time of the utopian socialists it was claimed that the working class would be the principal agent of world history. Its function was to consist in bringing about a revolution in the most advanced countries, thus creating the bases for the liberation of mankind. True, Lenin thought it was possible to take a historical leap and assign the traditional task of the bourgeoisie—industrial development—to the dictatorship of the proletariat. He probably believed that revolutions in the backward countries would precipitate revolutionary changes in the capitalist world. It was a matter of breaking the capitalist chain at its weakest link. . . . The efforts of an "underdeveloped" country to industrialize itself are in a certain sense anti-economic, and demand great sacrifices from the people; but there is no other way of raising the standard of living. Also, national self-sufficiency is a costly experiment that must be paid for by the workers, consumers and peasants. However, the nationalism of the "underdeveloped" countries is not a logical response: it is the inevitable explosion of a situation which the "advanced" countries have made unbearable. In contrast, rational direction of world economy—that is, socialism—would have created complementary economies instead of rival systems. Once imperialism had disappeared and prices in the world market had been regulated to eliminate excess profits, the "underdeveloped" nations would have been able to obtain the resources they needed for their economic transformation. A socialist revolution in Europe and the United States would have facilitated the transition of all the "backward" countries to the modern world, and in this case in a truly rational and almost imperceptible way.

The history of the twentieth century causes some doubt (to say the least) as to the validity of these revolutionary theses and especially in regard to the role of the working class as the embodiment of the world's destiny. Nor is it possible to claim that the proletariat has been the decisive agent in this country's historical changes. The great revolutions of our time, not excluding the Russian, have taken place in backward countries, and the workers have represented only one segment—almost never the determining one—of the great popular masses made up of peasants, soldiers, the bourgeoisie and thousands of other persons harassed by wars and crises. These formless masses have been organized by professional revolutionists or specialists in coup d'état. Even the counterrevolutions like Fascism and Nazism fit into this scheme. The most disconcerting fact of all is the absence of a socialist revolution in Europe, the very center of the contemporary crisis. It hardly seems necessary to underline the aggravating circumstances: The European prole-

tariat is the best educated and best organized of all, with the oldest revolutionary tradition, and the "objective conditions" favorable to a seizure of power have existed in Europe on a variety of occasions. At the same time, several isolated revolutions—in Spain, for example, and recently in Hungary—have been mercilessly suppressed, without the international solidarity of the workers having manifested itself. On the contrary, we have witnessed a barbarous regression, that of Hitler, and a general rebirth of nationalism in all of the Old World. Finally, instead of a rebellion by a democratically organized proletariat, the twentieth century has seen the birth of the "party," that is, of a national or international grouping that combines the spirit and organization of two forces in which discipline and hierarchy are the dominant values: the Church and the Army. These "parties" are unlike the old political parties in every way. And they have been the effective agents of almost all the changes that have taken place since the first World War.

The contrast with the periphery is very revealing. The colonial and "backward" countries, since before World War I, have undergone a whole series of disturbances and revolutionary changes, and the tide, far from ebbing, rises year after year. Imperialism is withdrawing from Asia and Africa, and its place is being occupied by new states. Their ideologies are confused, but they share two ideas that once seemed irreconcilable: nationalism and the revolutionary aspirations of the masses. In Latin America, which was tranquil until recently, we have seen the fall of various dictatorships and a new revolutionary spirit. Almost everywhere—Indonesia, Venezuela, Egypt, Cuba, Ghana—the ingredients are the same: nationalism, agrarian reform, better conditions for the workers and, at the top, a state determined to complete the process of industrialization and thus leap from the feudal era to the modern. It is of little importance, in a general definition of the phenomenon, whether the state allies itself with certain sectors of the native bourgeoisie or, as in Russia and China, abolishes the old classes and entrusts the imposition of economic changes to a bureaucracy. The distinctive—and decisive—characteristic is that this is not a proletarian revolution in the "advanced" nations but an insurrection of the masses and peoples who live on the periphery of the Western world. Imperialism linked them to the destiny of the West, but now they are turning to themselves, discovering their identity and participating at last in world history.

The men and the political forms that have embodied the insurrection of the "backward" nations are widely varied. At one extreme, Gandhi; at the other Stalin; and then there is Mao Tse-tung. There are martyrs like Madero and Zapata, buffoons like Peron, intellectuals like Nehru. It is a portrait-gallery with very different types: Cardenas, Tito, Nasser. Most of these men would have been inconceivable as political leaders during the past century or even during the first third of the present. As for their language, they combine messianic formulas with the ideology of democracy and revolution. They are "strong men" and political real-

ists, but they are also inspired leaders, and dreamers, and—sometimes—demagogues. The masses identify with them and follow them. The political philosophy of these movements has the same variegated character. Democracy as the West understands it is mixed with new and sometimes barbarous ideas, from the “directed democracy” of Indonesia to the idolatrous “personality cult” of the Soviet Union. And we should not forget the respect—the veneration, even—which Mexicans show for the figure of the President.

Along with the cult of the leader there is the official party. In some countries, including Mexico, it is an open group to which almost anyone who wants to participate in public affairs can belong, and which includes great sectors of both the left and the right. This is also true of the Congress Party in India. We should mention here that one of the healthiest traits of the Mexican Revolution—due, no doubt, to the lack of an orthodox political creed as well as to the open nature of the party—is the absence of organized terrorism. Our lack of an “ideology” has saved us from committing those tortuous persecutions which characterize the exercise of power in certain countries. True, we have suffered from violence, repression, caprices, arbitrariness, brutality, the “heavy hand” (*mano dura*) of certain generals, etc., but even at the worst moments it has always been human, that is, the result of passions, of circumstances, even of chance and fantasy. It is very different from the spiritual aridity of a closed system with its syllogistic, police-state morality. In the Communist countries the party is a minority, an exclusive and omnipotent sect; it is at once an army, an administration and an inquisition, combining both spiritual and secular power. Thus a wholly new type of state has arisen, in which various revolutionary traits—a directed economy, for example, or the disappearance of private property—are inseparable from such archaic traits as the sacred nature of the state or the deification of its leaders. Past, present and future; technical progress and the basest of political magic, economic development and slave labor, science and a state theology: this is the prodigious and terrifying visage of the Soviet Union. Our century is a huge cauldron in which all historical eras are boiling and mingling.

How is it possible that the contemporary intelligentsia—I am thinking especially of the heirs of Europe’s revolutionary tradition—has failed to make an analysis of the present situation, not from the perspective of the last century but from that of the new reality confronting us? For example, the debate between Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin regarding the “spontaneous revolution of the masses” and the function of the Communist Party as the “vanguard of the proletariat” would perhaps gain new meaning in light of the respective conditions in Germany and Russia. In the same way, there is no doubt that the Soviet Union hardly resembles what Marx and Engels thought a workers’ state should be. Nevertheless, this state exists; it is not an aberration or “historical error.” It is a vast reality, which manifests itself in the only way possible to living

things: by the solidity and fullness of its existence. Even so eminent a philosopher as Lukacs, who has devoted so much energy to denouncing the "irrationality" of bourgeois philosophy, has never seriously attempted to analyze Soviet society from the point of view of reason. Can anyone assert that Stalinism was rational? Was the Communists' use of "dialectic" rational, or was it merely a rationalization of certain obsessions, as happens in other neuroses? And the "theory of collective rule," and that of "different roads to Socialism" and the Pasternak scandal . . . were these rational? Also, not one left-wing European intellectual, not one "Marxicologist," has studied the blurred and shapeless face of the agrarian and nationalistic revolution in Latin America and Asia in an attempt to understand them for what they are: a phenomenon of world-wide importance which demands a new interpretation.

The silence of the Latin American and Asian intelligentsia, who live in the center of the whirlwind, is even more discouraging. It should be clear that I am not suggesting we abandon the old methods or reject Marxism, at least as an instrument for historical analysis. But new facts, radically contrary to the predictions of theory, demand a new set of instruments or at least a sharpening of those we already possess. A little before he died, Trotsky wrote—with greater humility and perception—that if revolution did not break out in the advanced nations after the second World War, the Marxist view of world history would perhaps require a complete revision.

The Mexican Revolution is a part of world history. Despite certain differences in degree, in methods and in "historical time," our situation is much like that of many other countries in Latin America, Africa and the Orient. We have freed ourselves from feudalism, military bosses and the Church, but our problems are essentially the same. We are surrounded by many dangers, and also by many temptations, from "government by the bankers" (that is, the intermediaries) to Caesarism, along with nationalistic demagoguery and other spasmodic political forms. Our material resources are few and we have still not learned how to use them effectively. Our intellectual instruments are even poorer. We have done very little thinking on our own account; most of our ideas have been borrowed from the United States or Europe. The grand words that gave birth to our peoples now have equivocal values and no one knows exactly what they mean. Franco is "democratic" and forms a part of the "free world." The word "Communism" is associated with Stalin. "Socialism" means a group of gentlemen defending the colonial order. Everything seems to be one gigantic mistake. We console ourselves by saying that everything has happened as it should not have happened. But it is we who are mistaken, not history. We must learn to look reality in the face; if necessary, we must invent new words and new ideas for these new realities that are challenging us. Thinking is the first obligation of the intelligentsia, and in certain cases the only one.

Meanwhile, what can we do? There are no prescriptions any longer. But there is a valid point of departure: our problems are our own, and we are responsible for solving them, but at the same time they are also everyone's. Our situation in Latin America is that of the majority of the peripheral countries. For the first time in over three hundred years, we have ceased to be an inert material which the strong could use as they wished. We were objects before, but now we have begun to be the agents of historical changes, and our acts and omissions affect the great powers. The image of the present-day world as a struggle between two giants, with the rest of us as their friends, supporters, servants and followers, is very superficial. The background—and, indeed, the very substance—of contemporary history is the revolutionary wave that is whelming in the peripheral countries. For Moscow, Tito is a disagreeable reality, but he is a reality. The same can be said of Nasser or Nehru for the West. A third front, then? A new club of nations, a club made up for the poor? Perhaps it is too soon. Or perhaps it is too late: history is moving swiftly and the great powers expand more rapidly than we are able to grow. But before the flow of historical life congeals completely—and the “draw” between the great powers is leading to this—there are still opportunities for intelligent concerted action.

We have forgotten that many others are as isolated as ourselves. We Mexicans must acquire a new awareness of Latin America. These countries are waking up now. Are we going to ignore them? We have many unknown friends in the United States and Europe. The struggles in the Orient are related to our own. Our nationalism, to be more than a mental illness or self-adulation, must search the whole world. We must recognize that our alienation is not unique, that it is shared by a majority of the world's peoples. To be ourselves would be to oppose the freezing of history with the mobile features of a living human face. It is better that we have no prescriptions or patent medicines for our ills. At least we can think and work soberly and resolutely.

The object of these reflections is no different from that which troubles other men and other peoples: How can we create a society, a culture, that will not deny our humanity but will also not change it into an empty abstraction? The contradictory violence of our reactions and the explosions of our intimate selves and our history all began as a rejection of the petrified forms oppressing us; now we are attempting to resolve them by creating a society which is not ruled by lies and betrayals, by avarice and violence and dissimulation. A society that does not make man an instrument of the state. A human society.

The Mexican hides behind a variety of masks, but he tears them away during a fiesta or a time of grief or suffering, just as the nation has cast off all the forms that were stifling it. However, we have not yet found a way of reconciling liberty with order, the word with the act, and both with the evidence—not supernatural now, but human—of our fellowship with others. We have retreated now and then in our

search, only to advance again with greater determination. And suddenly we have reached the limit: in these few years we have exhausted all the historical forms Europe could provide us. There is nothing left except nakedness or lies. After the general collapse of Faith and Reason, of God and Utopia, none of the intellectual systems—new or old—is capable of alléviating our anguish or calming our fears. We are alone at last, like all men, and like them we live in a world of violence and deception, a world dominated by Don No One. It protects us but also oppresses us, hides us but also disfigures us. If we tear off these masks, if we open ourselves up, if—in brief—we face our own selves, then we can truly begin to live and to think. Nakedness and defenselessness are awaiting us. But there, in that “open” solitude, transcendence is also waiting: the outstretched hands of other solitary beings. For the first time in our history, we are contemporaries of all mankind.

Daniel M. Friedenberg

A CUBAN DIALOGUE

I hadn't seen Mario since he fled Cuba.

"Hola, Mario," I said. "It's been a long time."

"Manuell!" he said, hugging me. "What brings you to New York? I just asked Raúl Chibás last week why I hadn't heard from you. Stand back and let me look at you. By God, you're getting fat!"

"It's the good food in Puerto Rico," I said. "San Juan has better food than Habana these days. Not to mention the Sierra."

"I'll soon find out," Mario said. "I just accepted a job in San Juan myself. And please, don't ask me to join the Committee work there."

"Why not?" I asked with surprise.

"The Committee. The Committee," Mario said in disgust. "Grau and Prío all over again, but this time the United States runs the show directly instead of through a Welles, a Caffery or Smith. I can't take it any more. The Americans will make me a Fidelista again if they keep up this *porra*. I've had enough. I want to go back to a regular job, work with no relation to politics, as I did before the revolution."

"*Dios mío*," I said. "When I think it's been three years since we last saw each other. So much has happened to poor Cuba since then, the years seem more like decades. The last time I saw you was in May 1959, just after Fidel came back from his trip to the United States. We were at the roof garden of the Habana-Hilton, remember?"

"The Sugar Bar," Mario mused. "Fidel, Urrutia then President, Celia, Teté and the two of us. It was great to be alive, how well I remember. *Cuatro gatos* come down from the Sierra, a woman who was the symbol of the earlier fight against Machado, and the greatest Cuban judge. We thought we represented the purity of our democratic revolution. How little we knew! Now only Fidel and Celia remain." He paused, and then continued.

"What happened that night after I left? For some reason an argument had begun between Fidel and Urrutia. I didn't want to get involved because I respected our president as much as I adored Fidel. That's the real reason I went home early."

"Although it's quite some time now," I said, "I can remember the discussion as if it were last night. For it was the first time that I disagreed with Fidel. And it was also the first time I realized where he was taking us."

"Tell me about it," Mario said.

•

We were sitting in the Sugar Bar overlooking Habana, still blazing with lights though it was long after midnight. Every few seconds one of the guests came over to have a menu signed by Fidel. The interruptions were getting on his nerves. It was obvious he had not slept for days. President Urrutia sat across from him, clean-shaven, alert and aristocratic, with an air of quiet confidence that I could see irritated Fidel. Celia and Teté were facing the two of us across the table. Teté was dressed in an elegant black suit with a double string of pearls around her throat. Celia, in a creased olive-green uniform, looked plain by comparison.

Mario, when the argument started, I could see you didn't want to take sides—for all the good it did considering the way Fidel crucified you over television a few months later. Anyway, after you had gone, I moved closer to Fidel. Urrutia seemed to notice the gesture and a somewhat acid smile touched his lips.

Fidel and Urrutia were disputing the trials we had held of the Batista war criminals. The American press had started its first big campaign against the revolution, accusing us of the most fantastic charges, of bloodbaths, some even comparing us with the Romans throwing Christians to the lions—the same press that never reported the murders and sadistic torturing of tens of thousands of Cuban men and women by the *batistianos*. Urrutia had said to Fidel that it would have been better to conduct the trials in a more judicious atmosphere than a public stadium with thousands of howling spectators. He used the words “legal forms,” which seemed to irritate El Jefe.

Fidel half rose from his chair and scowled. “Legal forms,” he spat out. “Legal forms. I am no judge but as a lawyer I can tell you legal forms have imprisoned as many men as they have freed. The bourgeoisie creates that paraphernalia to destroy anyone who opposes its rule. As long as it is legal you can steal and cheat with impunity. The bigger the interest, the smarter the lawyer and the more corrupt the judge. I remember trying to defend a group of *pobrecitos* caught in a swoop by Eleuterio Pedraza's police after Batista came back from Florida. They had their nails torn out. One boy was castrated. What did the judge do? He told them not to mix in politics and then sent them to jail! And he warned me that if I persisted in representing offenders against public order I too would be sent to prison. That is your legal justice.”

Urrutia was startled by the savagery of Fidel's voice.

“You yourself should be the first to admit that there is justice of form based on content and mere justice of form,” he said. “I know that Batista was a hoodlum who used the law for his own purposes. Did I not refuse to condemn you at your trial on the grounds that resistance against an illegal government is no crime? But once legal government is instituted, order and justice are necessary. Otherwise the state is administered in chaos and the latest decree alone is legal. Besides, you must realize that the Americans have an obsessive regard for form and the trials created a bad effect there.”

Fidel whispered something to Celia, who smiled.

"The Americans, the Americans," he sneered. "All I hear is what I must do and must not do for fear of what the Americans will say. *Al carajo* with the Yanquis. They put Batista in office. They supported him when he would have fallen the first year in power. They gave him arms and planes to shoot down the Cuban workers. They confiscated the weapons to be sent to me in the mountains. And now that I have won despite them, they want me to lick their boots in gratitude."

Teté spoke up.

"It wasn't only the Americans. They were as little and as much to blame as anyone else. Remember, it was the Mexican police who did the confiscating, not the Americans."

Fidel laughed whimsically at Teté. "Another Christian, all-forgiving soul. But I don't have the sense of the good Lord, who in his infinite compassion permitted the Mexicans to heed American pressure, thus leaving 70 of my 81 comrades on the *Granma* dead within the week of landing."

He turned again to Urrutia.

"Do you really think the Americans will help us?" Fidel asked sarcastically. "How can they? The Yanquis are thinking of their billion-dollar investment and we are thinking of the needs of our people. The two aims are incompatible. They are already calling us Communists, just as Ché said they did in Guatemala before they found Castillo Armas under a rock and armed him to overthrow Arbenz. Ché gave me the *Fábula del tiburón y las sardinas* by Juan José Arévalo. Did you ever read the book? It shows how the American Pentagon, the State Department and Wall Street work hand in glove to suck us of our wealth. If their small investment in Guatemala forced them to invade the country for what they call democracy, what won't they do to us?"

"I haven't read the book," Urrutia said, "but I am familiar with Arévalo's thought. It is a mingling of facts with arguments that have only the appearance of truth. Remember what our great José Martí wrote: 'The enemies of a people's freedom are not so much the foreigners who oppress them as the timidity and vanity of its own sons.' Our Cuban martyr, who had suffered much from the Americans, could still see that the oppressor only enters in strength when the people itself is ready for betrayal. We are as much to blame as they."

I could see that Fidel was greatly irritated at José Martí being quoted against his own position. His eyes seemed to glaze and his voice rose.

"Perhaps," he said in a tone that verged on insult. "But it also might be that your own training as a member of the high bourgeoisie has made you incapable of appreciating the suffering of the people. You are concerned with truth and justice. I respect you for that. But your truth and your justice are only reflections of that training. What you would like to see as the ultimate state of affairs is a Cuba *americanizada*. The *guajiros* should live in houses with hot and cold running water and a

toilet. The *macheteros* should have a forty-hour week and all-year-round wages. The middle class should be free of extortion and shakedown from corrupt politicians. And the capitalists will no longer have to beware of confiscation if there is a revolution of true social content. You do not see into the heart of Yanqui imperialism, you refuse to admit its real nature, because in your soul you yourself think and feel as an upper-class American, a Spanish-speaking one but a Yanqui none the less."

Manuel Urrutia rose from the table. With impeccable courtesy he spoke. "It is getting very late, Fidel, and I must see an important delegation tomorrow. I wish you the best of luck in the coming difficult days. And you too, *señoras* and *señores*. Most of all luck to Cuba, which needs it. God bless you all and good night."

It was indeed late, past 3:00 in the morning. A woman in a brilliant evening dress came over and put a finger on Fidel's sleeve. Then she reverently kissed the finger. Fidel sat slumped in his seat. But he made no move to leave and lit another cigar. Teté smiled at me with a bewildered expression. Celia kept her eyes fixed on Fidel.

"Jefe," I said, "you know how I feel about Yanqui influence. They only entered the war against Spain after we were on the point of winning. They came in to take our island, just as they stole Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Even when they failed, they pushed through the Platt Amendment so they could come back any time their investments were threatened. But, though we can't forget the past, we still have to live with them. President Urrutia is only using common sense when he points out that it is not smart to alienate the Americans. I don't mean we should modify our revolutionary aims. Nobody wants another Grau or even Prío. But there is a way of doing things. During the Spanish Civil War the Republicans brought on the fascist revolt by attacking the land-owning class and the Church at the same time. The mass of Spaniards were ready for land reform. But by uniting the opposition, the religious element with the landed oligarchy, a combination too strong for the Republicans was forged. You can arrive at your objective and yet do it in a slow calculated way so as not to offend the American liberals together with the reactionaries and conservatives."

"You mean I should be a hypocrite," Fidel growled. "Say one thing and do another. Tell the Cuban people that their sacrifices were in vain, that we must not upset the Yanquis by sentencing the criminals who tortured our Cubans, that we must not touch the American interests even though they extort millions of dollars from us and raise the utility and food and building costs to the point where we cannot live as decent human beings."

"Not at all," I replied. "But Urrutia has a point. The Americans are obsessed by forms and we should realize this. Cuba stands behind you. You are the Jefe Máximo, the new José Martí. The first thing we should do is have elections. We will win by such an overwhelming vote that the American people—if not their government—will see that our 26th of July

Movement is the only voice of the Cubans. Then we can advance more securely to the social measures necessary to destroy the old order."

"Arbenz was elected by popular choice, and that did not prevent the American State Department from crushing him," Fidel said with a snort.

"Our case is different. The Army was never with Arbenz and the power of the oligarchy was untouched in Guatemala. But the old Cuban Army is shattered and our militia unbeatable. Most of the corrupt plutocracy has fled and what remains can be turned to our will. We have a golden chance in Cuba, perhaps the first in the entire history of all Latin America. Let us call elections and show the Yanqui that Cuba is a *frente unido*!"

"And let Grau San Martín, Carlos Prío Socarrás and that collection of *chivatos* return, supported by more American dollars, to twist and confuse the minds of the people! No, thank you. Manuel, even you are naive on the question of American power. You think the good will of the Americans can help us. But it is not good will, it is *interest*, that motivates Yanqui policy. Only through destroying the roots of United States' control on Cuban soil can our people recover their soul. Look at Puerto Rico. The standard of living may have risen since the Americans stole the island. And what is the result? The schools teach American culture, not Hispanic. The native customs are dying. The Negro is a degraded citizen. Even the Spanish language is being corrupted. We did not fight the revolution for that!"

Teté spoke up.

"Fidel, you are exaggerating. I lived over ten years in exile in Mexico. American investment is strong there too but it has not destroyed the Mexican spirit. Lázaro Cárdenas told the Yanquis where to come off and ever since then they have been forced to accept the autonomy of Mexico."

"But Mexico is 40 million and we are 6," Fidel answered. "And American investment is greater on our small island than throughout all Mexico. Besides Lázaro Cárdenas had the exceptional luck of being president at the same time as Franklin Roosevelt, the smallest of the sharks after Lincoln, while this Eisenhower is the worst of reactionaries. No, I tell you, the Americans will try to break our revolution and the first step will be to corrupt the people against us. Let us not play into their hands with the legal *porquería* of elections when we have already voted with our own blood and sacrifice. Ché can tell you about Americans! In Argentina the Yanquis bitterly opposed Perón because they thought their investments threatened. But Perón ended up actually proposing more concessions to Standard Oil of California! When the Americans can't buy elections, they buy the elected. If we yield one inch, the whole gang of thieves, the electric and telephone companies, the petroleum and the sugar and the mining outfits will manipulate us just as they did after the fall of Machado."

"Teté, you should know that better than any of us," he continued. "Pablo your husband had to flee when Batista liquidated the student

revolts. He went to fight Franco in Spain. And he promptly joined the Spanish regiment of El Campesino, the great Communist peasant general. He must have seen enough of imperialism to be convinced, as is Raúl, my kid brother, that the fox loses its hair but never its tricks."

"Oh Fidel, be careful," Teté cried out. "Even El Campesino renounced Communism as the new tyranny after living in Russia. You know how the Cuban Communists never supported us. You know they worked with Batista almost to the last minute. They are not concerned with democracy, with human beings, but only with power. That is not the meaning of our fight. You yourself defined our aim as a humanistic revolution."

"I didn't say I was a Communist," Fidel answered, looking at Teté with a grimace of disgust. His face became hard. "The only ones who could make me a Communist would be the Americans, not Cubans. But you must admit that the only rational explanation of imperialism comes from the Marxist camp. As I am not a Communist, neither am I anti-Communist. We need their ideas to wake up the masses, to organize, to hate if necessary. Our Cuban people are too soft. They like to laugh and joke and dance. Unless the Cuban learns to be *duro*, *bien duro*, he will never have the force to withstand the will of the Yanquis."

Teté was almost crying. "Don't say those things, Fidel," she said. "We want all Cubans to laugh, to joke and dance. It was Machado and Batista who made our sweet island obsessed by hate and vengeance. The revolution was waged to do away with violence, to eliminate the Army and use the barracks for schools, as you so often said. The revolution was fought to eliminate bureaucracy and corruption, to give the workers and peasants a chance to dream of a better world, a world of Christian brotherhood and peace. Violence and hatred are wrong, even when used by good persons because they will poison the good until they are no different than the ones they replace."

Fidel leaned over the table and glared at Teté.

"I graduated from a Jesuit school, you romantic. I know all about Christian values and actual Christian conduct. Where did they get you with Machado, a protector of the Church, when you organized your student manifesto against his rule? Remember what he said? 'I am not going to be overthrown by scraps of paper'—that is what he threw in your teeth. And the Church was mute when he spoke. Whom did the Church support in Spain during the Civil War where your husband's corpse is rotting from a fascist bullet? Whom did the Church support in the Mexican revolution? Whom does the Church always support? Don't talk to me of brotherhood and peace. I know how the words are used and corrupted until the same filthy forces regain control. Give me the spirit rather of our great Latin American poet, Ruben Darío:

*! Y al sol que hoy alumbra las nuevas victorias ganadas,
y al héroe que guía su grupo de jóvenes fieros,
al que ama la insignia del suelo materno,
al que ha desafiado, ceñido el acero y el arma en la mano,*

*los soles del rojo verano,
las nieves y vientos del gélido invierno,
la noche, la escarcha,
y el odio y la muerte, por ser por la patria inmortal,
saludan con voces de bronce las trompas de guerra que tocan la marcha
triunfal!**

Teté watched Fidel while he quoted the martial stanzas. A tear dripped down her cheek. She was in the mid-forties, but a natural charm and vivacity often gave her the look of a young girl. Now she seemed old and tired. She got up, went to Fidel and impulsively stroked his head with a maternal gesture.

"It is very late and I'm expecting a group of journalists from the United States tomorrow. I have to get some sleep. But please Fidel, think carefully what you are saying. More is at stake than Cuba. Don't let yourself be consumed by hate no matter how justified. For it can only lead to another cycle of violence and those who love you will be destroyed with it."

She left, a small drooping figure in black. Celia put her palm over the hand of Fidel. He said nothing but a peculiarly sad expression crossed his lips. Then he shrugged, and muttered rather ominously:

"The group is getting smaller. The romantics are leaving. But the fewer the better. It took only twelve men from the *Granma* to conquer Batista. Our greatest battle still lies ahead. And only the hardest will survive."

He paused, and then looked at me intently.

"I can't help thinking that some of this discussion is a bit abstract," I said. "Because of my training as an engineer, I tend to look at the technical factors even in politics. Elections or no elections, peace or violence, humanistic revolution or Communism—these are big words. But they all flow from a certain economic base. In this sense I am a Marxist. Of course we have to be hard to achieve our objectives. There again I have no quarrel. But it seems to me we should put the situation in a correct frame of reference. Cuba is a small island next to the most powerful nation in the world. We must be honest with ourselves as to the limits of a hard policy. As the old proverb says, he who sows winds will harvest storms. Even putting aside the possibility of an invasion by the United States, a couple of turns of the screw in the economic field

• *Triumphal March*

And to the sun that today lights up the newly gained victories,
And to the hero who guides his group of fierce young men,
To him who loves the standard of his maternal soil,
To him who has defied, sword-girded and weapon in hand,
The suns of burning summer,
Snows and winds of frigid winter,
Night, white frost,
And hatred and death, to fight for his immortal homeland,
Salute with voices of bronze and trumpets of war
That play the triumphal march!

can do almost as much damage. Your brother Raúl recently announced that the sugar quota was Cuban slavery to the economic dictates of America. In a sense he is right. Because of the quota, we have to buy back from the United States goods we could purchase at lower prices in other countries. Our sugar sales are limited elsewhere. And a lot of the benefits of the subsidy simply flow back in repatriate dollars to the American owners of the sugar plantations and mills, or used to before the currency freeze. But when all is said and done, we should realize there are real benefits for us too. Our sugar and tobacco market is almost entirely American. It is easy to talk about Yanqui imperialism but I wonder if we are willing to face the prospect that the United States government may take Raúl seriously and eliminate us from the quota."

"They can't do that," Fidel reassured me.

"Why not?" I asked.

He laughed. "Because of several factors. The first is that the entire delicate structure of sugar quotas, including their own domestic sugar beet industry, is keyed to the Cuban crop. Without us, the system would collapse and many powerful interests would be hurt. The second is that, as you mentioned, a good part of the Cuban owners are in reality American and they would not cut off their nose to spite their face. But most important, you forget we have a billion-dollar hostage, the enormous American investment here. If they cut our sugar quota, we could nationalize everything they own."

"But suppose the United States capitalists feel they have nothing to lose any more. Their dollars are blocked now. They are getting no benefits. They may come to the conclusion it would be better to face the issue, knowing they would lose everything, and start an economic blockade to destroy the revolution and get back their property. Remember, the British, working with the international cartels, did just that when they overturned Mossadegh of Iran after the nationalization of petroleum. And the Americans tried to do the same thing over the petroleum expropriations of Mexico."

"Viva Cárdenas," shouted Fidel, and then winked at Celia.

"But what then happens?" I insisted.

"I told you," Fidel answered. "Viva Cárdenas! that's what happens. We seek other markets. According to a report Ché recently drew up, the so-called premium we get on sugar could easily be compensated by a combination of cutting off the flow of dollars to the American owners, buying goods cheaper than what we overpay them now, and selling unlimited sugar on the world market. We will do just what Lázaro Cárdenas did. We will sell elsewhere, we will crush the *pulpo americano* by developing new markets."

"And tobacco?" I asked.

"And tobacco, and tomatoes, and mineral ores and petroleum and manufactured goods of all kinds," Fidel answered gaily. "You classical economists get me sick. You have no vision of the energy that will flow forth from a liberated people. The underdeveloped countries are being

strangled by the imperialists. Their wealth is being sucked out like a sponge. Break the chains that bind us and we can produce like they do. Are we so different? Can we not learn the industrial skills of the Yanqui? Our Cuba is the richest country of its size in the world. We have incredibly fertile soil. We have great resources of iron, copper, manganese, nickel, chromium and cobalt. The Yanquis have built enormous petroleum refining plants here. Good! we will use them for ourselves instead of letting the profits go north."

"And whose petroleum will we refine?" I asked.

"We can import from Venezuela, from Mexico, even from the Arab states."

"But what if the international cartels block the passage?"

"Then we will defeat the capitalists!" he roared. "We will go elsewhere. We will buy petroleum from the Soviet Union, we will sell sugar to the Soviet Union! An enemy of an enemy is *un amigo*. If the United States tries to strangle us, we shall know who our friends are. And don't tell me I am a Communist. President Cárdenas sold petroleum to Hitler when he was blocked by the Yanquis, even though he loathed the Nazi system. I don't have to be a Communist to know that I buy and sell where I can to save the Cuban revolution."

I was stunned. I never had heard Fidel speak this way before. I wondered if he understood the full implications of what he was saying.

"You mean," I asked, "that you would substitute the Russian market for the American market and consider that a step in the liberation of Cuba? Even from a Soviet economic view, that is crazy."

"Manuel, Manuel," Fidel answered, "don't you see that our very distance from Russia is the security we need. I am familiar with the dangers. I read Raúl Roa's condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Hungary while we were living in Mexico. But he forgot two things. And I believe he has a clearer view now. The first is the practical. Russia flanks Hungary, as the United States flanks Cuba. Our fear is America, not Russia, for just that reason. The second is ideological. Hungary was revolting against a socialist system, which is a superior form of economic organization to capitalism. America is trying to reimpose on Cuba a more primitive social structure to the one we are proposing."

"But this socialist system was forced on Hungary by the Soviet Union through conquest, rather than growing out of the needs and hopes of the Hungarian people."

"So much the worse for the Hungarian capitalists and feudal lords," Fidel said bluntly.

"Wait a minute, Fidel" I said. "Do you mean that you agree a system should be imposed on a people even if they don't want it, because you feel it is superior and disregarding whether the people agree with your definition of superiority? But that is the reverse of democracy, it is tyranny in its old form cloaked by a new vocabulary. For it must then imply a secret police, a powerful Army, a totalitarian press and propa-

ganda machine, even torture cells—only now a man who calls himself a socialist will do the torturing instead of a man who calls himself a fascist. That is the very system we fought to destroy.”

Fidel glared at me. “Manuel, you talk like a counter-revolutionary. Never lose sight of the prime enemy and don’t be lead astray by a lot of *intelectuales estúpidos*. Our enemy is the imperialist forces flowing from America and linking themselves with the reactionaries in Cuba that want to perpetuate the old order. These people care nothing for economic democracy or the rights of the workers for a better life. To break their chain of repression is the goal to which I am dedicating my life. And to achieve this I am willing to seek support from the progressive forces, wherever they come from. Do you realize we are the only people in all Latin America who say *No* to the Yanquis? who tell the Americans that we will no longer be inferior, puppets, *sardinas* ready to be eaten by the shark? This demands strength and will, a united Cuba. And to create this unity we have to forge our own organization of iron. It may take twenty or thirty years of struggle to win. I may even fail. The Yanquis may invade us and destroy our revolution, as they did in Guatemala and, with more subtle means, in Bolivia. But we Manuel, *we* are the future and not they. And how glorious to be able to fight for the right, knowing that the right is on our side and that history will record us, if not conquerors, at least martyrs for the truth!”

Celia turned and kissed Fidel. She was crying like Teté, but for a different reason. “Viva Fidel! Viva el Jefe!” she cried out. “*Patria o muerte!*”

I looked at Fidel. His mouth was clamped in a vise, his lips thin and curled in a hard line. And I shuddered. For Fidel had the absolute truth of a Loyola or Stalin, of the dedicated fanatic who creates a new set of torture chambers and concentration camps, of large armies and the eternal cycle of hunger and war. The truth I thought! Judges, what for? Justice, what for? Truth, what for? And what is truth? But I knew that Fidel’s truth, true or false, could no longer be for me.

Mechanically I repeated “*patria o muerte.*” Dawn was breaking and I could hear the pigeons clucking. I must sleep, I must sleep, I thought to myself, or I will go insane. But Fidel and Celia had stood up to see the sun rise. As I left, I saw them peering to the east at the first false beams of light. And I knew I must escape from my beloved Cuba, or else I might soon end up a victim of the very system I had fought to create.

I. A. Langnas

DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP

1. Clashes between democracy and dictatorship have punctuated the history of Latin America for 150 years, ever since it won its political independence. Formal democracy, with all its trappings, was adopted by the new republics at the very moment of their birth. But democracy cannot become a national reality unless adapted to the other national realities. This is what the early leaders of Latin American democracy, by and large, failed to do; and this is why Latin America produced one dictator after another.

Few of these leaders were unaware of the national realities, although many preferred to ignore them, for they did not easily fit into the patterns of democratic thought which these politicians found in European textbooks of political theory or in the Constitution of the United States; they did not even fit well with the accepted clichés of democracy. The 19th-century liberal could not, by definition, doubt that the Church and the Army were reactionary forces. But for the average citizen in Latin America, Church and Army provided almost his only chances to rise in the world. A poor man could become a general or a bishop, and thus break through the barriers which made the good things of life a monopoly of the elite. He could even become a dictator.

Nor was political democracy an easy thing to explain to the average Latin American. It is not for nothing that Castro talks for hours and hours. His oratory put Khrushchev to sleep at the UN, but it keeps his Cuban audiences on the alert. And the historian of Latin America recalls how Father Hidalgo spoke, in 1810, to 100,000 Mexican Indians gathered in the meadow of Salamanca—it took him many hours to explain to them why they should rise against the Spanish rulers.

2. Now, after 150 years, democracy can become as deeply rooted in Latin America as in areas with a happier history. Partly because the work of its democratic pioneers, from men like Hidalgo onwards, is beginning to bear fruit, but also because a new generation of democratic leaders has come to the fore since the end of World War II, who are determined to make democracy a reality for the many as well as the few. Leaders like Betancourt or Figueres are no longer lonely men with a handful of followers—they have had considerable success in giving democracy a mass backing.

One after another, the old-fashioned dictators have been put out of

business, until only three small countries—Haiti, Nicaragua and Paraguay—are left under their rule. In other countries of Latin America democracy may be far from perfect, but in many of them it is at last beginning to grapple with the national problems. It has two main enemies: The old ruling class which refuses to give up its monopoly of power, and the new kind of dictator, forecast by Peron and exemplified by Castro, who tells the masses that the old elite will yield the fruits of power only at gunpoint.

3. The facts of life in Latin America begin with geography, which is far more decisive than in Europe or the United States. Man has left a much smaller imprint on Latin America. In a few countries, like Uruguay and Costa Rica, geography provides an equable climate, a fruitful soil, easy communications. But most of Latin America suffers from all kinds of geographical handicaps—impassable mountain ranges, extremes of heat, cold and humidity, tropical forests, steppes, deserts, etc. Peru is a textbook case: until quite recently the only way from Lima to the Amazonian outpost of Leticia led not straight across the Andes but thousands of miles around the whole continent and up the entire length of the Amazon. The population of Latin America is, on the whole, sparse and badly distributed. It is concentrated in a few favored areas which are over-exploited, leaving the majority of the country bare and barren. National unity tends to be extremely fragile, and government has to be strong if there is to be a government at all.

The success of Latin American democracy will largely depend on the success of modern technological devices in overcoming these geographical handicaps. Air-conditioning may prove as revolutionary as the airplane.

4. Much has been written about the economic ills from which Latin America suffers, which is not so surprising for these quickly leap to the eye. Much of Latin America is still waiting for the capitalist revolution. Agriculture is still dominant, and it is a feudal and colonial type of agriculture—its two chief forms, the hacienda and the plantation, represent feudalism and colonialism respectively. Old-fashioned paternalism, which may have mitigated the evils of these systems, is on the wane. Pitiless exploitation and ruthless defense of the status quo are much more common. Such is the case in Peru, which may well be “the saddest country in the world,” as one of its leading intellectuals, Juan Luis Valesquez, claims with bitter pride. In only a few places has land reform given substantial land to the landlords. In some parts, it is still to be tried.

Industrialization can claim in Latin America some spectacular successes. The Mexicans are rightly proud of Monterrey, the Brazilians of Volta Redonda. But industrialization has failed, so far, to raise the standards of living at a speed matching the increase in population. Statistics may be made to prove anything (especially in Latin America, where Luis Alberto Sanchez, rector of the University of Lima, classifies them as “poetry”), but most of them are pessimistic.

For all the advance of economic nationalism, a good deal of Latin America's economy is still controlled by foreign interests. This exasperates the nationalists, but theirs is only an extreme reaction to the widely held view that Latin Americans lack the economic know-how to exploit their resources properly. Recent history offers a good deal of evidence to support this pessimism, but history also supplies a corrective. The Mexican Ministry of Education is decorated with a long list of animals, vegetables and minerals which the Indians put to use and passed on to the Europeans. The conquistadores pioneered in mining technology, and as late as the last century the now world-wide cultivation of sisal was started by a group of Yucatan landowners, one of whom invented an essential piece of machinery still called the Solis wheel. Nor is there any indication that the new generation of entrepreneurs, managers and technicians now growing up is inferior to their equivalents elsewhere.

Another current explanation of Latin America's economic inferiority raises more fundamental issues. It sees the root of the trouble in the existence of two parallel economies, one modern and advanced and the other old-established and backward. It is usually assumed that the latter must yield to the former if Latin America is to find a way out of its present economic morass.

This assumption, however correct it may be in itself, requires some serious correctives. Its basic defect is that it fails to take into account the point of view of the people immediately concerned, those about to be industrialized and modernized. They tend to be as passionately attached to their own "backward" values as the modernizers and industrializers to their "progressive" ones. And are they so completely wrong?

After all, a village community like the Mexican *ejido* or the Andean *ayllu* not only maintains a community spirit and offers individual satisfactions that the industrialized city dweller has lost; it is also, in important ways, an economic democracy. It is not imposed from above, like the collective farm; the decisions are made by the people directly involved. Its guiding economic function may well be the equal sharing of poverty, which tends to perpetuate poverty—but at least it is an equal sharing. And let us not forget that the *ejido* was merely revived by the Mexican Revolution; it was originally created by Philip II to preserve the Indians from the devastating effects of the free enterprise practiced by the conquistadores.

If modern economics doesn't always make sense to those who freely live under it, all the more often does it fail to make sense to primitive people *compelled* to live by it. When Felipe Carrillo Puerto became the revolutionary governor of Yucatan, he gave back to the Indians of his native village of Motul the lands they had been deprived of by the landlords. The first thing the Mayas did was to cut down the sisal-bearing henequen plants and plant corn. Nor is it easy for an outsider to appreciate the barriers of hate and distrust that the compulsory incorporation in a modern economic system creates. The villagers of Viru (Peru) won themselves a mention in textbooks of sociology by refusing to accept the

artesian wells offered to them under a UN-sponsored scheme; they preferred to go thirsty.

This is the background to the painful conflict between economic efficiency and social justice which plagues Latin America and which Toynbee tried to analyze in the lectures he gave at the University of Puerto Rico in February 1962. Why do measures of social justice, like land reforms, nationalizations or welfare laws, so often reduce productivity? Toynbee hopes that this is but a temporary stage in Latin America just as it was in Western Europe and the United States. But the problem is more complex in Latin America. If economic democracy is to be achieved there, ways and means have to be worked out to *persuade* the people to enter modern economy while yet preserving the good in pre-modern values.

5. The reasons for this caution become clearer when the population structure of Latin America is examined. The two basic strains are the Hispanic and the Indian. The Negro has not had a dominant influence except in some limited areas, primarily the Caribbean and Brazil; the same applies to the non-Hispanic European immigrant—the main exceptions here are Argentina and Uruguay.

Though relations between the various racial strains have often fallen short of ideal, Latin America is free from ideological racism, and the worst atrocities occurred within a few years of the “trauma of the Conquest,” a phrase still current in Mexico. Today countries like Brazil and Mexico have established a measure of racial democracy that should make them models for South Africa or the American South (and, for that matter, the American North). A good deal of the credit must be given to the Spanish Crown and the Catholic Church. The Catholic Kings passed laws permitting the intermarriage of Indians and Spaniards. Many missionaries made the protection of the victims of the Conquest a labor of love, and the Jesuits, led by Lainez, a man of partly Jewish extraction, made the Council of Trent adopt the thesis that all men, regardless of their skin color, have souls capable of achieving salvation.

These ethnological patterns help to explain the problems and prospects of economic democracy in Latin America, especially if it is remembered that a man like Vasco de Quiroga was not only Bishop of Michoacan but also a social and economic reformer inspired by More's *Utopia* and that the Tarascan Indians still practice the industrial arts he taught them 400 years ago. But these patterns also throw a very important light on questions of political democracy.

6. There are some serious misconceptions about the political outlook of both the Indian aborigines and the Iberian immigrants. In both cases, a complexity of experience has been overshadowed by a spectacular achievement. The absolute monarchy which put the American colonies of both Spain and Portugal under an iron rule was, in both countries, a rather recent innovation. Its primary function, exercised today by the

dictatorships of Franco and Salazar, was that of a straitjacket to restrain the explosive anarchism of the subjects.

As with the Spanish and Portuguese, so with the Indians. The centralized Aztec and Inca empires were actually similar straitjackets, imposed by a victorious tribe on the tribes it had conquered. But the Indian political experience also included popular assemblies, common among warrior tribes from the Apaches to the Araucanians, and such political devices as the Maya league of city states.

Moreover, both the Indians and the Hispanic peoples who came to rule them have the same basic social dichotomy, which has been perpetuated to this day in Latin American politics. It is a dichotomy between a majority of people who are essentially primitive and a ruling elite which claims to have a monopoly of civilization. The title of a Latin American classic, written by a man who is rightly acclaimed as a founder of Argentine democracy, Sarmiento, is significant: *Facundo or Civilization and Barbarism*.

It would be a mistake to believe that this basic dichotomy was introduced into Latin America by the conquistadores. It was there long before them. A sculpture from Palenque shows a Maya with each of his feet standing on the neck of a cowering subject. His name is unknown and his social position is merely guessed at when he is called "priest-king." But he surely belonged to the *Halach Huinic*, the Maya ruling caste who called themselves "the (only) real men." Their subjects showed what they thought of their claim when the Maya capital, Mayapan, was burned down in the 15th century by "the people beyond the walls," Toynbee's "internal proletariat." This refusal to accept the elite at its own estimate is a continuous tradition in Latin America. The "gaucho epic" *Martin Fierro* was written by Jose Fernandez as a deliberate assertion of popular values against Sarmiento's exclusive claim to civilization.

7. This dichotomy between "primitive" and "civilized" is vital for any consideration of political democracy in Latin America. But it cannot be fully understood without a reference to a wider, world-wide context.

The whole theme remains shrouded in ignorance which has only recently begun to lift somewhat. History has been made by both the primitive and the civilized, but only the civilized wrote it. The primitive has expressed himself by action rather than words. He has not accepted the civilized man's estimate of himself, but he could not prevent the civilized man from holding that estimate and imposing it wherever he could. The social sciences have of late begun to make up for the historian's errors, but the real nature of primitive man is still veiled by "civilized" hostility and prejudice.

The primitive population of Latin America shows certain clearly marked and recurring patterns. The primitive finds it difficult, if not impossible, to grasp general and abstract ideas above a certain level, the state, the nation, the ideology and the political party among them. Instead, he judges issues in terms of personalities. An individual gesture means more

to him than a detailed political program, and this is one of the roots of *caudillismo*, the indigenous form of dictatorship. When Bolivar died, Venezuela had a sizable intellectual elite. Yet it was not an intellectual who entered upon Bolivar's heritage but the barely literate Juan Antonio Paez. Somebody took a potshot at him from a few yards—and missed. "You are a very bad shot," said Paez, "go away!" Paez was the idol of the masses.

The other side of this personal approach shows itself in a remarkable toleration for individual peculiarities, far more common in Latin America than in most industrialized countries. This respect for the individual is something that political democracy needs as much as its more abstract forms. Again, if Latin Americans bow too quickly to tyrants, they have never lacked the courage to get rid of them.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to political democracy in the mind of the primitive is that his politics are those of passion, not of reason. Hence, a tendency towards discontinuity, which scorns the regular succession of elections and peaceful transfers of power. One basic political pattern of primitive Latin America runs, roughly, as follows: A brutal conquest of power is followed by a long spell of exploitation. The victims remain passive and even develop a masochistic pleasure in their sufferings. Then they rise, and indulge in a frenzied orgy of killing, rape, robbery and destruction. They are defeated, and resume their passivity. The Mayas of Yucatan remained quiet for 300 years after the Conquest. Then, in 1846, they rose. After two years of the "War of the Castes" the population of Yucatan was reduced from 500,000 to 200,000.

Salvador de Madariaga has coined the most acceptable formula to describe this kind of politics, the alternative of "hierarchy or anarchy." The ruling elite fears—and not entirely without reason—that political democracy, if introduced prematurely, would mean the end of civilization as they understand it. Portales, the Chilean conservative leader who gave his country a century of relative stability, was a ruthless and stolid man, but he confessed to a deathly fear of "the dark night of anarchy." Political democracy, to be effective, must provide an answer to this fear.

8. If it has done little to provide such an answer so far, the explanation lies in history. Formal democracy on the Western model was introduced into Latin America by the ruling elite and has been used by it ever since to buttress its interests. The winning of national independence of the twenty national republics merely replaced one ruling elite, of European "peninsular" origin, by another with more local roots but no less determined to rule. The Mexican Guillermo Prieto saw it fifty years later with the clarity of a poet: "Since Independence, we [i.e., the mestizos] have become the *gachupines* [peninsular Spaniards] of the Indians."

And yet Mexico has been the biggest exception to the general rule, ever since its war of independence. The first two leaders, both priests, wanted to give the political revolution a social content. Hidalgo abol-

ished slavery and the Indian tribute; Morelos worked out a program of giving land to the landless, put into practice only a hundred years later. Other countries can show little to match this. The protest of the majority has, all too often, taken the form of a revolution which set up a dictatorship. The regimes of Peron and Castro cannot be understood without bearing this in mind.

9. The last few years introduced a number of new factors into the Latin American situation. It is still too early to say how they will affect the fate of political democracy, but there is no doubt that they are offering it a new chance. Here are some of them: new means of communication which reduce the effective distances; political parties and ideologies which begin to replace allegiances to personalities; a more vital social conscience among some members of the elite; the majority's new will to win a place in the sun here and now; and technological revolutions which make possible economic revolutions.

Much will depend on the new middle class of Latin America, which has been the most conscious advocate of these changes and their chief, if not only, beneficiary so far. The United States is now backing it as the most reliable Latin American ally. The Communists alternately woo this new middle class and attack it in the name of the masses, whose championship they claim.

The new middle class has not yet fully shown its hand as far as political democracy is concerned. On the one hand, it has produced and partly backed the new leaders who are determined at least to make it a reality; on the other, there are many indications that it wants to follow the course of previous Latin American elites and keep itself in power.

But will the new middle class be able to do so? If it can, political democracy in Latin America will remain in its present exceedingly fragile state. But if the middle class is willing to make democracy a working political tool of the majority, it must also make up its mind to accept two fundamental changes.

First is the realization that political democracy cannot be imposed from above; it must be willingly accepted from below. It is not enough to provide a clean ballot; it is necessary also to *persuade*—again the key word—the mass of the voters that ballots are better than bullets. This is an enormous but by no means hopeless task. We who believe in political democracy may well be cheered by the ending of *Martin Fierro*: the hero voluntarily submits to the law because he finally realizes that, for all its injustices, it satisfies man more deeply than lawlessness.

The second task is equally enormous. Political democracy must develop new tools and techniques, adapted to the local conditions and the mentality of primitive man, to make the will of the majority prevail and to abolish its recurring need of dictators. Also, to preserve in politics the great potentialities that slumber within primitive man and to give him constructive release. One example is worth recalling here: Felipe Carrillo Puerto, a mestizo, learned Maya to organize the peons of Yuca-

tan. He started by reading to them, in their own language, the article of the Mexican constitution which abolished slavery.

10. Finally, another reference to a wider context. Latin America is no longer living in isolation from the rest of the world, neither is it any longer a kind of American "backyard" in which the United States exercises, in Secretary Olney's phrase, "a practical sovereignty." It has become the object of political rivalry between two rival power blocs.

So much is obvious; or should be. But other things are not so obvious. The present world set-up has been imposed after a victorious war for the preservation of democracy. It has, indeed, preserved democracy from extinction but only by confining its effective exercise to certain countries and to certain aspects of international life. Gunnar Myrdal has established an important distinction between internal democracy, applied within any country, and external democracy, applied to relations among countries. Viewed in the light of this distinction, the system of great powers is a clear contradiction of external democracy. It gives a small minority of mankind certain rights and privileges denied to the majority. The minority may, according to international standards now current, plunge mankind into atomic war or poison its future generations by radiation, without even consulting the majority.

Latin America forms part of that majority of mankind which is excluded from decision-making. It may well be said that this is the least of its troubles, but that would be taking a very short-sighted view. Latin America is tired of being the eternal "Continent of the Future," a phrase that has become a bitter joke there. Latin Americans no longer want to be the passive objects of history; they want to become its active subjects. This frustration finds an outlet in the kind of thinking exemplified by former President Kubitschek's Brazilian election slogan: "Fifty Years of Progress in Five Years."

The fate of internal political democracy in Latin America is intimately linked with its quest for external democracy. Latin America is unlikely to go whole-heartedly democratic unless it is lifted from its present under-privileged position vis-a-vis the better developed and more powerful countries of the world. Moreover, the rule of the local elites has always been supported by—and exercised for the benefit of—powerful foreign interests: Spanish, Portuguese, British, French, American, and now, in Cuba, Russian.

External democracy is, by definition, opposed to imperial and colonial relations, even if the more powerful partner is as democratic as he possibly could be. It is a two-way process possible only on the basis of "Free with free; equal with equal," the motto of the Polish Legion which fought under Napoleon. This is the kind of relationship that the best of Latin Americans want to establish with the United States, for mutual benefit. But they can hardly become masters in their own house except as part of a new world-wide political set-up in which the present unrestrained rule of the great powers is subjected to the overriding interest of humanity.

Oscar Delgado

REVOLUTION, REFORM, CONSERVATISM:

Three Types of Agrarian Structure

Latin America had a population of 199 million in 1960, according to a United Nations estimate. Of this total, 108 million or 54 per cent live in rural areas, and of these 28½ million are economically active.

All rural dwellers who are economically active have family and social responsibilities, but almost all of them are underemployed and many are victims of seasonal unemployment. Their income is extremely low, and considerable numbers of them live only on the margin of money economy. Generally speaking, they work the soil in a primitive or almost primitive fashion. The average percentage of rural Latin America is around 80; but vast areas have no schools at all and an illiteracy rate of 100 per cent.

Indians form some 15 per cent of Latin America's rural population. The majority of them speak only an Indian language, though some of them are bilingual. The Indian policy of Latin American governments generally aims to keep them isolated from the white peasantry of their countries. Moreover, Indian communities benefit very little from government aid or not at all, and it is an open secret that such programs have been a complete failure because of inadequate funds and lack of any real interest on the part of the governments concerned.

In spite of these obstacles, some Indians have established contact with the white peasants. These have adopted the cultural patterns of that peasantry. Wherever such cultural contacts take place, the Indians suffer from exploitation not only by the white bourgeoisie but also by the white and *ladino* (mestizo) peasants.

These 28½ million have to produce food not only for themselves but also directly for their 70½ million dependents and, more indirectly, for the 91 million urban dwellers. Moreover, in terms of the national economy, they have to produce a surplus for economic development. And yet, 63 per cent of them—18 million adult farmers—have no land at all. Some 5½ million have an insufficient amount of land; 1.9 million have enough land, and 100,000—mostly absentee landlords—have too much land.

One out of every 185,000 Latin Americans—or one out of every 100,000 rural Latin Americans—owns over 1,000 hectares.* For 107,955

* A hectare = approx. 2½ acres.

landlords, or 1.5 per cent of all landholders, own 471 hectares, or 65 per cent of all land in private hands.¹ Each of them owns an average of 4,300 hectares; but many have more than 10,000, and some have hundreds of thousands—even millions.

So much for individuals. But properties belonging to several members of a family can be registered under the name of its head. There are Latin American families who own more land than is occupied by a number of sovereign nations. In fact, there are families or groups of interrelated families in the Argentine, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, of which each has more land than several countries put together. This is a situation with no parallel elsewhere. Statistically speaking, Latin America has the highest index of concentrated accumulation of rural property in the world.

Latin America is now beginning to develop, however, slowly. Its indices of urbanization² and industrialization are progressively rising. However, this progress is generally unnoticeable because the population rapidly increases at one of the highest rates of growth in the world. Internal migration to the cities is constant and growing, but it does not absorb the rural population explosion caused by the rising birth rate and the falling death rate. This migration, a product of urbanization and industrialization, makes the rural population decrease relatively, in proportion to urban population; but it does not decrease it absolutely.

It is estimated that the percentage of rural population will fall from 54 to 46 in 1970. However, the rural population as a whole and hence also the number of actual and potential agricultural workers, will actually rise by that date from 108 million to 133 million. . . . There can be no question that the rural—and agricultural—population of Latin America is increasing today in a geometrical progression. Every year, every month and every day there are new mouths to feed and new hands to be provided with work, land, tools, and money. Given an annual rate of increase of 3 per cent, this means about 6 million new mouths and new pair of hands every year in all Latin America, and 3.8 million in the rural sector.

"Parcellation" and Colonization

How can this problem be solved? The answer is simple and can be reduced to four words: Economic and social development.

We can deal here only with one aspect of this urgent problem: The different agrarian policies which can become stimulants or obstacles to the improvement of agricultural production and productivity, and to the white, mestizo, and indigenous rural population which participates—or is unable to participate—in growing crops and raising cattle.

In three countries of Latin America, a political revolution produced an agrarian policy of redistributing the property and tenancy of land: Mexico (1915), Bolivia (1953), and Cuba (1959). In these countries, new ruling groups³ and new ideologies replaced the old and changed the traditional values. The old ruling groups had governed with the sup-

port of traditional ideas, and their rule was tolerated by the masses who lived in utmost ignorance, submission, and political apathy.

In two other countries, conservative governments, representing a bourgeois-landlord-military-clerical coalition, have introduced a land reform: Venezuela (1959) and Colombia (1961). This reform has meant a "parcellation" of cultivated land or a "colonization" of virgin soil.

"Parcellation," as used in this article means:

- a. The acquisition by a government agency of land used for crops or cattle by purchase from its private owners paid in cash and at once and
- b. the subdivision of this land for resale as private property to landless or landpoor peasants by payment of an amount of money equal or similar to that laid out by the government agency on the installment system, with a fixed term and a low interest rate.

Similarly, "colonization" means here the opening or preparation of new agricultural, cattle-raising, or forest land owned by the government or of no definite ownership, and the settlement in it of rural population.

In all the remaining countries of Latin America, there has been no serious program of redistribution or parcellation. The countries which tried colonization in the course of the present century were successful only as regards a few fortunate individuals; for the rest, colonization completely failed to solve their agrarian problem.⁴

Parcellation, as a method of land reform, leaves the large estates practically intact. The concentration of land in a few hands is not affected by it, and it leaves the problems of the rural population unsolved. This is why it is the favorite method of land reform in "rural conservative" countries.

This phrase also requires some explanation. At first sight it seems strange to apply the label of "rural conservative" to seventeen countries which differ so much economically, socially, and politically. They include two countries at the very extremes of economic and social development: Argentina and Haiti. This is also true of political development: They include, on the one hand, the Central American republics dominated by "strong executives" and custodians of foreign interests and, on the other, a country like Uruguay, with its markedly developed democracy. Nor is it easy to include in the same group countries which never had any significant colonization or foreign immigration with others which have intermittently tried out colonization ever since the beginning of the 19th century, though on a small scale in relation to their open spaces and settled population.

Still, it is convenient to group together the countries of recent parcellation (Venezuela and Colombia), those of colonization (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay), and those dominated by large estates (the rest of the seventeen). They have something in common—rural conservatism—which distinguishes them from the countries of revolutionary

land reform, which we may call countries of "agricultural transformation."

A closer look at the three countries where a revolution occurred with a broad popular participation will reveal certain distinctions which will require separate categories.

In Cuba, the large estates and ranches were not divided by the Castro Revolution; they continue in operation by either a government agency or a peasant cooperative. Both in Mexico and in Bolivia, land reform marked a notable social progress, though it was limited to only a part of the rural population. The national economy of these two countries benefited somewhat from the land reform,⁵ but the benefits were limited by an excessive fragmentation of the estates which were distributed. Also, neither country made a sufficient effort to foster government, collective, or cooperative operation of agriculture and cattle-breeding.⁶

We can now classify the Latin American countries as follows:

I. *Agricultural Transformation:*

1. Agrarian revolution (Cuba)
2. Land reform (Mexico and Bolivia)

II. *Rural Conservatism:*

1. Parcellation (Venezuela and Colombia)
2. Colonization (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay)
3. Rural conservatism, in the narrower meaning of that phrase (the remaining countries).

The countries of agricultural transformation have a dynamic agrarian situation: Their agricultural population—or at least a large part of it—has a genuine opportunity to raise its standard of living. The countries of rural conservatism have a static agrarian situation; such an opportunity is limited or non-existent in them. . . .

The reason Cuba falls into a different category from Mexico and Bolivia is that the transformation happened there with surprising efficiency and speed. This is no longer land reform; it must be called an "agrarian revolution." In Mexico and Bolivia, the rhythm of change has been much slower than in Cuba, for all the positive achievements of their land policies. But it has been very fast by comparison with Venezuela and Colombia.

Land Reform Laws

In Mexico today, 47 years after the Land Reform Law was signed, 106 million hectares remain in private hands, and 71 million (76%) belong to private individuals who own more than 1,000 hectares each. In Bolivia, land reform has moved at a faster pace than in Mexico; but even here, 9 years after the law was passed, 28.5 million hectares—87 per cent of all utilized land—are still in the hands of landlords who own more than 1,000 hectares each.⁷

The land reform laws of Cuba, Mexico, and Bolivia stipulate that the former owners of expropriated land be indemnified with long-term

bonds. But, in actual practice, none of these countries has paid the compensation required by the law. The small payment was made in money, not in bonds. How else would it have been possible to redistribute 61 million hectares (52 in Mexico, 5 in Cuba, 4 in Bolivia)?

The laws of Venezuela and Colombia, on the other hand, authorize the expropriation of land, with payment partly in cash and partly in medium-term bonds. Both, however, have actually preferred parcellation.

The Venezuelan government has bought about half a million hectares, at market prices, from landlords who sold their land voluntarily. They actually received payment, almost full and immediate. This land has not been given to the peasants, as happened in Cuba, Mexico, and Bolivia. It was sold to them at cost price, which included the value of improvements and the wages of the officials in charge of the transactions. The peasants pay in annual installments for a medium-term period.

In Cuba, the large estates and ranches were taken from individual owners and national and foreign companies. They were not subdivided, but continue to be operated as wholes by the government or by peasant cooperatives.

In Mexico and Bolivia, on the contrary, they were subdivided into very small farms—an average of 4 hectares of unirrigated lands—handed over to the peasants. But the beneficiaries of the land reform were, in both countries, abandoned to their fate. Because of financial stringency or for other reasons,⁸ they have received hardly any credit, technical assistance and other services needed for efficient farming.

Among the different types of rural conservatism, parcellation deserves special treatment. In most of the literature on the subject, "land reform" actually means parcellation. This is because, for many people, parcellation means an "agrarian transformation," and so they associate what is happening in Venezuela and Colombia with what happened in Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba.

Several Latin American countries are planning to start a parcellation program in 1963. Only they are careful to call it "land reform." (This is also true of Venezuela and Colombia with their "land reform" laws.) The Congresses of two "colonization" countries (Brazil and Chile) and of two "rural conservative" countries (Peru and Ecuador) are now studying several "land reform" projects. If they are approved in the form they were presented,⁹ they will certainly not provide the legal basis for an agrarian transformation, but only for parcellation. And their practical efficiency will depend on the amount of public funds assigned to buy land from private owners.

We stated earlier that parcellation permits preservation of the traditional structure, based on large estates. The case of Venezuela will prove this. That country is now engaged in the most expensive "land reform" ever made in the world, even more expensive than those of Italy and Japan, with their special difficulties.

Venezuela has financial resources unmatched by any Latin American country. Its annual per capita income is, through the revenue derived from petroleum, the highest in Latin America—\$500, as against \$92 in Bolivia, and a general average of \$292. Also, Venezuela has an unusually small number of agriculturally active population—only 705,000, as against 10,300,000 in Brazil and 28,500,000 in all of Latin America. No other Latin American country could afford to invest the equivalent of 750 million dollars in a program devoted exclusively to parcelation and its auxiliary agricultural services.¹⁰

The sum seems disproportionately high when compared with the cost of land reform in Japan and Italy. Japan spent 390 million dollars to distribute 2 million hectares among 4 million beneficiaries. Italy spent only 120 million to give to over half a million beneficiaries 750,000 hectares of redistributed land and 28½ million hectares of improved and colonized land.¹¹

The Venezuelan Four-Year program proposes to settle 200,000 peasants on the parcelled land; but in its first three years (1960–1962) only 50,000—a quarter of the number planned—have been actually settled.¹² This means 7 per cent of the active agricultural population, as opposed to 41 per cent in Mexico and 32 per cent in Cuba. The Venezuelan beneficiaries occupy 1.5 million hectares of land: One-third taken from public lands (colonization); one third bought by the government from private owners (parcelation); and one third confiscated from the friends of the deposed dictator Perez Jimenez who had obtained it illegally when in power.

Venezuela has 29.6 million hectares of land used to raise crops and breed cattle. Before parcelation was started, 22 million hectares were occupied by large estates, over 1,000 hectares.¹³ Three years later, when the four-year plan is coming to its close, this figure has fallen to only 21.5 million.

Another difference between parcelation and agrarian transformation is that the latter limits the amount of land a person may legally own, and the former doesn't. Thus, in Cuba the limit, for a private person or a corporation, is 403 hectares; in Mexico, 100 hectares of irrigated and 200 of unirrigated land; in Bolivia, the limit varies according to the geographical zone.¹⁴ No other country has such restrictions.

The amount of money Venezuela spent on its "land reform" would seem fabulous if we didn't compare it with the cost of agrarian transformation, truly insignificant by comparison: 133,000 dollars in Bolivia for 4 million hectares;¹⁵ 14.5 million dollars in Mexico for 52 million hectares;¹⁶ and 8.9 million dollars in Cuba for 5 million hectares.¹⁷ (In all three cases, the land was expropriated.)

In Colombia, the government assigns annually, from 1962, 12 million dollars for "land reform," some 3 per cent of the national budget. (Venezuela makes an annual assignment of 187.5 million dollars; the Peruvian draft law foresees one of 11.5 million dollars or about 3 per cent of the budget.) In the year since the Colombian law was passed

(November 1961), the Colombian Institute of Land Reform has so far parcelled out only 15 thousand hectares, which were handed over to 750 persons. The two-year plan of the Colombian Ministry of Agriculture for 1962-3 proposes an expenditure of 18 million dollars for the purchase of land to be distributed to tenant farmers and sharecroppers.

Colombia and Peru have an active agricultural population of 2,023,000 and 1,546,000 respectively, i.e. roughly three times and twice that of Venezuela. Colombia has 27.7 million hectares of agricultural land. Of this, 7.4 million is owned by landlords with over 1,000 hectares each.¹⁸

Political and Judicial Restraints

Some "colonization" and "rural conservative" countries are preparing a parcellation for 1963. In Brazil and Chile there is a hope, still vague and distant, that parcellation may be transcended and a genuine land reform achieved. This hope is based on changes in the composition of their Congresses (Brazil will have elections in October 1962) and on the election of a new president of Chile.

As things are now, Brazil and Chile cannot be expected to go beyond a modest parcellation. Any serious land reform there is blocked by juridical considerations—always the most conservative and change-resisting in Latin America. The constitutions of these two countries bar any expropriations without a cash payment in advance for the property to be expropriated, and at market prices. Large parts of Brazilian and Chilean public opinion believe that such constitutional provisions make land reform impossible and they are pushing for constitutional amendments which would permit a deferred payment of the indemnification. In the present pre-election campaigns they are concentrating upon obtaining more representative Congresses so as to neutralize—to say the least—parliamentary domination by big land owners and their allies.

It is worth recalling that, in the last 10 years, 208 projects of land reform laws or relevant legislation have been presented to the Brazilian Congress.¹⁹ Not one of them was able to pursue its normal course through the commissions appointed to "study" them. None of these laws were actually rejected; they were simply buried in the commissions.

Much the same thing happened in Peru and Ecuador. And yet a conference of agricultural economists agreed that "the majority of the tenancy contracts now prevalent in Latin America are archaic, unequal, rigid and unsuitable for the full utilization of human and natural resources."²⁰

Generally speaking, in the countries of agrarian conservatism, the big landowners have exercised a powerful political and economic influence ever since Independence. Conditions vary from country to country;²¹ but, except in one or two cases, the landed interests have been completely successful in blocking any structural change.²²

Their resistance is certainly not without a logic of its own. An agrarian transformation may well make the landlords feel "lost." Their

lands would be confiscated outright or they would receive an indemnity which they consider too small for investment in business. Moreover, they would not receive it in cash but in long-term bonds. They would lose their political power and their social status, which they derive from the ownership of land. Not only would they lose their prestige, but they would fall into the depths of unpopularity and be blamed by society as a whole for having prolonged a fundamentally unjust situation. From the point of view of defending their interests, the resistance of landlords to the land reform is perfectly logical, even if it is irrational in the present historical situation.

But whether they resist or not, the landlords are doomed to lose the fight for the retention of their long-held privileges.²³ Since society asked them to give up their lands, they have won many skirmishes and even some technical battles. But they are losing strategically and the fortress of their privileges—inherited rather than acquired—is beginning to succumb.

The more intelligent among the landlords will adapt themselves to the new situation. They will try to forget a lost world which had seemed ideal to them but which was too unjust to resist the passage of time. That ideal world, in which they had been the center of attention and power, is now colliding with industrial civilization.

The landlords will find a refuge in the big cities (or will remain in them if they are absentee owners). They will be shareholders in industrial, commercial, and service enterprises. Some of them will stick to their old values, and would rather become the victims of the hurricane of social transformation than give up an inch of their land. This type of landlord will die with his boots on and with his gun cocked.

United States Policy

Meanwhile, the United States government insists that the Latin American countries carry out a land reform. But it has not, so far, clearly stated what kind of land reform it wants. Its pronouncements are marked by vagueness, diversity, and even contradiction.

President Kennedy himself has said in a speech that there exists in the rural areas of Latin America "an immediate necessity of a better distribution of wealth and income and of a broader participation in the process of development"—and that "the unequal distribution of land is one of the gravest social problems in many Latin American countries. . . . It is evident that, when the ownership of land is so concentrated, the efforts to increase agricultural productivity will benefit only a very small percentage of the population." To help solve these difficulties, the President added, the Bank for International Development (BID) has allotted 309 million dollars for *colonization* and improved *utilization* of the soil.²⁴ (Emphasis ours.)

The nations of Latin America, gathered under the leadership of the United States and with the promise of its aid, have signed two documents which refer to the land question.

The Bogota Act of September 12, 1960, mentions "the improvement of rural life and use of the soil" and "the revision of legal systems with regard to the holding of land with the view of insuring a broader and juster distribution." The Charter of Punta del Este of August 17, 1961, outlines a program for the decade of 1961-70. One of its aims is "to prompt, within the particular conditions of each country, programs of integral land reform oriented towards the effective transformation of structures and of unjust systems of tenancy and exploitation of land wherever it is required and with a view of replacing the regime of *latifundia* and *minifundia* by a just system of property."

The Sub-Committee on Inter-American Economic Relationships of the United States Congress, headed by Senator Sparkman, has recently published an extensive volume, *Economic Policies and Programs in South America, 1962*, which formulates its basic criteria of land reform. A careful reading of it will justify our reservations on the efficacy of the Alliance for Progress as an instrument of agrarian transformation. The key passages are:

The concept of agrarian reforms. It seems to us that an official clarification of the meaning and objectives of "agrarian reform" in the context of the Alliance for Progress, especially the role of U.S. government as a participant is not only in order but imperative. . . . Land reform is not exclusively a tenure problem but a problem of improved farming practices generally (rural education, research, extension services, credit institutions) . . . Land reform would include real estate tax reform. . . . The objective of land tenure changes is not to be punitively directed against large landholdings or absentee landowners as such; on the contrary, existing property rights under law are to be respected. The programming and administration of agrarian reform is, and must remain, an internal matter for each of the several nations. Certainly the United States is not pressing for any preconceived patterns of land tenure or agrarian reform; least of all can it undertake unilaterally to assure individual croppers of its support of ultimate landownership, no matter how seemingly meritorious cases may be. . . . As a first step in land reform and possible redistribution, the respective participating countries should first look to public lands and lands not presently under appropriation. To this end (1) an accurate survey of acreage and useability of the public domain, (2) an appropriate adaptation of the U.S. provisions for land grants in aid of schools and colleges dating back to 1859, and (3) the so-called homestead acts dating from back to 1861 are recommended for consideration.²⁵ [And:]

[The Charter of Punta del Este] recognizes that conditions and needs will vary from country to country. Largely as the result of events in Castro Cuba, the specter of wide-spread and uncompensated expropriation has unfortunately been read into the Alliance program and one of the conditions of U.S. aid. . . . To what extent are we committing ourselves in such internal matters as land tenure reform? In view of the sorry history of international commodity stabilization agreements, to

offer another example, we had best be quite wary that the United States is not put in position of going along at the risk of being charged with their possible if not probable failure.²⁶

These documents need no comment; they speak for themselves. It is enough to say that if the Alliance for Progress is to be guided by such concepts, its failure is practically certain. It will be even more certain unless the Alliance quickly acquires what it presently lacks—a program of specific measures to deal with controversial issues, to be formulated, in the first place, by the American government. The only such measure formulated so far is the fixing of restrictive limits by the various governments with regard to land reform. This being so, it is not difficult to view the Alliance, paradoxically, as a subtle form of resistance to social and cultural change—including a true land reform.

The Charter of Punta del Este refers to the “effective transformation of structures and of unjust systems of tenancy and exploitation of land.” It seems to do it on the naïve assumption that the neo-traditional oligarchies might be moved by an instinct which Durkheim called “altruist suicide.”

Alternative Policies

Some of these oligarchies seem to have found a magic formula which would permit them to maintain the existing agricultural structure while proclaiming that they had transformed it. The formula is “parcellation,” i.e., the subdivision of large properties and the fostering of homesteads. . . . What this formula means in practice, however, is the stimulation of the *minifundio* in a disguised and uneconomic form, within the framework of a subsistence rather than market-oriented agriculture. The rural population will remain poor, and the backward tenancy systems and the exploitation of agricultural labor will continue. The levels of rural income and buying power will not stimulate savings and consumption, so that they will not benefit industrialization. There will be, in fact, no social or political change.

As the president of the University of California, Clark Kerr, puts it: “the successful perpetuation of the family homestead . . . serves to maintain contact with the old society.”²⁷ In other words, the old elites will continue in power at the expense of representative democracy and the participation of the mass of the population in national life. Other investigators also point out this danger.²⁸

There exist alternative policies to parcellation, namely cooperative and/or communal exploitation of land. A number of Latin American experts favor cooperatism on a large scale²⁹ while the American experts are divided.³⁰ But the official U. S. policy, as embodied in the Alliance for Progress, does not take these alternatives into consideration.

Of the Latin American countries themselves, the laws of Venezuela and Colombia indulge in some rhetoric in favor of cooperatives, but the actual policies of these countries have restrained rather than favored the growth of different types of cooperatives. In Mexico and Bolivia, official

support of cooperatives has considerably fallen off as their governments gradually veered away from revolutionary agrarianism.³¹

To sum up: The Alliance for Progress will make only an insignificant contribution to Latin American industrialization and land reform so long as it lacks effective means of coercion and a clear formulation of the means required to realize its objectives. It offers Latin American countries money—in amounts insufficient for the needs of their development—but does nothing to resolve the grave problem of the “terms of trade” which is an essential precondition of any increase in the rates of capital formation.

Politically speaking, the Alliance stimulates an irrational and unconditional adherence of Latin American governments to the foreign policy of the United States without any serious discussion on an international level. It gives the United States 19 unconditionally favorable votes at the United Nations. It favors the Western bloc in the Cold War and prevents Latin American countries from becoming neutralist.

All this is, however, achieved upon a tacit condition, namely that of United States support for the established political and economic oligarchies of the various Latin American countries. Their power would be seriously jeopardized if that support were to be withdrawn. This means a limitation on the supposed American pressure in favor of replacing these oligarchies by political, agrarian, industrial and financial democracy.

Translated by I. A. LANGNAS

Notes

¹ Oscar Delgado, *Estructura y Reforma Agraria en Latino-america*, Bogota, Sociedad Economica de Amigos del Pais, 1960; Thomas F. Carroll, *The Land Reform Issue in Latin America*, pp. 161–201 in Albert O. Hirschmann, ed., *Latin American Issues*, New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961; T. Pompeu Accioly Borges, *A Reforma Agraria na America Latina*, in *Desenvolvimento e Conjuntura*. Rio. V. 12:51–68; VI, I: 55–83, 1962; Rene Dumont, *Terres Vivantes*, Paris, Plon, 1961, pp. 1–123.

² Philip N. Hauser, ed., *Urbanization in Latin America*, Paris, UNESCO, 1961; Pedro C. M. Teichert, *Economic Policy, Revolution and Industrialization in Latin America*, University of Mississippi, 1959; Howard S. Ellis, with Henry C. Wallich, eds., *El Desarrollo Economico y America Latina, Mexico*, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1960.

³ Gino Germani believes that the dissolution of the old-style army of the *ancien regime*, generally a bulwark of rural conservatism, is a necessary condition of agrarian transformation: “It may

be a coincidence but it is certainly very significant that no military regime ever seriously modified the concentration of landed property and that the only countries which managed to achieve a true land reform dissolved their army and either substituted for it a workers’ militia (Cuba and Bolivia) or a new army (Mexico).” Germani, *La Democratie Representative et les Classes Populaires en Amerique Latine* in *Sociologie du Travail*, Paris, October–December, 1961.

⁴ “It is disillusioning, says the FAO, that the effective progress has been so scanty and inadequate so as to create the impression that the distribution and colonization of land, even if carried out with efficiency, benefit only a very limited number of people and affect only a small fraction of the idle land and underdeveloped resources of these countries. . . . Considering that in most of them the population increases at a rate of 2.5 to 3% and that, generally speaking, a large part of the families own no land, it is obvious the programs now in operation are far from providing a solution.” Thom-

as F. Carroll, ed., *La Creacion de Nuevas Unidades Agricolas*, Report of the Second Latin American Seminar on Problems of the Land, Santiago, FAO, 1961, pp. 15-16 and 19.

⁵ Edmundo Flores, *Tratado de Economia Agricola*, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1961; Giuseppe Barbero, *Realizaciones y Problemas de la Reforma Agraria en Bolivia*, in *El Trimestre Economico*, Mexico, 112; 612-650, 1961.

⁶ "It is necessary to create a firmer foundation for collective organization—here lies, one might say without exaggeration, the salvation of the *ejido*." R. Fernandez y Fernandez and Ricardo Acosta, *Politica Agricola: Ensayo sobre Normas para Mexico*, Mexico. Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1961. A FAO document says: "Mexico, which carried out its land reform years ago, faces today's new problems which require new kinds of action." Carroll, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 16. The Mexican economist Jesus Silva Herzog asks for "a reform of the Mexican land reform"; i.e., the abrogation during the Aleman administration, which has acted as a brake. *El Agrarismo Mexicano y la Reforma Agraria*, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1959. Hernandez y Hernandez writes: "The numerical predominance of small peasant property, possession and usufruct will maintain the foundation of the present agrarian regime, with its exploitation of poor and medium peasants by the local merchants and bosses. The system of small-scale production for the market will not free the peasant masses from misery and oppression. . . . The preconditions of total collectivization are: integration of the trading set-up which now favors the big operators; taking over of basic industries by the government; growth of agricultural cooperation; creation of big state farms; the struggle to hand all the land to the *peasants*." Jesus Silva Herzog, *El Movimiento Campesino*, in *Mexico: Cincuenta Anos de Revolucion* Vol. II, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1961, pp. 235, 238-9.

On the other hand, the XI International Conference of Agricultural Economists held at Cuehavaca in 1961 criticized the land reform in Bolivia "because insufficient attention has been paid to the transformation of Indian communities into market-oriented cooperative soci-

eties." *Report on Tenant Farming*, p. 4. Giuseppe Barbero says that Bolivia today "is characterized by the absence of the large estate but is dominated by a primitive type of agriculture though she has large unexploited natural resources." *Op. cit.*, p. 650.

⁷ Pan-American Union, *La Estructura Agropecuaria de las Naciones Americanas*, Washington, 1960 and *America en Cifras*: 1960, nr. 2, 1961; *Bolivia*, in FAO, *Documentacion del II Seminario de la FAO sobre Problemas de la Tierra*, Montevideo 1959, Doc. IP-2; CEPAL, *Actividad Reciente en Materia de Reforma Agraria en America Latina*, pp. 123-57 in *Estudio Economico de America Latina 1959*, Santiago, CEPAL E/CN. 12/541, 1960.

⁸ "The lack of sufficient and timely credit and the bad faith of the officials in charge made the *ejidatarios* fall once more into the hands of unscrupulous operators and moneylenders. . . . Another reason is the small operating capital of the Banco Nacional del Credito Ejidal—only 72 million dollars per annum, while the actual credit needs are estimated at 400 million." Victor Manzanilla Schaffer, *La Reforma Agraria*, in Mexico: 50 Anos de la Revolucion, Vol. III, pp. 254-5. See also the study by Charles Erasmus of the important cotton area of the Yaqui Valley, with its ample documentation of corruption in official agencies in charge of agricultural credit. *Then Land Reform (in Northeastern Mexico) in Man Takes Control*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1961, pp. 209-37.

⁹ Jorge Alessandri, *Proyecto de Ley sobre Expropiaciones Agricolas* and *Mensaje Presidencial* in *Boletin de la Camara de Disputados*, Santiago, nr. 165, 1962. In accordance with this project, all expropriations have to be paid for in cash and in advance except "abandoned or notoriously ill-worked estates" when the compensation can be paid on installments and according to the market value, as follows: down payment of no less than 20% . . . and the rest in equal six-monthly installments, in cash, for a maximum total of 10 years and with adequate interest." According to a cable just received from Santiago, the Chilean Congress has passed this draft, which is now a law. Chile thus joins Venezuela and Colombia as another country which accepts "parcellation."

Here, too, this false kind of land reform is bound to fail.

On Ecuador, see R. Fernandez y Fernandez, *Reforma Agraria en el Ecuador*, in *El Trimestre Economico*, Mexico, 112, 569-94, and Ecuador, Junta Nacional de Planificacion y Coordinacion Economica, *Anteproyecto de una Ley Agraria*.

On Peru, *La Reforma Agraria en el Peru, Exposicion de Motivos y Proyecto de Ley*, Lima, Comision para la Reforma Agraria y la Vivienda, 1960.

¹⁰ Romulo Betancourt, *Discurso de Carabobo*, in *Reforma Agraria Integral en Venezuela*, Mexico, no date. Also, *Reforma Agraria*, 6 vols., Caracas, Ministerio de Agricultura y Cria, 1959.

¹¹ On Japan, Pan-American Union, *Report on the Agrarian Reform Program of Certain Countries*, Washington, 1960, p. 5.

On Italy, Giuseppe Barbero, *La Reforma Agraria Italiana*, in *Boletin de Estudios Especiales*, Mexico, XVII, 202, 486-90, 1960.

¹² The Instituto Agrario Nacional, in a Statement to the Associated Press, July 1, 1962.

The reports of governments which speed up the re-distribution of land are often distorted by exaggerating the area of the land and the number of beneficiaries. This happened in Cuba as well as in Venezuela. For the sake of curiosity we collected and examined the reports of various officials and commissions in charge of these programs. We found serious contradictions between them. . . . President Betancourt, in his last Message to Congress, said that in three years—December, 1958 to December, 1961—1.3 million hectares were granted to 42,000 beneficiaries. However, the National Peasant Confederation corrected these figures to 15,000 beneficiaries who received official title to the land and 10,000 peasants settled on land without official title in the period under review. It seems advisable not to trust official data too much.

Similarly, in Bolivia, one official report says that 4.2 million hectares were given to 47,585 beneficiaries in 1955-1960. But another such report gives 1.5 million hectares and 63,414 beneficiaries, and a third—1,065,000 hectares and 32,608 beneficiaries. All three reports are official and refer to the same period.

¹³ Carroll, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

¹⁴ Bolivia, Decreto-Ley de Agosto 2, 1953; Cuba, Decreto-Ley de Mayo 17, 1959; Mexico,Codigo Agrario, Diciembre 31, 1942, art. 104.

¹⁵ The budget for 1959; expenditure for assignment of 270,000 hectares, in Joao Gonsalves de Souza and Manuel Diegues Junior, *Resumen de las Respuestas al Cuestionario Enviado a los Paises Latinoamericanos*, Washington, Pan-American Union, p. 90. However, the government bonds to be used for compensation have not been issued to date, in spite of demands and reminders. Cf. Barbero, *op. cit.*, p. 648.

¹⁶ Edmundo Flores, *op. cit.*, pp. 335-44. From 1915 to 1962, the Mexican government has paid only 14.5 million dollars in indemnification. Two million dollars were paid to 170 Mexican ex-owners in bonds which were later cashed by the government at a depressed market value of 5 to 16% of the nominal. From 1938 to 1955, 12.5 million dollars were paid to American ex-owners for lands expropriated in 1927-1940.

¹⁷ Cuba, Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria, Report of the Director, Antonio Nunez Jimenez, in *Bohemia*, La Havana, May 28, 1961.

¹⁸ Carlos Lleras Restrepo and others, *Tierra*, Bogota, Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1962. Alberto Aguilera Camacho, *Derecho Agrario Colombiano*, Bogota, Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1962; Hernan Toro Agudelo, Minister of Agriculture, *Plan Bienal para la Reforma Agraria*, in *El Tiempo*, June 3, 1962.

For Peru, see note 9.

¹⁹ T. Pompeu Accioly Borges, in a private communication. References to 41 projects in Universidade do Brasil, Instituto de Ciencias Sociais, *Bibliografia sobre Reforma Agraria*, Rio, 1962, pp. 4-7.

²⁰ XIth Conference of Agriculture Economists, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

²¹ On the political power of landlords see Merle Kling, *Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America* and John H. Kautsky, *An Essay on the Politics of Development*, both in John H. Kautsky, ed., *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism*, New York, John Wiley, 1962; C. Wright Mills, *Listen, Yankee!* and *The Marxists*, New York, Dell, 1962. An

ECOSOC report issued in November 1961, says on p. 24: "The necessity of a land reform in Latin America and the Middle East has been accepted on the international plane, but little has been achieved on the national scale. In actual practice, the national development programs have tended to concentrate on the non-agricultural sectors of the economy, where it is easier to achieve visible progress and where the resistance of interests opposed to progress and reform is less entrenched."

²² "The land reform progressed little against a decided resistance by the landlords. A partial success was registered only by a violent social cataclysm, as in Mexico and Bolivia. . . . The forms in which the *ancien regime* accommodated itself to the new order have varied greatly. The strongest resistance came from the big landlords. Though their political control had disappeared, their economic power had been destroyed and their social monopoly broken, they successfully resisted land reform everywhere except in Mexico and Bolivia." Edwin Lieuwen, *Armas y Política en América Latina*, Buenos Aires, Sur, 1960, pp. 73 and 79.

²³ Cf. A. J. Toynbee, *The Present Revolution in Latin America*, lecture given at the University of Puerto Rico in February, 1962: "There exists in Latin America an oligarchy of landlords, a dominant minority surely doomed to disappearance, but dying with difficulty and refusing to die before it puts its mark on the 'new rich' of industry and commerce. . . . The oligarchs are now fighting from their last bastions a battle which they are losing." (Retranslated from Spanish text.)

²⁴ John F. Kennedy, Message to the Congress of the United States on Latin America, March 14, 1961.

²⁵ Congress of the United States, *Economic Policies in South America* (Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationship),

Washington, Government Printing Office, 1962, pp. 24-25.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

²⁷ Clark Kerr, *Changing Social Structures*, pp. 348-59 in W. E. Moore and A. S. Feldman, ed., *Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas*, New York, Social Science Research Council, 1960, p. 354.

²⁸ The economist John F. Timmins writes: "The Homestead Acts gave millions of acres to the settlers; but, only a few years later, almost a third part of that land had fallen into the hands of speculators and absentee landowners who rented it to the farmers. Our error lay in not taking complementary measures to assure to the farmers the permanent ownership of their land." *Tenencia y uso de la Tierra en América Latina*, in Selected Studies of the Latin American Seminar on Land Problems, Campinas, Brasil, 1953, published in *Problemas Agrícolas e Industriales de México*, Vol. VI, No. 1, January-March, 1954, p. 254.

²⁹ For example, the Mexican economist Victor L. Urquidí: "It is very probable that, unless a new effort, combined with cooperative or collective forms of agricultural production, is made, economic development will not receive from agriculture all the contribution it requires." *Viabilidad Económica de América Latina*, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1962, p. 87.

³⁰ Among the American officials and Congressmen who favor cooperatives are Chester Bowles, Hubert Humphrey and Wayne Morse.

³¹ Cf. Giuseppe Barbero, *op. cit.*; Fernando Chaves, *Las Cooperativas, Elemento de Cambio Social*, in *Américas*, Washington, 13, 9:7-11; Rosendo Rojas Coria, *Introducción al estudio del cooperativismo*, México, Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1961.

Bernard Rosenberg

THE ARGENTINE TRAGEDY

Hunger, illiteracy, unemployment, an exploding population, race conflict, strife between the oppressive oligarchy and the miserable masses, with no middle class to stabilize a backward economy: are these the familiar problems of all Latin America? Then, a powerful case must be made for Argentine exceptionalism.

Argentines are perhaps the best-fed people on earth; their per capita consumption of food is higher than ours. The national complaint is liver trouble, a disorder that stems from absorbing too much protein, not too much alcohol. An abstemious person, the Argentine does not need to quiet his hunger pangs like so many Chileans who buy a quart of caña for less than a quart of milk. There is a Northern pocket of hunger among sugar workers around Salta and Tucumán. This condition is bad enough but no more typical than the substandard diet of distressed coal miners in West Virginia.

Argentina is a big country, the eighth largest on this globe—with a population numbering 20,000,000, of whom more than a fourth live in Greater Buenos Aires. Argentines do not suffer from lack of *lebensraum*. For some time they have been depopulating the countryside, flocking to and creating big cities. Rosario and Córdoba, each with over a million inhabitants, are only the most conspicuous cases. Argentina, still short of the “take-off” to industrialism, still dependent upon the export of meat and wheat, ranks very high (not far from Britain) in urbanization. The cities get crowded, although they continue to have an amplitude, beauty and spaciousness that can only amaze the North American. Blight appears; the *villa miséria* is a reality in Buenos Aires, but insignificant by comparison with New York or Caracas, forty per cent slum and spreading fast.

I did a little sociological research last year in the Isla Maciel, a wretched slum joined to the capital city. There one found a large swarm of families recently arrived from the hinterlands, occupying tiny parcels of land illegally but by sufferance of the state, living in huts with dirt floors, little water and no electricity. Most of the men I met were *stevedores* who earned eighty-five pesos a day (when the dollar was worth 82 pesos), but being subject to the daily shape-up, they did not work regularly. Their wives most often hired out as part-time domestics.

In this “community” there were few illiterates. Children went to school, motivated by their parents to master at least the skills of read-

ing and writing without which they knew there was no decent occupational future. For the country at large, literacy stands at about 90 per cent. In this most depressed environment, I found men who on an average day bought and read three newspapers, first *Democracia*, full of union news but popular mainly for its Peronist slant, then most likely, *El Mundo*, *La Nación*, or *La Prensa*, all eminently respectable with full, redundant translations from the UPI. I dare say the Argentine worker is at least as well, or as badly, informed as his U.S. counterpart. Women soak up stories from the *cine novelas* they buy and the soap operas they hear all day long. I found a radio but no electric light in every hut I visited, even one communal, centrally located television set. No one explained how the power was tapped in from a line outside the Isla. The mass media have left their mark.

The Argentine people are steadily employed, if poorly remunerated, well-fed and literate in part because they do not feel any great population pressure. Their growth rate is comparable to our own. Having exterminated most of the indigenous peoples long ago, the Argentines are overwhelmingly European; *Negros*, *Mestizos* and *Indios* together compose less than three per cent of the total. More than half are of Italian extraction. The culture, with its very special flavor, is Italo-Spanish rather than Indo-Spanish. "Race" signifies less in Argentina than in any other American republic, North or South.

The polarization of rich and poor is taken for granted in any conventional picture of Latin American society. Superficial observers exude optimism whenever they note an increase in the middle class anywhere. That it might de-stabilize as much as, or more than, it stabilizes has not yet occurred to them.

Argentina has a very substantial middle class. If we use white collar work, including entrepreneurs, professionals, functionaries, clerks, military officers and teachers, then by occupation more than fifty per cent of all Argentines are middle class. They are heavily concentrated in the Federal bureaucracy. To see how heavily, you need only know that in Argentina there are 1,800,000 *empleados públicos*. Nearly one-fifth of the whole population is made up of civil servants! This, on the principle that wherever you need one man there are fifty, and in those rare instances when you need fifty, there is one. The swollen bureaucracy is typical of Latin America, as it is of India and other emerging nations; we have our bureaucracy because of our development and they have theirs because of their underdevelopment. In underdeveloped areas like Argentina, bureaucracy will continue to flourish as long as it is necessary to reduce discontent among the educated by supplying them with jobs.

The Argentine situation should teach us—as if France did not!—that full bellies, universal literacy, racial harmony, urbanization and the existence of a large middle class do not necessarily produce stability, let alone the good life. This message ought to be conveyed urgently to those peoples who are, hopefully, on their way to the Argentine level. We

wish them godspeed—and warn them, from bitter experience, that there are no panaceas.

"Dynamic" Stagnation

Lincoln Steffens returned from Russia after the revolution and exclaimed, "I have seen the future, and it works." The Western visitor in an economically underdeveloped area is obliged to say, "I have seen the future, at home, and it doesn't work very well." Beware. Avoid our mistakes. Do not share the illusions that held us in thrall. Why go through the same agony when even we now know better? And this is roughly what Argentine intellectuals should be saying to their neighbors.

Instead they subscribe almost without exception to the new world religion of economic development. Over a sustained period, mingling mainly with academic men, I was unable to locate the famous *pensadores*, a vanishing breed of literary intellectuals committed to spiritual values which make them antipathetic to Uncle Sam. The antipathy persists; *pensadores* do not. No influential writer in Latin America any longer denies that his continent needs rapid technological innovation. Differences arise only on the question of means; the ends are given.

For all its uniqueness, Argentina is underdeveloped, or rather, it got to be underdeveloped. It did not used to be so. Stagnation did the trick: *dynamic* stagnation, a process by which this country on par with Australia and Canada until the Second World stood still, and thereby fell hopelessly behind. The analogy with Australia and Canada is limited but instructive. We have to do in all three cases with cattle-breeding and agricultural economies, large land masses sparsely populated by homogeneous Europeans who have long since subdued the natives. The Commonwealth countries are booming, while Argentina cannot seem to budge. Its citizens are dazed and above all, resentful. Their backwardness fills them with rage. To them it represents a relatively new state of affairs.

This is a peculiar kind of underdevelopment and we had better not confuse it with other kinds. Here income statistics are especially misleading. The economists' favorite yardstick cannot tell us the difference between a low income people in Africa and a low income people, otherwise entirely distinct, in South America. Argentina's underdevelopment is all her own.

So is the Argentine personality, an enigma harder to penetrate than most. The national character has puzzled and fascinated a host of scholars and essayists, especially those most given to brilliant introspection in the Great Days—more or less from 1890 to 1930. When immigrants poured into Argentina and the proportion of foreign-born was higher in Buenos Aires than in New York, as material well-being and cultural ascendancy reached their all-time high, impressive thinkers like José Ingenieros and Alejandro Korn sought to understand Argentina. One benefits enormously from a close reading of their work—as well as that of a half dozen others, early and recent—and then most cautiously attempts an analysis

of his own. The mystery remains, but its contours may be somewhat clearer.

A few characteristics are immediately apparent to the outsider. He cannot help being aware of the widespread resentment, a symptomatic cry of frustration, heard on every hand. Soon it will come to him that this quality is wedded to something as pervasive and classless as resentment, namely, ambivalence. No doubt everyone suffers from a certain amount of ambivalence; every system, like every human being, has its share of internal contradictions. Argentines have more than their share.

Talk to Argentine workers and they will express their preference for living in the United States "where workers are so much better off"; the well-to-do identify with Europe, dreaming of, or actually dividing their time among Rome, London, and Paris. A higher standard of living attracts the underprivileged. The privileged, who already have their gadgets, look to Europe for high culture. Taken at their word, these people, if they only could, would all leave their motherland. They would and they wouldn't. For Argentines are also intensely nationalistic. They think so well of themselves—even as they disparage all their works—that in Brazil and Chile, in Paraguay and Uruguay, they are viewed as arrogant and overbearing. They absorb large amounts of literary trash from abroad—from Vicki Baum to Herman Wouk, reading any international best seller that deserves oblivion—while ignoring, when they are not exalting, their own much more gifted writers. They will tell you, with some justification, that Argentine woollens are the best in the world—on their way to purchase shoddy goods imported from the States costing twice as much as their own. This is a people of at least two minds about everything.

They are hospitable and aloof, warm and withdrawn. The school-teacher will kiss her little charges as they enter the classroom, and then discipline them with the utmost severity. My five-year-old boy was once forbidden to console an age mate of his who sobbed in a corner for one hour after having failed to stand properly at attention in deference to the teacher. But "teacher" is more demonstratively affectionate than her counterpart in the United States. So is Mama. Children may not direct aggression at either authority figure, though both egg them on to fight their peers. Youngsters can pummel each other before the unseeing eyes of parents. The same parents express horror at the intractability of boys and girls from North America.

Libertarian—Authoritarian

The irreconcilable impulses that actually govern Argentines are evident in all their institutions. They help to account for a certain deformation of character, particularly among the young. This impression is one I could scarcely resist as a parent of two children and a professor teaching university students for over a year—until shortly before the removal of Dr. Frondizi. I am persuaded that the primary schools are intellectually inferior to our own (and I do not have a very high opinion

of our own). But the secondary schools are intellectually superior to our own. In the European tradition, they are elite institutions where rich men's sons and daughters soak up an extraordinary amount of knowledge. The average Argentine adolescent cannot dream of attending such a place, for he will never get beyond the first few grades of his childhood schooling. So few reach the secondary level that, as of last year, there were more university students than high school pupils. To be sure, many are perennial students or *crónicos* who move from one field of study to another without ever feeling any drive for completion. Similarly, Argentine youth cannot easily bring itself to marry, and the interminable *noviazgo*, the engagement that may last ten years, is common to all classes. The family structure is such that children find it exceedingly difficult to cut ties and grow up. Their dependency brings indecision, and this in turn promotes impulsive behavior.

Argentine ambivalence stems mainly from a conflict between authoritarian and libertarian tendencies. The schools which keep children under a tight rein, release them suddenly into an unwonted climate of freedom. A student who has been ground down, firmly if affectionately, all his life, is unprepared for the exercise of power. Yet power will be thrust upon him. Academic councils are composed in equal proportion of faculty, students and alumnae who jointly determine admission standards, curriculum and personnel. If college students in the United States are generally powerless, those in Argentina are too powerful. Our students tend to be passive, seldom venturing to challenge their professors. Argentine students who do not dare to murmur till they reach the university, sit in judgment of professors, declaring some to be competent and acceptable, others not, usually for extra-academic reasons. When Perón ran the country there were only Peronista teachers; they were ejected wholesale upon his departure in 1955. The ex-teachers form a large cluster of disgruntled men who would like to regain their old posts. Since the university is above all a political arena, something more than formal education is at stake.

The social schizophrenia of Argentina reaches its apogee in politics. Specific historical figures symbolize the struggle between polar positions; one works incessantly to negate and destroy the other. Thus, Mariano Moreno (the liberal principle) and his antithesis, Saavedra in the eighteenth century, or Domingo F. Sarmiento (inspired by Jefferson and Lincoln), a nineteenth century President of the Republic, and his nemesis, the long-time Dictator Rosas. Strophe, antistrophe. These names evoke the strongest possible passions to this day, not only between contending groups but within the individual whose mind is a patchwork of much that they imply. The liberal constitution should not be dismissed as a mere scrap of paper any more in Argentina than in her sister republics. It pulls the Argentine one way, meaning as much to him as the Rights of Man meant to his ancestors who modeled their constitution after that of France and the United States. But there are other equally potent forces pushing him in the opposite direction. Democracy is meaningful

to him; so is autocracy. Every man who inherits this dual tradition is at war with himself.

In his person and in his movement, Juan Perón incarnated the syndrome I have been trying to describe. Only such a man could have welcomed Nazis and used them as thugs, while admitting Jews who were unable to find refuge elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere—to use some of them as advisers. If there was a Fascist cast to *Peronismo*, there was also a tinge of Socialist idealism. Workers who felt defrauded when Perón “ran away like a coward” in 1955 instead of arming them for a military showdown, also revere the man (and more so his wife, for the cult of Evita refuses to die) who gave them *dignidad*. That he was a thief, a sybarite, and a scoundrel counts for much less than that he did something for them. Dominating their unions, he nevertheless strengthened them. Swindling the people, he spread enough from a plundered treasury to improve their lot and lift their spirits. Among the fanatic supporters of Perón it almost suffices that since his time no boss may address a worker—and no señora a maid—by using the personal pronoun, *tú*, for the law now requires a polite *usted*. The *descamisados* did benefit from Perón—by whom they were also systematically cheated.

Following his flight, a kind of revolutionary exhilaration animated Argentina. General Pedro Aramburu rose to power, and restored much of the freedom Perón had wiped out. Some momentum seemed to have been regained. Then came the disastrous election of 1958 which elevated Frondizi to office, made him a captive of the military with a political debt to the Peronistas who had backed him on orders from Perón himself. Frondizi ran on a Left platform: he was after all the author of a book, later withdrawn from circulation, that denounced Yankee oil imperialism. His first major move in office consisted of importing the Yankee oil imperialists in unprecedented numbers. Frondizi and his Finance Minister, Alvaro Alsogaray (soon tabbed Essogaray) announced and imposed their policy of austerity which, in effect, freed prices and froze wages. Businessmen applauded, the International Monetary Fund loosened its purse strings, the regime became a pet of the U.S. State Department, foreign investors appeared, the peso hardly fluctuated, confidence could be felt in the air. Only the masses groaned. Inflation hurt them, no matter how big the profits for business, and inflation which crept at first, began to gallop. Strangely, the gross national product declined and neither the Kaiser plant, paying high wages for the production of an automobile few could afford to buy, nor the new steel factory, a first for Frondizi, balanced the general state of dilapidation. The Argentine masses had lived fairly well; they were now asked to live much less well—in the interests of a goal so far off that no one could see it. This is the meaning of austerity, as it is the meaning of “sacrifice for socialism,” sacrifice today and tomorrow so that your children’s grandchildren may prosper. It is vulgar Liberalism as much as it is vulgar Marxism. The Castristas who damn such austerity have nothing to offer but more and worse austerity. If there is another way, if capital accumu-

lation is not god, we shall have to find it by turning away from economism, towards some kind of humanism.

Parties and Classes

The Argentines do not know which way to turn. They are the creatures of mass society, fractionated and pulverized. Frondizi made his deal with Perón, only after helping to split the large Radical Party in two. There are now Radicals of the People and Intransigent Radicals, two bourgeois parties venomously opposed to each other, with no more ideological difference than that between Democrats and Republicans. They would rather lose everything than move one inch toward amity. The Socialist Party? There was still such an entity in Argentina two years after Frondizi's election. Then it split, leaving a right wing and a left wing, and the left wing produced a victory for the Socialist patriarch Alfredo Palacios, a Senator in 1961 as he had been in 1909. Palacios praised Fidel and cursed the *Yanquis*, but not vociferously enough to please those "left" of him. Another split. And yet another. When I left Argentina there were four feeble Socialist parties. The *Justicialista* movement, *Peronismo*, is directionless, sundered by the squabbling of would-be heir-apparents. New parties, licit and illicit, multiply like amoeba. Each one is divided and subdivided.

Bosses are generally contemptuous of workers—who in return hate them with a vengeance—but beyond such smoldering antagonism, there is no passionate solidarity within the social classes.

Pressure groups or veto groups resemble parties and classes. Even where the military looms as large as in Argentina, it is impossible to speak of *the* military. The armed forces have developed three separate and distinct traditions, based on officers' training at the postgraduate level: the army favored study in Germany, the Navy, England and the Air Force, the United States. There is a general expectation that army men will be more barbarous than the others. Therefore, chicanery and brutality in the police department of Buenos Aires, run by Admirals, saddens one more than yet another abortive coup hatched by General Toranzo Montero, or his brother. The truth is that Dr. Frondizi was a prisoner not only of the army, but of the police force. When Senator Palacios undertook an exposé of the police, revealing, for example, continued use of the *picana eléctrica*, an instrument of torture and death that antedated and outlasted Perón, a large number of cops, led by their chief who professed not to know about it, shot up the Congress. The press carried full accounts of all this, and the President did not dare to discipline his own paramilitary police: he needed them to control street mobs.

Those mobs may be inflamed not only by one branch of the military or another, they may be the victims of a faction within any one of them. For each of the services is divided and subdivided into rivalrous factions.

But what of the Church, which surely must be reckoned with in

any Catholic country? Divided and volatile, reactionary and reformist, Peronista and anti-Peronista, with some kind of hold on the people who, however, rarely attend church services.

Political parties, trade unions, social classes, the military, the police and the Church: these are all atoms afloat in the Argentine atmosphere. Any two or more of them may combine at any time, then dissolve and reunite in a new and yet more bizarre configuration. Communists and Catholics may support Perón at the same time, and for awhile they did; military officers and Castristas may find common cause in condemning those who "sell them out" to foreign investors, and they do. A temporary fusion of Right and Left is always possible. Indeed, with pandemonium the rule, nothing can be precluded, anything is possible.

Argentines speak of the First Tyranny (Rosas) and the Second Tyranny (Perón) as they await the Third Tyranny. For who can doubt that the pandemonium will end, that the inchoate atoms will be organized, that order will be restored by a Strong Man? He will come not on horseback, but in a tank or a jet—in answer to the irresistible invitation tendered him by a pure, prostrate mass society. It is not out of the question that he will have nuclear weapons at his disposal. Most of Argentina's physicists are said to be gathered under U.S. guidance in Bariloche where persistent rumors suggest that they are not too far from arranging for their own production of atomic weapons. Imagine the Third Tyrant with hell bombs to loose on his enemies! A civilian government has set aside forty per cent of its budget for military expenditures. This in a nation whose last war—with Paraguay—was concluded nearly a century ago. Given enough help from us, there is no telling what a military dictatorship could do.

If there is a Third Tyranny, it will not be like the others. They left too many loopholes. Even under Perón, a man hostile to the regime could migrate, or stay on, outside government circles, and send his children abroad. No such freedom is to be envisaged under the coming totalitarianism which will be designed to extinguish every dilemma and squelch all opposition.

Nowadays it is fashionable to assert that there can be no democracy until a certain, presumably calculable point of economic development has been reached. This proposition seems to me to be highly problematic, and I am surprised that so many of my friends uncritically accept it. Some of them used to say that the only true democracy existed in New England before the Industrial Revolution; often they inclined toward the Jeffersonian tradition, that is, toward a political preference for the grass-roots agrarian life; others carried their logic all the way to utopian intentional communities. Many of the same people now contend that a democratic polity can exist only after the proper infrastructure of machine production has been brought into being. This assumption is at least debatable, but we may rest assured that modern technology is the prime precondition for totalitarianism.

Left, Right and Center are committed to industrialization: it is the only Argentine consensus. No one believes the people are "ready" for liberal democracy: the best of them say they have tried that and it doesn't work. A forced draught, sponsored by Left or more likely, Right totalitarian dictatorship, will work. Tyranny plus technology is the way to spell totalitarianism—and death to the human spirit. An honest observer who hopes he is wrong and who would like to proffer democratic socialism as an alternative (one that beyond peradventure makes perfectly good sense in this situation) can only see a ghastly prospect in store for Argentina. The spectacle of a people for whom one has developed some fondness, bent senselessly on their own destruction can never be very edifying. I find that, like all avoidable tragedy, it sickens me. I know a few Argentine intellectuals similarly afflicted—notably Américo Ghioldhi, isolated leader of the old Socialists. If only there were more! Maybe there are.

Frank Bonilla

RURAL REFORM IN BRAZIL

RIO DE JANEIRO

Most rural Latin Americans have a standard of living no better than that of the Indians who were found on the land by the European colonizers or of the slaves that subsequently were imported into parts of the continent. In Brazil the evocation of the slave society provides more than a dramatic yardstick of the absence of material progress for the nation's rural population. The "big house" and the *senzala* (slave quarters), the social poles of Brazilian plantation society, remain richly symbolic of a past that extends in subtle ways into the present. Gilberto Freyre, who organized his search for fundamental truths about Brazilian culture and social organization around the big house and the *senzala*, saw most Brazilians as psychologically only a few steps away from one or another of these symbiotic social worlds.¹ Whether or not the individual remained directly enmeshed in the extensive survivals of the plantation economy or had moved into more modern sectors of the national society, Freyre affirmed, the background of slavery and the one crop system were a persistent influence on conduct, ideas and morality.

Freyre's statement in the introduction to the first edition of *Casa Grande e Senzala* in 1933 is as valid today as it was then:

... a latifundiairy monoculture even after the abolition of slavery found a means of subsisting in certain parts of the country with a more absorptive and sterilizing effect than under the old regime and with abuses that were still more feudal in character, through the creation of a proletariat under conditions of life less favorable than those of the mass of slaves.²

The fact that the system, long ago shorn of many of those features that once cushioned the harsh exploitativeness of the master-slave relationships, has survived for so long with no material change in the situation of the exploited and with only recent serious signs of restiveness lends weight to Freyre's argument about the enduring influence of traditional social relationships. Freyre's theme is that the felicitous fusion of races and cultures worked out in Brazil and brought to its highest expression in the 18th- and 19th-century plantation constituted a unique synthesis

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¹ Gilberto Freyre, *Masters and Slaves*, tr. by Samuel Putnam (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1946). The first edition of this basic work on Brazil appeared in 1933.

² *Ibid.*, p. xlviii.

of aristocratic, individualistic, and democratizing elements. The almost unlimited powers of the plantation *senhor* that gave free rein to an individualism sometimes bordering on anarchy were presumably tempered and humanized by an amalgam of love, sex, and mutual indulgence that transcended the barriers of class and race. More was involved here than the sexual exploitation of slave women by white masters; the sexual bonds between *casa* and *senzala* were at once an expression of and the basis for a more generalized and genuine affective solidarity between masters and slaves.

Whether or not Freyre's thesis is a faithful depiction of Brazilian slave society, few persons who know Brazil will deny that the forms of domination elaborated by the groups who have traditionally held power have been singularly effective in mitigating and controlling violent social conflict. One does not have to go along with any mystique about the Portuguese capacity to absorb and assimilate diverse racial elements into a happy social balance—Angola gives the lie to that theory. Nevertheless, in no other country in Latin America do such staggering inequalities (material, social, political, racial, and regional) seem so little productive of individual tensions or of intransigent, regimented strife. This cannot be explained simply as mass apathy or fatalism, or as the incapacity of the exploited to mobilize themselves for the defense of group interests. All of these are factors in the avoidance up to the present of more violent internal conflict, but the nation is not inert politically. The country is now in fact in the grips of a great political struggle in which popular groups (*o povo*) are more than passive or docile spectators.³ There is nevertheless an almost exasperating blandness underlying the public façade of combativity affected by politicians and a bewildering lack of rational connections among apparent interests, organized political groups, and points of view espoused. There is an element of civility, a capacity and a disposition to work out disputes peaceably in Brazilian political life that one would hardly expect to find in conjunction with such harsh inequities, the generally low cultural level, the sad record of corrupt and irresponsible government, and the vulnerability and rudimentary organization of political institutions.

The current situation with respect to agrarian reform is difficult to understand without some grasp of this special quality in Brazilian political life. Brazil is not ever likely to get an agrarian reform bill that defines its objectives as simply and directly as the Cuban decree whose first article opens with the declaration, "The latifundium is forbidden" (*Se proscribe el latifundio*), but the country also does not face the intransigent resistance to any modifications of agrarian organization that dominant groups in other Latin American countries continue to show. True reforms will not be easily won in Brazil—even if there were complete accord on all sides as to the objectives of an agrarian reform and

³ A recent analysis of the significance for Brazil of the gradual emergence of a mass political constituency not subject to the simple manipulation of political parties or individual leaders is Alberto Guerreiro Ramos' *A Crise do Poder no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, Zahar Editores, 1961).

the best ways to achieve it, the task is formidable and the outcome of many proposed measures uncertain. But despite a gradual hardening of the lines of conflict and recurrent crises, Brazil remains one of the few countries where it still seems possible to hope realistically for fundamental social changes without major violence.

The Agrarian Problem

In broad outline, Brazil's agrarian situation parallels that of many other Latin American countries. One noted economist, Pompeu Accioly Borges has summarized it in this fashion:

- 1) the prevalence of farm properties of vast extension (more than half with an area larger than 500 hectares);*
- 2) a high and increasing concentration of farm properties (8% of the proprietors control 75% of the area in farm properties);
- 3) the large proportion of farm workers who own no land (nearly 10 million of a total of 12 million);
- 4) the small proportion of the farm area actually in cultivation (10% on the average);
- 5) harmful and outmoded farming techniques with the primitive burning and rotation of lands still prevailing;
- 6) rudimentary mechanization, fertilization, and combating of crop diseases;
- 7) semifeudal work relations with the prevalence of sharecropping and unpaid labor;
- 8) a minuscule rural per-capita income (on the order of about 30,000 cruzeiros);
- 9) the lack of legal protection, security, and opportunities for the person who works the land;
- 10) the absence of incentives to new investment as much for the landowner as for the sharecropper or the person renting land.

The enormousness of the problem is magnified by the fact that 63% of the total population depend on agriculture, that two thirds of this rural population are illiterate and therefore have no vote, that only 4% of the rural homes have electricity, and only 1% have running water.⁴

Brazil's rural problem is not only massive in scale by comparison with other Latin American countries but immensely more complex. Within the general framework outlined above, there exist both a primitive subsistence agriculture and a capitalist, export-oriented though also technologically low-level, single crop system. A seminomadic subsistence agriculture exists throughout the country, relying on simple slash and burn techniques and providing no more than a slender margin of sur-

* A hectare is about two and a half acres.

⁴ Pompeu Accioly Borges, *Fundamentos e Características de Uma Reforma Agrária* (1961, mimeo.). Mr. Accioly Borges has been a member of most of the official bodies designated to investigate rural problems and recommend legislation.

vival. The chronic problems of export crops (especially coffee), despite wasteful and inefficient levels of productivity, have been overproduction, the instability and steady decline of export prices, the lag in the expansion of new markets, and increasing competition from abroad. The overweening importance of coffee and other key export commodities to the national capacity to import multiplies conflicts between special interests and national objectives.

Economists, geographers, and anthropologists vie with one another in thinking up useful ways to cut up for analysis the sprawling Brazilian land mass. Some economists seem inclined to abandon the geographical delimitation altogether, preferring to talk about developed, underdeveloped, and undeveloped areas. A more ambitious recent attempt to characterize areas alternatively on the basis of the chief activity, topography, climate, ethnicity, and other cultural factors distinguished ten major regions in Brazil. Each of these has a distinctive terrain and climate, differing ratios of land to people, populations that differ in age, ethnic origin, education, a distinct occupational structure and economic organization, sharply variant levels and styles of living.⁵ Even within a single region there are marked variations. In Brazil's Northeast, which has recently figured in international headlines as the most depressed underdeveloped area of its size in the Western world, the wet coastal lands (*mata*) are largely given over to sugar plantations. Inland in the semiarid *agreste* zone cotton growing is combined with cattle raising giving way in the interior *sertão* to a precarious subsistence agriculture in combination with cattle raising. To the north in the coastal palm forests *carnaúba* and *babaçu* cultivation take over. Any reform program has to take into account the vastly different needs of each of these forms of land exploitation. Each represents different problems of work organization and land tenure, different problems of soil technology and equipment, different requirements with respect to credit facilities, with respect to the development of markets, storage and distribution systems, and the growth of subsistence crops to supplement earnings from cash crops.

Legal problems of tenure are no less complex than the technical problems of organization and land exploitation. As an outcome of a centuries-old history of land-grabbing and seminomadic land-squatting no one knows who owns much of the land in Brazil, including much of that now occupied and in cultivation. According to the 1950 census, in some states more than half of the farm establishments were occupied by persons without legal title to the land.⁶ The howl of alarm provoked by a recent reform bill providing for an examination of the legitimacy of land titles for all rural establishments of more than 500 hectares as well as any others of doubtful legality is thus understandable. The Vice President of the Brazilian Rural Confederation speaking

⁵ Manuel Diegues, Jr., *Regiões Culturais do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, Centro Brasileiro de Pesquisas Educacionais, 1960).

⁶ Manuel Diegues, Jr., *População e Propriedade da Terra no Brasil* (Washington, D. C., União Pan Americana, 1959), p. 63.

before a general assembly of that organization affirmed that such an inquiry would be no less than a ruthless Inquisition, leading the assembled landholders presumably to visualize themselves under rack and torture defending their property rights.

The government is as embarrassed as the private landowners by the reigning confusion regarding titles to land. In July 1961 the writer accompanied a small delegation of squatters, who had been forcibly evicted from what they believed to be government land in Rio State, to the offices of the National Institute for Immigration and Colonization (INIC). The men concerned had recently formed a farm workers association (*Associação de Lavradores*) and for the first time were presenting a collective grievance to an official body. They were cordially received in the main meeting room by the newly appointed head of the agency. After complaining that he was new to his job, still unacquainted with his subordinates, and strapped with a laughably inadequate budget, the director went on to observe that one great obstacle to the land distribution and colonization work of his agency was the fact that less than 10% of the land that was theoretically in their control had been legally cleared as to title. "We cannot give away land that we are not sure we own," he said.

The long-established pattern of squatting and nomadism has made a climate of violence and insecurity a commonplace aspect of rural life in Brazil. The *Associações de Lavradores* rapidly growing up in Rio and adjacent states are primarily defensive organizations against the arbitrariness of landowners and the rural judicial and police officials whom the landowners often control and against the destructiveness of the hired and independent thugs who roam the countryside. (The *Associações* have been taking on a slightly more political cast as they are being pulled into the orbit of the better-known *Ligas Camponesas* (Rural Leagues) originating in Pernambuco.)

In July 1961 the *Associações de Lavradores* in Rio, Guanabara, Minas Gerais, and Espirito Santo claimed some 35,000 members in 43 municipalities. A great majority of the members are squatters working unoccupied lands whose ownership is dubious. Their chief enemies are the *grileiros*—rural gangsters who falsely claim title to lands and often in combination with the police extort rent or shares of crops from squatters. There is practically no commercial agriculture among these squatters, who work small plots for subsistence. In few cases are the squatters able to hold on to a plot for more than three years. The tenants, *colonos*, and sharecroppers are no better off than the squatters. They have no form of legal protection or work contract and are entirely at the mercy of employers.

The *Associações* are as yet precarious organizations without resources and lacking capable leadership. As they gain strength they attract the attention of politicians, and efforts are being made to consolidate effectively the *Associações* with the *Ligas* of the Northeast led by the Social-

ist deputy, Francisco Julião. Julião is seeking as well to build up support for the *Ligas* within the cities. At a recent meeting in Rio de Janeiro well attended by Communist and nationalist leaders, intellectuals, students, union officials, and a sizable crowd of sympathizers, Julião announced the beginning of a national campaign in behalf of a radical agrarian reform.

The apprehensions of conservatives focus on the figure of Julião and his following among farm workers in the explosive Northeast, where he is reputed to have some 100 farm leagues with nearly 40,000 members. Rumors about contraband in weapons, the circulation of guerrilla-training pamphlets printed in China and Cuba, and the presence of well-known Communists in the ranks of Julião's collaborators have added to the general alarm. Julião's pronouncements, often couched in an apocalyptic rhetoric, are also not calculated to induce complacency among landowners. The remarks that follow are excerpted from a recent manifesto by Julião directed to all who work the land:

You and your brothers make up almost all of Brazil. It is you who kill our hunger. And you die of hunger. It is you who clothe us. And you live in rags. You give the soldier to defend the fatherland. And the fatherland forgets you. You give the hired killer to the *latifundio*. And the hired killer tyrannizes you. You give to the Church. And the Church asks you for resignation in the name of Christ. But Christ was a rebel. And for that reason he ascended the cross. And like Christ and the good St. Francis of Italy, I also stand by your side. And two who are still alive, Mao Tse-tung of China and Fidel Castro of Cuba. All of them were victorious because they were with you and you with them. You were and are. You are and will be.



What democracy is this that is a cold spectator of your assassination, that sees your blood soak the land you conquered with your axe and does not come to your aid? That democracy is not yet yours. It belongs to the *grileiro*. How many rivers of blood will yet run through this immense Brazil before democracy realizes that no *grileiro's* claim should prevail over your title which is your own life? . . .⁷

The *Ligas* and the other incipient mass organizations of rural workers, sharecroppers, and squatters cannot yet be regarded as having a decisive weight in the current drive for basic reforms in the countryside. That is, the pressure for an agrarian reform bill on the national legislature from the short-lived Quadros Government and the regime of João Goulart cannot be regarded as simply a direct response to popular demands of this kind. The growing presence of the leagues is a new element that for some is a strong argument in favor of decisive, immediate action and for others only conclusive evidence of the greater evils to come if further agitation and socialistic reforms are allowed. Possibly,

⁷ Francisco Julião, "A Alforria do Camponês," *O Semanário* (No. 253, April 1961).

Brazil may never get a true rural reform until the *Ligas* or some equivalent organization gains the strength to make effective demands on the parties and the government. But for the moment, there is a fairly generalized disposition to consider possible reforms; this attitude is widespread, has borne up well under counter political pressures, is more than a reluctant or grudging concession to mass demands, and is supported by influential sectors of society.

The Debate on Agrarian Reform

If professed interest, the volume of commentary, and the variety of groups outspokenly favoring the idea of agrarian reform were to be taken as signs of Brazil's readiness for a peaceful rural revolution, the country seemed more than set for the plunge by mid-1961. A *Jornal do Brasil* editorial in late July remarked, "The impression one gets is that the country is ripe for agrarian reform since the conservatives, the Communists, the *fidelistas*, the clergy, industry, the Brazilian authorities, and the Americans are all demanding it. The problem, of course, is that each of them wants a different agrarian reform." There have been more than 200 separate bills touching on agrarian problems presented in the legislature since 1947 with little concrete result beyond the formation of the National Institute for Immigration and Colonization mentioned earlier. The attacks on the bills that attempted to define conditions and measures for the expropriation of private lands have tended to set up a false dichotomy between the desire to break up large and inefficiently exploited concentrations of land and productivity goals. By starting with the premise that any bill that touches on expropriation is aimed at the confiscation and fractioning of private lands into minuscule, unproductive holdings, attention has been drawn away from the concrete question of just how present systems of tenure can be modified to satisfy both productivity objectives and the need to relieve the intolerable situation of the landless farm workers. Considerable effort has thus been spent attempting to prove that expropriation is neither necessary nor useful, that it is probably unconstitutional and certainly immoral, and that whatever the just basis of compensation might be for such expropriation it is beyond the means of the state. Much of the argument is basically irrelevant since no one has seriously proposed in Brazil an across-the-board expropriation of landholdings above a certain size nor promoted expropriation as in itself a solution.

Nevertheless, the line taken in support of these contentions runs about as follows. The fact that the Federal Government and the several states have considerable unoccupied landholdings is put forth as making unnecessary any redistribution of present properties. Actually, most of such public lands are poor, inaccessible, and remote from markets and would require massive investment to colonize and develop. Alternatively, it is argued that land distribution is a romantic, socialist scheme, that only private initiative and the supervision by the *fazendeiro*, who knows how to handle the lazy, unlettered, improvident rural worker, can maintain production.

The opinions of the majority of the clergy in Brazil, though generally skirting the issue of expropriation, are liberal. There have been repeated statements in favor of rural reform by prelates, especially those from the Northeastern states, where the situation is most desperate. In the most recent pronouncement a group of bishops from the area proposed to undertake a campaign to organize rural workers in defense of their liberty. "I speak of liberation," said the spokesman for the group, "because our rural population has endured the drama of two centuries of darkness: one of slave labor and the second of work without the protection of law."⁸ The National Conference of Bishops of Brazil has mapped out a program that includes mass education via radio, unionization of rural workers, agrarian reform, and the elaboration of social legislation adapted to the rural milieu. The liberal Catholic position, spelled out in considerable detail in a recent symposium, recognizes the *de facto* enslavement of the rural worker in Brazil as a consequence of existing patterns of tenure.⁹ The group therefore defined agrarian reform as primarily a human problem rather than simply one of economics or productivity; the latter position it attributed to extremists of right and left. "Agrarian reform," declared the gathering of specialists in rural problems, "is a set of measures directed immediately toward the elevation and dignification of rural populations, and in the long run toward improving the political, social, and economic level of the Brazilian people." The symposium repeatedly hammered away at the idea that it is the fundamental structure of social relationships in rural areas that needs to be changed. "For us," stated the group at another point, "*agrarian reform is not essentially a change in the regime of property, but it cannot be achieved without such a change.*" [Italics in the original.] In its final conclusions the symposium affirmed unequivocally: "It is not possible to rehabilitate rural man in Brazil, that is 65% of the population, without giving him the instrument par excellence which is the ownership of land."

The major reform proposals that have been seriously considered and debated in the legislature place great emphasis on productivity and the rationalization of the use of land while taking account of the need to raise rural levels of living through a variety of measures including the breaking up of existing tenure patterns. One of these men, Pompeu Accioly Borges, has served on every recent legislative and executive body designated to study the question as well as on the National Economic Commission's special committee on agrarian reform. Mr. Accioly Borges defines agrarian reform as "essentially the revision, through diverse procedures, of the juridical and economic relations among those who work and own rural property, with a view to modifying the dominion and use of the land to achieve the development of agricultural

⁸ Dom Jose Tavora, Archbishop of Tracaju, quoted in the *Jornal do Brasil* (October 5, 1961).

⁹ *Recomendações sobre Reforma Agrária* (Rio de Janeiro, Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática, 1961). The symposium was held from April 17 to 22, 1961. The quotations are from pages xvii, 61, and 294.

production, to increase productivity, and to ensure a better distribution of income."¹⁰ The *Projeto Joffily*, which had been approved in principle by President Janio Quadros and was being debated in the legislature at the time of his unexpected resignation, largely paraphrases the definition just given in its first article, "This law defines expropriation in the social interest and disposes with regard to other means of access to farming and cattle raising; it creates the Federal Commission for Agrarian Reform, regulates the distribution of lands and institutes the National Agrarian Fund with the goal of developing production, increasing productivity, and ensuring social stability."¹¹ The *Joffily* bill was radical enough to be given small chance of successfully getting through the legislature; it enumerated a substantial number of situations that would justify expropriation in the social interest and specified that indemnization would be on the basis of declared tax value, provided for temporary as well as permanent expropriation, and proclaimed that the Federal Government would make land grants to all squatters occupying public lands on the date of the passage of the law. The reform was to be financed by a 3% allotment of the national tax income, a billion-cruzeiro issue of rural bonds, and income from the sale and lease of government and expropriated lands. Quadros' support of the law was reputedly an element in the growing dissatisfaction with his Government among conservatives, but the bill was nevertheless criticized as incomplete and unrealistic by the left. Characteristically, Quadros when president announced his support of the *Joffily* project without waiting for the conclusions of a commission he had himself set up to study the problem. While for some the law was clearly subversive and confiscatory, others felt that it failed to take account of the situation of the large numbers of sharecroppers, tenants and farm workers who would not be touched by the limited expropriations or land distribution that would take place under the law. A complete reform bill, they asserted, had to regulate contracts for sharecropping, establish ceilings on the rents of rural properties, and extend social legislation covering conditions of work to the thousands of rural wage workers. The crisis created by the resignation of President Quadros late in August 1961 cast a cloud over all the projects for basic reforms that had been in discussion in the seven months that he held office. New hopes were raised by the first message to the Congress from the new Cabinet which initiated Brazil's experiment with parliamentary government, the compromise solution that permitted João Goulart, Quadros' legal successor, to take office despite strong military opposition. That message reaffirmed the determination of the new Government to carry out the many reforms promised and in part begun by Quadros.

The situation of the new Government is precarious enough to make predictions about immediate legislation risky. It is rather doubtful that

¹⁰ Pompeu Accioly Borges, *op. cit.*, footnote five, p. 6.

¹¹ Article 1 of the legislative project approved by the Special Commission on Agrarian Reform of the Federal Chamber of Deputies in August 1961.

it could hope to win approval for a bill as advanced as the *Joffily* project and it will find resistance to even a more moderate formula.¹² Still there is a consciousness abroad that this may be the last chance for Brazil to move forward democratically, that the new Government cannot capitulate on the reforms promised Brazilians in the last election even though in the October voting most Brazilians put their faith not in the men now in office but in their opponent now gone. Brazilians are aware as well that their position as leaders in the continent hinges not only on maintaining an independent position in foreign policy but also on a demonstrated capacity to achieve genuine social progress at home. Even a moderate success in rural reform, at a moment when the problem is at stage center, would enormously strengthen national prestige and give a more solid footing to Brazilian aspirations to leadership within the underdeveloped world community.

¹² Several states have moved ahead with local agrarian reform programs in the absence of federal action. São Paulo has the only full-scale legislation on the problem; in other states, such as Minas Gerais and Paraná, some distribution of state lands and colonization is programed while in Pernambuco and Rio there have been isolated expropriations of private properties as solutions to irreconcilable disputes between owners and tenants. The chief instruments of reform in the hands of the states are the distribution of state lands and progressive taxation designed to penalize the proprietors of large, unproductive landholdings.

Frank Bonilla

RIO'S "FAVELAS":

The Rural Slum Within the City

Until mid-June of 1961 when *Life* magazine's millions of readers saw Gordon Parks's photographic essay on poverty in Rio's hillside slums (*favelas*), the American image of the life of Rio's poor was based largely on Marcel Camus' moving film fantasy, *Black Orpheus*. Camus' movie fully exploits the magnificent scenic backdrop provided by the city as well as the exuberant sound and color of carnival. His *favelados* are a race of handsome blacks, who within the heart of a modern city manage to retain a natural, almost bucolic way of life. They are sleek and carefree, full of boundless energy and rhythm, with an unfettered zest for life. By contrast, Parks's *favela* family is a proto-human band, weakened by chronic illness, callously indifferent to each other's suffering, living in a monotone degradation punctuated only by flashes of violence.

No one can quarrel with the artist's right to select and blend what he finds in reality to his purpose; both Camus and Parks catch essential aspects of the meaning of life in the *favela*. If there is still magic and an authentic human quality in a Rio carnival, these spring directly from the infusion

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of vitality and joy in sound and movement that invades the city from the hills during the pre-Lenten festival. But the very intensity of that collective catharsis suggests the explosive potential that is built up day by day in the more than 100 favelas that scar the city's *morros* (hills).* Camus and Parks each fasten on separate phases of the emotional cycle of the *favela*.

Recent estimates put as many as a third of Rio's three million inhabitants within these jerry-built, vertical islands of squalor. Children and adolescents make up a large part of that population. The median age among 169,305 *favelados* counted in the 1950 census was just over 20 years; about 35% were under 15 years of age. By current calculations more than a half million youngsters under 15 are living in Rio *favelas*.** The family chosen by *Life* photographer Parks to represent those many thousands had eight children who along with their parents were crowded into a six-by-ten-foot shack.

The fact that Parks, himself a

* Researchers at UNESCO's Latin American Social Science Research Center in Rio identified 132 *favelas* on aerial maps of the city taken in 1960. A recent police report put the number at 194 and estimated the total *favela* population as close to a million. (*Correio da Manhã*, July 1, 1961.)

** *Correio da Manhã*, June 30, 1961.

Negro, featured a white *favela* family in his pictures and that his essay makes no allusion to race provoked some comment in the local press. Statistically, his choice was not indefensible. Though Negroes are numerically slightly in the ascendancy within the *favela* (about 38%), they are accompanied in their misery and hardship by sizable contingents of mixed bloods (29%) and whites (33%). Brazilians, in fact, often point to the heterogeneity of the *favela* population as evidence of the country's racial democracy. When the asthmatic adolescent who was the central figure in Parks's *Life* report was taken to the United States for medical treatment, one Rio weekly proposed that *cariocas* counter by bringing a boy from Harlem to Rio, where he could live like a white man. The favored Harlemite, the story ran, would in Rio be able to study in any school, pray in any church, bathe at any beach, ride on any vehicle, bury his dog in any cemetery, and go to any movie. The writer neglected to note that the boy would also almost certainly be assured of a place to live in one of the city's *favelas*. For if the relative racial representation reported above has remained more or less stable and the *favela* population has grown in line with most estimates, Rio's Negroes may not be alone in the *favela*, but they are almost all there.*

* According to the 1960 census 13% of Rio's population was Negro (*preto*). In a present estimated population of about three million that would give about 400,000 *pretos*. If the present *favela* population is close to 900,000 as estimated by the police, and the proportion of *pretos* among *favelados* is still close to 40%, practically all of Rio's Negroes must be in *favelas*. See "Aspectos Humanos da Favela Carioca," *O Estado de São Paulo*, Suplemento Especial, April 13, 1960, page 8. Part II of this report appeared in a second supplement on April 15, 1960.

Structurally, the *favela* dwelling represents the intrusion into the city of a type of construction which still is the basic shelter for Brazil's rural population. The improvised shack of odd scraps of lumber, packing cases, tin sheeting, canvas, or rough tile is an anomaly when perched above the gleaming glass and concrete of modern Rio. In the Brazilian countryside the same crude habitation is the standard when not a remotely aspired-to-luxury. When reformers and government officials talk about "urbanizing" the *favelas*, they raise the hope born of despair that a collection of rustic hovels can become a habitable city if provided with water, electricity, rudimentary sewerage, and streets. But even that degree of adaptation to city living has not accompanied the migration of the rural dwelling to the Rio hills. The *favelas* crawl in cancerous disorder up the steep *morros*, divided by labyrinthine paths and gullies that serve as precarious avenues of movement and natural sewers. The frequent rainfalls bring flash floods, landslides, and undermine the fragile hold of stilt foundations on the hills' flanks.

The Growth of the Favela

The inhumanity of Rio's *favelas* is matched in the "*villas miseria*," "*cal-lampas*," and "*colonias proletarias*" of other major Latin American cities. New York's single-room occupancy flats and rat-infested tenements belong to the same savage family. But in many of these cities the blight of the slum can be more easily ignored. The most unsightly housing clusters on the periphery of the city or is pushed into out-of-the-way pockets of undesirable land. Rio's *favelas* relentlessly meet the eye of anyone who walks the city's streets and lifts his gaze above eye

level, no matter how elegant the neighborhood.

Not all of the housing in Rio that would be considered substandard by even very moderate criteria is in the *favelas*. But the *favela* is in part an outgrowth of the elimination of the city's more conventional slums. The opening up of the Avenida Rio Branco, the leveling of the Morro Castelo, and the addition of a second main artery (Avenida Pres. Getulio Vargas) not only required the demolition of the crowded warrens (*cabecas de porco* and *corticos*) that housed Rio's poor but also dramatically increased land values in the central area. A substantial part of that population and of the constant flood of migrants from surrounding rural places put up their makeshift shelters on the city's outskirts and along the main rail lines running out of the city. The inadequacy of both rail and bus transport as the distances became longer and the population mushroomed has continued to feed the climb upward in search of space within the city.*

The growth of the *favela* is thus linked to the general flight from the countryside into the cities in Brazil, to a generally high rate of demographic growth, to the excessive concentration of industry and commerce in a few major cities, and finally to an almost absolute absence of serious concern with the process of urban expansion among city officials. The anarchic growth of the city marked by large-scale profiteering and speculation in real estate and construction simply took no account of the housing needs of the large number of people automatically eliminated from the housing market by their low incomes.

* Goulart, José Alípio. *Favelas do Distrito Federal*. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério de Agricultura, 1957. Pages 11-18.

Living conditions in Rio *favelas* have been documented in exhaustive detail by a group of researchers under the guidance of Father Louis Joseph Lebre, an internationally known student of problems of economic and social development, and José Arthur Rios, an American-trained Brazilian sociologist.* In broad outline, that account of the life and problems of Rio's poor holds no surprises. The *favelado* is plagued by all the ills that beset his kind everywhere. As a group, the *favela* population is on the wrong side of every standard index of social disorganization, whether it be illiteracy, malnutrition, disease, job instability, irregular sexual unions, alcoholism, criminal violence, or almost any other on the familiar list. But these remain prevailing conditions not only in the *favela* but elsewhere in the city and throughout the vast rural spaces of Brazil. Thus the human waste and tragedy that the *favela* represents is only a small part of the problem, as is the health, police, and welfare burden the *favela* creates for a city lacking both capacity and practice in dispensing effective social services.

Marginality and Integration

If the *favela* did not provide a framework for some working forms of human coexistence and social cohesion, the explosion of violence that some fear may some day descend on the city from the hills would have come long ago. From one point of view the *favela* can even be optimistically viewed as an integrative element—as a sort of staging area in which the recently arrived rural migrant is initiated into the mysteries of city life, learns new forms of solidarity, acquires

* "Aspectos Humanos da Favela Carioca," *op cit.*, footnote three, especially Part II.

new social and political skills. Though the number of *favela* children who achieve more than two or three years of primary schooling is extremely small, it is still higher than in some rural areas where often there is simply no school. The forced intimacy of the urban slum breeds conflict but also a variety of simple forms of organization to deal with common problems. Though the petty crime and violence of the *favela* fill the front pages of Rio's more sensational press day after day, a great many favela families are relatively stable, have fairly regular employment, and are even rigidly conventional by middle-class standards.*

The core of the problem lies not within the *favela* itself but is national in scope. A nation that is embarked on a massive program of industrial expansion simply cannot leave half of its population behind without compromising its possibilities for future growth. A government that seeks to mobilize political support for economic policies that demand continued sacrifices and forbearance from those least able to give cannot expect that support to flow easily from those whose participation in national life is

marginal in every way. The drama is not just one of the confrontation of what is old and what is new in Brazil —of the existence side by side of “developed” and backward sectors in the nation. The *favela* throws into focus long-standing inequalities that by and large continue being actively exploited or regarded with complacent indifference as much by “modern” as by traditionalist-minded Brazilians. It is the fragility of the social bonds, the lack of organic connections between the *favelado*, together with his rural counterpart, and the rest of the national community that threatens the hope for a peaceful social revolution in Brazil. Maria Carolina de Jesus, a São Paulo *favelada* whose diary created a literary sensation in 1960, made a memorable entry in her notes on a day in May of that year when she was too tired to do her daily foraging through the city's trash in search of something to eat or to sell. “When I am hungry,” she wrote, “I want to kill Jânio, I want to hang Adhemar and burn Juscelino. Hardship dims the affection of the people for politicians.”*

* Pearse, Andrew, “Notas Sobre a Organização Social de Uma Favela do Rio de Janeiro.” *Educação e Ciências Sociais*. Vol. 3, No. 7. April 1958. See also Josil-deth Gomes Consorte's “A Criança Favelada e a Escola Pública,” *Educação e Ciências Sociais*, Vol. 5, No. 11, August 1959

* “*Eu quando estou com fome quero matar o Jânio, quero enforcar o Adhemar e queimar o Juscelino. As dificuldades corta o afeto do povo pelos políticos.*” The three men named were Jânio Quadros, the president elected in 1960, his predecessor, Juscelino Kubitschek, and Adhemar de Barros, another candidate for the presidency in 1960.

Victor Alba

LABOR IN LATIN AMERICA

There is much talk these days about the Latin American middle class, about students, intellectuals and oligarchs. But, except when there are strikes, little talk about the industrial working class.

There are some 15 to 20 million industrial workers in Latin America and labor unions exist in every country, even under the dictatorships. Latin American labor legislation is, generally, advanced (and as often as not, not carried out).

The industrial workers must cope as best they can with a multitude of complex problems stemming from industrialization, rapid urbanization and the prospect of automation. Their interests as workers force them to consider such problems as agrarian reform, inflation and the planning of economic development.

Nevertheless, it is the middle-class parties that spell out the orientation, study the problems, and propose the solutions. The labor movement as such rarely voices an opinion on these general questions. It is satisfied to fight for wages and working conditions. Only recently have any attempts been made to give the labor movement a voice of its own.

This has not always been the situation and it probably will not remain so in the future. But at present it may be said that the destiny of Latin America is taking shape without the

decisive intervention of the industrial working class. To understand this we must briefly examine the character of the Latin American working class and the history of its labor movement.

I

a) *A considerable percentage of illiterate workers and, perhaps still worse, a great number of people whose formal education does not go beyond knowledge of the ABC's, who have no interest whatever in any cultural activity, and who are impervious to and suspicious of complicated explanations.* Such is the reality, and any program of workers' education must take this into account. This low educational level helps stir up differences within the working class. It creates castes of better educated workers, it establishes a hierarchy of wages and weakens trade-union solidarity.

b) *The peasant origin of the huge majority of industrial workers.* In a period of economic crisis or unemployment, they return to their villages where they are at least assured of food and shelter. In many areas workers abandon their work during protracted village festivals and at harvest time; hence there is a constant fluctuation of manpower, as well as of union strength. Educating these workers becomes a problem as does training them to fill skilled and specialized jobs.

c) *Persistence of an isolated, peas-*

ant mentality in the city worker. He is often mistrustful, uninterested in social problems, and indifferent toward culture. A special study alone would be required to explain the influence this has on the psychology of the Mexican worker in his work and in his union, as well as his attitude toward his children, home, and pleasures. We would find no doubt that alcoholism, use of harmful herbs, emotional and family instability stem largely from the peasant's failure to adapt to urban life.

d) *The Latin American worker is in a transitional stage between artisanship (work performed in small workshops) and rationalized assembly-line work.* This creates problems of psychological adaptation which are reflected in his attitude toward his union.

e) *Women scarcely take part in industry.* One out of 233 among Mexican women as compared with one out of 153 in the professions and with one out of 213 among university students. This disproportion also leads to friction in work and home and frequently provokes union injustices.

f) *The great number of children who work before reaching the legal age at which they are permitted to.*

g) *General lack of interest in social problems and the absence of documentation (magazines, libraries, books, lectures, workers' study circles, etc.), in virtually all of Latin America.*

II

Basic needs in Latin America are so pressing that there is neither time nor possibility for disguising them in idealism. The workers are satisfied to fight for immediate aims. Exploitation is so blatant that any theoretical explanation is useless. While the European labor movement, particularly at

the beginning, was preoccupied with the future, the labor movement in the New World concentrated exclusively on the improvement of existing conditions without bothering about tomorrow. Hence, its weakness in theory.

Toward the middle of the 19th century a few dreamers imported European socialist utopias. In Argentina, Esteban Echevarria, founded the Association of May in 1838 and wrote the *Socialist Dogma*. In Chile, in 1850, Francisco Bilbao created the "Society of Equals." Two poets in Mexico, Pantaleon Tovar and Juan Diaz Covarrubias, propagated utopianism, while in Brazil a Frenchman, Taudonnet, began to publish the *Socialist Review* in 1845. In Colombia the first socialist clubs were organized.

The old guild corporations of the colonial period disappeared or adopted a trade-union form. This development took place more rapidly when it received the help of European immigrants already familiar with trade unionism. That is why Argentina, with its mass immigration, experienced working-class struggles first.

The first union in Latin America was created in Buenos Aires in 1853. The *Union Grafica* (Printers' Union) won a ten-hour work day for newspaper shops in 1878, the first limitation of the working day accomplished by strike action. Nine years later the railwaymen went on strike to protest a foreman's mistreatment of one of their men.

It was the socialist *emigrés* who, after the Paris Commune, led the way to coordination of the until then scattered unions. Several sections—French, German, Spanish and Italian—of the First International were established at Buenos Aires. Their members exercised influence in various trades so as

to found the General Workers' Union of Argentina on May first, 1890.

This organization disappeared in 1896, weakened by a conflict between authoritarian and anti-authoritarian elements. In 1901 the Argentine Regional Workers' Federation (FORA) was organized. Exclusively trade-union elements left this in 1902 to found the General Workers' Union (UGT). In spite of a law permitting the expulsion of *emigré* agitators, the unions were very active. In 1902, 1904 and 1905 there were three general strikes, and in 1910 the Argentine Regional Workers' Confederation (CORA) was established. CORA and FORA merged in 1914, but split a year later. By the First World War the normal work day was ten hours (16 hours, however, for commercial employees), and wages kept up with price increases.

By 1918 FORA had 70,000 members and UGT had 80,000. Then, in 1929, after vain efforts to unify the unions, the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) was started. FORA remained independent. Trade-union cooperatives, certain of which lend economic support to strikes, have developed on a wide scale. In Uruguay and Paraguay similar movements developed.

As for Chile, thanks to foreign loans it was one of the first Latin American countries to become industrialized. British capital, followed by North American investments, built the railroads and worked the nitrate and copper mines in the inhospitable Northern regions. The working class developed rapidly, migration from the country into the cities was constant, contributing to the creation of a more democratic regime. The landed oligarchy was forced to permit universal suffrage in 1874, without any condition but literacy.

The nitrate region of Antofagasta, first exploited by combined Anglo-Chilean investments in 1866, saw thousands of peasants become miners. The solidarity which grew up among them was such as one rarely sees on the continent. The first strikes in the country were by the *salitreros* of Tarpaca in 1890 who wanted to be paid in cash, not in company-store vouchers. Jose Maria Balmaceda, president of the Republic, refused to act against the strikers and went so far as to suggest nationalizing the mines as well as the railroads. But in 1891 an oligarchical rebellion ended Balmaceda's regime and he committed suicide.

Chile today is still the country with the most highly developed cooperative movement. As early as 1900 there were 240 cooperatives. Starting in 1905, the anarchist movement organized the first groups and so energetic was their action that by 1907 a law establishing Sunday rest was promulgated. In 1910, out of 3,200,000 inhabitants listed by census, 55,000 were affiliated to 433 groups. A year later a large number of them had formed the Greater Workers' Federation of Chile (FOCH). The mass of workers affiliated in the north rapidly gained control and weakened the influence of the anarchist unions affiliated with the IWW. In 1921 the Federation constituted itself along industrial council lines, abandoning organization according to profession. Thanks to mutual-help organizations which it had created at the start, FOCH was able to sustain prolonged strikes such as the 1921 coal strike which lasted two months and which won an 8-hour day in the coal pits. After 1923 political events forced the FOCH into a crisis. The railroad workers' union split away from it and a number of other unions followed.

Until 1936, when the Chilean Workers' Confederation (CTCH) was established, FOCH led a rather monotonous existence; independent unions conducted the principal struggles.

In 1924 a military government was established which decreed, for demagogic reasons, a Labor Code giving legal recognition to the unions and to joint industrial committees. It also abolished night work for women and children, made health insurance obligatory and set minimum wages. In 1925, Arturo Apressandri issued a constitution recognizing the right of union organization and setting a 48-hour week.

Bolivia's first trade union made its appearance in 1906 and was called the Workers' Social Center. In 1912 the FOI (International Workers' Federation), changed to the FOT (Workers' Labor Federation) after 1918, was set up. This organization and the FOL (Local Workers' Federation—an anarcho-syndicalist movement) often form united fronts. In Peru also, anarchists were the initiators of the labor movement, taking leadership of the Confederation of Artisans ("Universal Union") which existed since 1884. The union instituted several agrarian communities for artisans. The CGT came much later and was dissolved, together with the "Universal Union," by the 1930 military dictatorship, at the moment when the APRA movement, founded in 1924 by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, began to develop. In 1922 Ecuador had its first union. As in the other countries, the central trade unions changed according to changes in the working-class ideologies and as the Communists formed their party—here by splitting with the socialists; or, as in Brazil, from anarchist groups.

In Central America the labor movement came late and has little influ-

ence. Costa Rican unions were unified only in 1943; in Guatemala two movements merged to form the Workers' Federation for Labor Protection; the Guatemalan Confederation of Workers was created in 1944.

By contrast, labor struggles in Cuba early acquired importance. In 1812, the Negro Juan Aponte led a slave uprising of 20,000 with the aim of establishing a Black Republic; in 1813 the *vegueros* refused to plant tobacco unless their wages were increased. In 1831, the copper mine workers rebelled and, in 1868, during the first war of independence, a group of Spanish anarchists founded the Society of Tobacco Workers. The work day then lasted 16 hours. In 1892 a Regional Workers Congress met to demand the 8-hour day. After independence from Spain, unions were rapidly formed and in 1925 joined together in a national Confederation which was successively dominated by the Communists and by democrats, then subjected to Batista from 1952 to 1959. Under Castro it is used to raise productivity and control the workers.

III

There are three different stages in the development of the Latin American labor movement:

a) *The period of origins:* Anarchists or socialists create unions, they have a life of their own, import European ideas and, without becoming political, take part in national problems.

b) *The period between the two world wars.* A withdrawal from active politics, but the unions become a battleground for Communists, socialists and anarchists. They rarely take part in the anti-imperialists' struggles except when these are conflicts with foreign enterprises (the most important

being those in the Colombian banana plantations in Santa Marta in 1929, the Chilean mine strikes and, in 1938, Mexican oil).

c) *The post-war period*: The unions become completely unpolitical in their activities, while splitting into anti- and pro-Communist groupings.

Several major conclusions may be drawn from this sketch of the Latin American labor movement.

First, the Latin American proletariat is numerically weak. In recent years, as a result of industrialization, it has increased in size, but its consciousness remains undeveloped and non-political. Except for Chile, the once powerful socialist and anarchist influence has vanished. Communist influence has always been slight, although during certain periods such as the Popular Front days and after the Second World War, Communists directed the central unions of a majority of Latin American countries. At present, Communism influences primarily intellectuals, students and the middle class. The Communists often succeed in making use of the working class, but have failed to obtain appreciable results in recruiting.

A majority of the labor movement is led at present by elements of the popular and revolutionary democratic parties (Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Costa Rica), by a Socialist-Communist alliance (Chile and a section in Ecuador), by a Peronist-Communist alliance (Argentina), and by leaders who are to all intents state functionaries (Brazil). Within all these movements a very active struggle between democratic and Communist tendencies goes on. The outcome of these struggles depends more upon the leaders' personal popularity than upon their ideological views. In Chile, Venezuela,

Colombia and Ecuador, the Christian-Democrats have begun to gain a measure of influence.

In the second place, the labor movement has lived in a state of isolation from other social forces. It has almost never collaborated with peasant organizations in the few countries where they exist. There is even the example of the "Red Battalions" formed by Mexican workers during the 1910-1917 Revolution which helped the city forces crush the insurrectionary peasantry. Although on several occasions the unions have attempted to organize peasants, they have rarely succeeded. The same indifference is found with respect to the problem of the Indians. The unions have neither a program nor a viewpoint to help in the solution of this problem despite its considerable importance for the labor movement, one reason being that Indians are easily mobilized as strike-breakers. It is only recently that in a few countries — Peru, Venezuela — the unions have shown an active interest in the agrarian question.

This isolation sometimes takes on a politically reactionary character. Since industrialization takes place almost everywhere without any prior or parallel agrarian reform, it is the peasants who must pay for it. Thus, to a degree, the working class becomes a parasitic class living off the peasantry. Even without a conscious realization of this, the unions have often sided with the feudal oligarchy against the peasantry or have become the latter's accomplice through indifference toward the peasants. Suffice it to recall that the Cuban unions did not participate in the anti-Batista struggle. It is only lately that the unions, almost without exception, have taken a stand in favor of land reform. But even then

it is only a platonic position which leaves to the popular and middle-class movements the brunt of the struggle against the *latafundists*.

Finally, such isolation creates very marked tendencies in the labor movement toward bureaucratization, the perpetuation of "leaders" in their posts, a fiction of democracy at meetings.

The result of this isolation and bureaucratism is the indifference of the unions toward important national questions. Not only a lack of interest in the agrarian and Indian problems, but no participation in planning where it exists, no struggle against dictatorships with the exception of some groups in Venezuela and Peru, no support to cultural activities, no help in the forming of workers or popular universities despite the fact that forty years ago such schools were common in Latin America and, particularly those under anarcho-syndicalist leadership tied to the labor movement.

IV

Despite these shortcomings, the labor movement has a part to play in Latin American life. Growth of Latin America's economy and politics requires that the unions participate.

It seems clear that the Latin American "revolution" about which everyone talks is nothing but a typical bourgeois revolution. It seems also clear that the weak and politically inexperienced Latin American proletariat, lacking any doctrine, can play only a subordinate and secondary role in this revolution. But if it cannot lead the revolution, it does have sufficient weight to limit to some extent the freedom of movement of the bourgeoisie which itself is still in process of forma-

tion. Limits to exploitation can be established to prevent the repetition in Latin America of the worst characteristics of industrialization in Europe and the United States. Particularly, the labor movement ought by its action to prevent the bourgeoisie and the forces that support it (the technicians and the younger army people who possess a rather developed sense of efficiency) from attempting to force the nation's development by non-democratic means; that is, to prevent over-exploitation of labor according to the Soviet model. This model, moreover, has a greater attraction for the bourgeoisie and the young military men and technicians than for the working class which mistrusts the Communists.

Very likely the major task of the unions at present is to win the right to actively participate in the economic planning about which everyone now talks and which the United States has finally come to accept. The cultural and technical level of the Latin American trade-union leadership is generally rather low. To prepare leaders, to renew the union teams by infusions of young blood, to attract intellectuals, students, technicians and especially young workers into the unions, to support the organizing of peasants and to help Indian groups become modern without losing their identity are among the many phases of union activity which still remain unexplored. Latin American labor needs to reform itself, needs to fall into step with the evolution of Latin America and make a reality out of the workers' movement's old slogan: to make itself the representative of all of society's interests precisely because it represents the interests of the workers.

(Translated by STANLEY PLASTRIK)

Samuel Shapiro

BOLIVIA'S FALTERING REVOLUTION

Bolivia's history provides a case study, exaggerated almost to caricature, of the reasons for the economic and political backwardness of Latin America. Geographic poverty, the heritage from Spain, a one-crop economy, racial and social tensions, and the absence of a middle class—these conditions, present everywhere to the south of us, are so overwhelming in Bolivia that one almost despairs of bringing the nation into the twentieth century. Yet this bitterly poor country of only 3.5 million people (two-thirds of them illiterate Indians who cannot even speak Spanish) celebrated this April the tenth anniversary of a genuine social revolution, one of the few ever to take place in this hemisphere. The significance of this revolution is enhanced by Bolivia's key position in the heart of South America, by its relation with similar revolutionary movements elsewhere in the area, and by its close ties with the United States, all of which make Bolivia a proving ground for the concepts of the Alliance for Progress.

Historians with a fondness for clichés like to call Bolivia a “Beggar on a throne of Gold.” During the colonial period Upper Peru, as it was then called, was indeed a source of immense wealth; the mountain of Potosí alone yielded 60 million troy pounds of silver (worth \$600 million today), and the city of Potosí was the largest in all the Americas. The silver boom was followed, after a long interval, by a boom in other metals, especially tin. Bolivia also has large, though still unexploited, oil reserves, and the eastern provinces of Beni and Santa Cruz can produce cattle, cotton, sugar, rubber, and tropical fruits.

These prospects, however, have so far been illusory. Mining in Bolivia has always been a robber industry which rested on semi-servile labor and brought wealth only to a very few. And agriculture, which still accounts for two-thirds of the labor force, makes use of only two per cent of the land area, and that in the bleak *altiplano*, the two and a half mile high tableland where the Indian majority lives. Thus a nation the size of Texas and California combined with a population density of only eight persons per square mile, the lowest in the hemisphere, cannot feed its own people. Bolivia imports more than half of its food and its per capita income of about \$70 a year is, next to Haiti's, the lowest in the hemisphere.

Poverty-stricken nations paradoxically produce some of the world's great fortunes. A feudal system brought over from Spain and grafted

onto the communal agriculture of the Inca survived in Bolivia down to the 1952 revolution; the Indian tenant owed personal service to his master, and could be rented out or sold with the estate. A few thousand landowners thus lived in comfortable though land-poor luxury, while their *pongos* (serfs) subsisted on a diet of 1200 calories a day and endlessly chewed coca leaves to deaden their hunger and fatigue. But the really big profits went to the tin mining companies controlled by the Patiño, Hochschild, and Aramayo families, which together produced eighty per cent of Bolivia's tin and twenty per cent of the world supply. Simón I. Patiño, an Indian from Cochabamba, came to control half of the nation's tin production and lived in Paris, Nice, and Biarritz like a great lord. His income, tax free because he was a Bolivian diplomat, was in some years greater than the national budget, and, as he once loftily told an inquiring official, "he was not interested in investments in Bolivia." Instead he used his immense income to purchase tin mines in Malaya and smelters in Europe, helping to decapitalize an already impoverished economy. The miners, subject to silicosis and tuberculosis and earning in most cases less than sixty cents a day, were kept at work by cruelly repressive measures punctuated by open massacres.

This iniquitous system was brought to an end by the triumph of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) in 1952. An armed MNR revolt defeated the regular army and brought Victor Paz Estenssoro, a quiet-spoken former professor of economics, to power. During his first term (1952–1956) Paz transformed Bolivian society. The army was tamed by demotions, exile, and jail, and its weapons turned over to militia regiments of miners and farmers. Six months after taking office Paz nationalized the Big Three mining companies, promising, however, to pay for them in the future. At the same time an MNR-sponsored *Grand Peur* swept the countryside; landlords and *mayordomos* were frightened off or driven off, and the Indians seized the land. An Agrarian Reform law issued by presidential decree on August 2, 1953 gave a color of legality to what had already taken place, and promised to pay for expropriated land with 25-year bonds (so far never issued). Although the actual granting of land titles was carried out very slowly (and with considerable violence and bribery of government officials), the number of landholders shot up in a few years from 50,000 to 800,000.

The MNR revolution, part of a continent-wide movement toward political and economic democracy, wrought a social transformation outstripping even the one that later took place in Cuba. Before 1952 the Quechua and Aymará Indians were not men but *pongos*, human livestock, who lived in wretched mud huts and slept on the floor like animals. The Indian majority was in the nation, but not part of it; it did not act, but was acted upon. As a recent Minister of Education put it:

The Indian is a sphinx. He inhabits a hermetic world, inaccessible to the white and the mestizo. . . . The Indian lives. The Indian acts and produces. The Indian does not allow himself to be understood, he doesn't

desire communication. Retiring silent, immutable, he inhabits a closed world. The Indian is an enigma.

The past decade has brought about greater changes than the preceding four centuries. Almost overnight the Indians were given land, civil liberties, the right to vote, military drill, and rifles. Peasants who formerly did not dare protest to their masters against forced labor of three or four days a week now come to La Paz to explain their problems to the President of the Republic, and receive a sympathetic hearing. After interviewing migrant sugar-cane workers in Northern Argentina a few years ago, I was struck by the superior sophistication of the Bolivians, who had formerly been the most backward. Mataco Indians from Argentina and Guaraní from Paraguay generally did not know their ages, what country they came from, or how much they were being paid. But the Toba, who came across the border from Southern Bolivia in the harvest season, were well aware of their salaries, their rights under an Argentine-Bolivian labor compact, and the meaning of inflation and differential exchange rates. The awakening of the Indian population is the principal accomplishment of the MNR, and one which is spreading beyond Bolivia's borders to Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador.

Economic Problems

This remarkable social achievement has, however, been put in jeopardy by the mediocre performance of the economy under the MNR. The text of the Agrarian Reform law calls for the preservation of efficiently run medium-size holdings and the provision of technical aid to the new small-holders. In practice, however, little distinction was made between badly run latifundia and well-cultivated estates, and Bolivia lacked the technicians and the foreign exchange that would have made possible assistance to the peasant proprietor. Agricultural production, always insufficient to cover the country's needs, dropped rather sharply and has yet to recover. Now master of his own land and labor, the Indian probably eats a little better and lives more comfortably, but he has neither the ability nor incentive to produce a surplus for the market. This leaves the urban one-third of Bolivia's population more dependent than ever on imported food.

The agricultural slump was accompanied by a collapse in the tin industry. Since World War II tin exports had provided about two-thirds of Bolivia's meager foreign exchange earnings; in 1951, with prices rising as high as \$1.80 a pound because of the Korean War, tin exports brought in \$93 million. Shortly thereafter, for reasons having nothing to do with the MNR, the price fell as low as 80 cents, and until recently has hovered at about \$1 a pound. Since each decline of one cent costs Bolivia about \$600,000, this disastrous slide, typical of what has happened to other Latin American commodities like coffee, wool, and copper, wrecked the nation's foreign exchange position at the very time that imports had become more essential than ever.

Even without the price decline, the government mining company

(COMIBOL) was in serious trouble. The former owners had put no capital into exploration or new equipment since about 1935, and the mines were in a run-down condition. Under government ownership things went from bad to worse. As a result of pressure from the powerful Miners' Union (FSTMB) thousand of new workers were hired and unproductive mines continued in operation; production nevertheless continued to slide, from 43,000 tons in 1945 to 30,000 tons in 1953, to 15,000 tons last year. Worn out equipment, absenteeism, feather-bedding, strikes, and depletion of the ore bodies have cut production per miner in half since nationalization. One director of COMIBOL negotiated a crooked contract for Argentine beef, escaped punishment and went off to comfortable exile in Buenos Aires; another was caught making profitable deals with his parents on behalf of the company. At present, despite a recovery in the market price of tin, COMIBOL's losses are running at about \$1 million a month; it costs the company between \$1.40 and \$2.10 to produce a pound of tin that sells for \$1.20. And hanging over the market is a U.S. strategic stockpile of 349,000 tons, part of which Senator Symington is now trying to dispose of.

Given the chaotic state of mining and agriculture, Bolivia's revolutionary leaders would have faced disaster without American aid. In contrast to our attitude toward Castro's Cuba, such aid has been forthcoming, in an amount so far equal to about a quarter of a billion dollars. Although the free enterprise theology of Secretary Dulles led him to veto requested loans for COMIBOL and the government oil company (YPFB), he did approve shipments of surplus food, technical assistance missions, extensive road-building operations, educational and agricultural aid, and direct payments which have regularly provided between thirty and forty per cent of the Bolivian national budget. In eight years our total aid has added up to more than Bolivia's annual Gross National Product, and it is evidently going to continue; Bolivia got the first loans under President Kennedy's much-publicized Alliance for Progress. Our experience there thus provides useful information as to the expanded *Alianza's* prospects for success elsewhere in Latin America. It must be confessed that the record to date is not a very heartening one.

Mismanagement and Corruption

To begin with, the program has been plagued with endemic mismanagement and corruption. As Stanford University's *Hispanic American Report* (April, 1960, pp. 49-50) sums up the findings of a Senate investigating committee:

It was discovered that no adequate financial records of expenditures or losses were kept until 1957, and that more than a million dollars were unaccounted for. Between 1954 and 1957 more than \$2 million in food and fiber gifts were lost through overcrowding of ports serving Bolivia and theft of material in transit. Many expensive and ill-conceived projects were undertaken which later had to be abandoned because they did not suit the country's needs. A million dollars were wasted on a

discontinued irrigation project in the Villamontes region of eastern Bolivia, which was so remote from populous areas that it could not be used. Two plants costing \$225,000 to produce yucca flour would probably never be used, since there is no market in Bolivia for yucca flour. An agricultural vocational training center costing \$160,000 was abandoned because it was too far in advance of Bolivia's needs. Agricultural equipment worth \$500,000 was lost, and other equipment, including combines, was rusting in the original crates because, again, it was unsuited to Bolivian agriculture. Even the much-publicized powdered milk plant at Cochamba, built as a joint U.S.-UNICEF project, was still not in production, and it did not appear that the plant would have adequate milk supplies for many years to come. . . . One confidential source pointed out that a sizeable percentage of U.S. aid had been diverted to the repayment of the Export-Import Bank loans so that the bank could maintain its records of no defaults. Another portion allegedly went for repayment of defaulted foreign loans which were contracted in the early part of this century under such scandalous terms that many do not think repayment should be resumed.

If we subtract these wasted sums and others like them, the total of our effective aid to Bolivia is somewhat less impressive. And American aid carried with it certain obligations. As Robert J. Alexander points out in *The Bolivian National Revolution* (1958):

The United States was not willing to begin such a program until at least a preliminary arrangement had been made with the old tin-mining companies, in which a considerable amount of United States capital was invested. . . . Several years later United States advice was a key factor in the writing of a Petroleum Code which is, from the point of view of foreign company seeking concessions, one of the most liberal in America.

Thus Simón Patiño's heir Antenor, who is so wealthy that he found it expedient to lend COMIBOL \$5 million last year in return for a special divorce law, will continue to draw payments from wretched miners of the altiplano. And Patiño Mines, Incorporated (28 per cent U.S.-owned) continues to invest its Bolivian profits abroad, most recently in purchasing the Bowie racetrack and a luxury hotel in Mexico City. The spectacle of American money being used to buy new playthings for a multimillionaire is enlightening.

Other American beneficiaries of "foreign" aid were the holders of \$57 million in defaulted Bolivian bonds issued during the 1920's; MNR President Siles Zuazo, who succeeded Paz in office, was persuaded to resume payment on them in 1958. Grace steamship lines and the John Deere agricultural implements firm also made generous profits from our ICA program.

As Alexander suggests, the new petroleum legislation, written with the aid of U.S. experts, is also generous. Bolivia nationalized her oil in 1937, and agreed to indemnify Standard Oil for its properties in 1942. But in 1956 the MNR agreed to grant forty-year concessions to for-

eign firms, along with special tax exemption and import permits. Alexander's explanation of the circumstances surrounding this reversal of policy is worth quoting:

There was a certain amount of pressure exerted by the United States Government—or at least the Bolivian Government might well think that there was. In this connection the action of Henry Holland in resigning as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs and turning up a few months later as a lawyer for oil interests seeking concessions in Bolivia has been criticized—particularly since he had been Assistant Secretary at the time the new Petroleum Code was written, with the help and advice of United States Government officials. . . . In the light of these circumstances, the Bolivians could not be blamed for regarding the sudden appearance of Mr. Holland so soon after his resignation from the top United States diplomatic post concerned with Latin American affairs as “pressure” of a rather obvious sort.

Private companies have so far spent \$90 million in exploration and drilling; only one or two discovery wells have been successful, and these are in the isolated eastern province of Santa Cruz. Officials of Bolivian Gulf say that another \$50 million in development will have to be spent before they can consider building a pipeline, and the present oversupply of Venezuelan, Middle Eastern, and Soviet oil on the world market make Bolivia's prospects dubious.

Agricultural Resettlement

The American plan to encourage agricultural resettlement in Bolivia's empty Eastern tropics, one of the few aid projects that has gone beyond the piecemeal, emergency stage, has also so far proved a disappointment. A 300-mile highway between Cochabamba and Santa Cruz was opened with much fanfare by Secretary Holland in 1954; when I visited Bolivia in 1959 it had been completely paved. The hope was that surplus farmers and miners could be attracted down from the altiplano and settled in farm colonies in the unexploited tropics. It was an attractive idea, and the mechanical engineering involved in building the road was superb. But the human engineering involved was faulty, for the Quechua and Aymará failed to behave like American frontiersmen excited by the prospect of cheap land. They had only recently gained title to the cold, windswept lands their ancestors had worked for centuries, and against all “logic” they refused to abandon them for new settlements in the jungle. Only a few thousand natives and some Japanese immigrants have taken advantage of the opportunity to emigrate, and many of them left after a year or two, disgusted with the strong-arm rule of Luis Sandoval Morón, the MNR boss of the area. Santa Cruz today still has fewer inhabitants than it had in the gaudy days of the pre-World War I rubber boom.

The result of Bolivian and American failure to come to grips with the nation's basic needs is painfully evident. No revolution in history has had so much outside aid, yet Bolivia's GNP has fallen from \$210

million in 1950 (\$84 per capita) to \$191 million last year (\$64 per capita). The government continues to teeter on the edge of bankruptcy, and a murderous inflation has been slowed down but not stopped by an American-sponsored stabilization plan (when I visited the country the *boliviano* was worth 1/120th of a cent!). Testimony before Congressional committees investigating our aid program (quoted by Heliodoro Gonzales, "The Domestic Political Effects of Foreign Aid," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Autumn, 1961) makes bleak reading:

1958: "Economic conditions have not improved as had been hoped for nor has the political situation become more settled."

1959: (Douglas Dillon, now Secretary of the Treasury): "The situation is serious and we cannot see that the situation is improving. . . . It is very difficult to foresee what the future of Bolivia is and how Bolivia is going to get to stand on its own feet."

1961: (Lincoln Gordon, now Ambassador to Brazil): "There has not been progress. . . . There has been economic stagnation and in fact the living standard per capita has gone down."

1962: (Professor Richard W. Patch of the American Universities Field Staff): "American aid has brought respect for the United States in government circles, but hardly love from the mass of people who continue among the most poverty stricken of Latin America."

The Kennedy Administration has given special attention to this inherited headache, which is such an ill omen for the success of our aid programs elsewhere. Benjamin Stephansky, formerly a labor specialist at the University of Chicago, has been named as our Ambassador in La Paz with the evident hope that a trained economist can suggest workable reforms. Kennedy has also been willing for the first time to make loans to state-owned industries, under new and more business-like conditions. But it is evident that we can still be pressured into loans and grants by invoking the specter of Communism and Castroism. American policy is still based on Professor Alexander's warning that the Communists "are the group most likely to profit from the national revolutionaries' failure"—a curious mirror image of the older argument that led us to support Pérez Jiménez, Rojas Pinilla, Trujillo, Batista, and every other right wing dictator in this hemisphere. This estimate is no doubt entirely right; but if the U.S. and the MNR cannot improve on their performance of the past decade, not even another \$250 million will keep the Cubans, the Russians, and the Chinese out of La Paz.

Cold War Balance

Fidel's plans for Bolivia are no secret. He has, of course, denounced the MNR leaders as "petty bourgeois, who have completed the surrender to Yankee imperialism"; on my visits to Cuba in 1960 and 1961 I kept meeting Bolivian Communist leaders who had been given paid visits to Havana to learn the techniques of propaganda and guerrilla

warfare at the source. The Bolivian CP is very small—it got only two per cent of the vote in the 1960 presidential elections—but it has influence beyond its numbers and is supported by a hyperactive Cuban embassy. Some locals of the tin miners' union are Communist dominated, and the party has a voice in the central labor federation (COB). By calling for "direct action by the masses" for wage increases such Communist leaders as Ireneo Pimentel and Federico Escobar (both union officials at the big Siglo XX mine) hope to weaken the government and gain popularity for themselves. Professor Patch, on the scene in La Paz, reported this February that "sentiment for Communist Cuba is a contained but explosive force." *Fidelista* influence was strong enough to make Bolivia one of the six nations that refused to vote for the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS at Punta del Este last January, despite what must have been enormous pressure from the American delegation.

The Soviet offensive in Bolivia has been conducted directly, as well as through native and Cuban intermediaries. Last October in New York Khrushchev offered \$10 million to build a long-hoped-for tin smelter; in December a visiting squadron of Russian experts offered a \$150 million low-interest long-term loan "without political conditions"—i.e., without even demanding the renewal of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Lincoln White, the State Department's press officer, has primly warned that a smelter "would be uneconomic and unfeasible for Bolivia at this time," and President Paz has so far hesitated to accept such a Greek gift for fear of losing his American grants—but he hasn't dared to reject Soviet offers outright, either.

In Bolivia then, even more than elsewhere in Latin America, the cold war balance is a delicate one, and neither side has gained a definitive victory. No recital of the errors and shortcomings of the MNR and the American aid program should blind us to the accomplishments of the Bolivian revolution's first decade. The MNR made the Indian a part of society, and for the most part still retains his loyalty. It has provided that often-underestimated blessing, stable government; Paz, the first Bolivian president in thirty years to finish out his term, turned over the office in due course to Siles, and was in turn re-elected in a reasonably free election in 1960. As Walter Guevara Arze, the losing candidate that year put it, "a fraudulent election is better for Bolivia than a revolution." The MNR record on civil liberties is not perfect, but there are opposition newspapers and parties and deputies; the Chamber even went so far as to refuse to confirm ex-President Siles as Ambassador to Uruguay. Economic blunders have been made, but the record in Castro's Cuba does not suggest that Soviet-style development is any more rapid or free from error.

Our own failures in Bolivia provide some idea of the difficulties the *Alianza* will face elsewhere. President Kennedy takes a personal interest in Latin America (which always bored Secretary Dulles) and has introduced some administrative reforms and some new ideas. We have got rid of a number of the inept amateur diplomats who got us into such a mess in Cuba and other countries. The Administration's willingness to

cooperate with nationalized industries in Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico is a hopeful sign. So is the widespread success and acceptance of the Peace Corps, which is already active in Bolivia and bringing to bear the idealism and practical approach that have been lacking in the past. But we have not yet come to grips with basic problems: the need for massive social reforms, for birth control, for civilian control of the military, for a Latin American common market, and for economic independence from the United States. In Bolivia after eight years we are only holding our own, preserving an unstable situation by massive infusions of aid without basically altering an unhealthy colonial economy. Cuba is an island which can be surrounded by the U.S. Navy and diplomatically isolated from its neighbors. But Bolivia has land frontiers with five other nations, and a Communist victory there would be a staggering defeat for democratic socialism in the rest of the hemisphere.

Robert J. Alexander

CONFUSION IN BRITISH GUIANA

The present situation in British Guiana must be traced back to the years immediately preceding World War II. Previous to that time, the colonies of the West Indies had lived in a kind of backwash of history. The overdevelopment of the sugar industry in the latter half of the 18th century had ended the era of fabulous prosperity of the land-owners of the region, which had resulted in many fortunes, as well as in the transport of hundreds of thousands of Africans to the region to do the work in the cane fields, people whose descendants make up the bulk of the population throughout most of the Caribbean area to this day.

The abolition of slavery during the first half of the 19th century completed the destruction of the era of sugar prosperity. For a century thereafter, the islands and mainland colonies of the region were the scene of vast misery, grinding poverty and the steady decline of the institutions of self-government established in the 18th century.

Suddenly, in 1937–38 this whole situation changed. As if by common accord a wave of unrest, punctuated by widespread strikes and violent political demonstrations spread throughout the British, French and Dutch parts of the Caribbean. This movement resulted in the establishment of two different kinds of institutions in each colony—a trade-union movement and one or more political parties—which were usually closely intertwined, and frequently had an identical leadership.

The principal figures in this movement were often very picturesque. Such men as Uriah Butler of Trinidad and William Alexander Bustamante were colorful demagogues who were very good orators but lacked ideas or a program. In many cases, they gave way after a few years to more thoughtful and stable kinds of leaders—although Bustamante remains an exception to this rule.

The British, as is their wont, took warning from this uprising of 1937–38. They began a process of political reorganization in the area, which in a series of steps turned the government of the individual colonies over to elected representatives, and also gave some encouragement to moves to diversify their economies. This process is now entering its last phase, with Jamaica and Trinidad already having achieved their independence, the rest of the British Caribbean islands organized in the East Caribbean Federation likely to be a sovereign nation collectively within another couple of years, and British Guiana also having been

promised independence, with no definite date being set for it. At the same time, the French territories of the area have been given the status of departments of Metropolitan France, and the Dutch regions have been organized into two semi-independent partners in the Dutch monarchy, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles.

Sugar Colony

British Guiana has participated fully in this anti-colonial revolt of the last quarter of a century. However, it has had certain peculiar characteristics which have made the process more complicated and will perhaps postpone its culmination for some time. For one thing, the initial revolt of 1937-38 gave rise only to a trade-union movement, and it was more than a decade before a political party appeared on the scene. Second, when this party did appear, it was Communist-oriented. Finally, the whole situation has been very much confused and complicated by a serious race division within the country.

British Guiana is essentially a sugar colony. Although it is about the size of Great Britain, its population numbers only about half a million, and most of its people live within a few miles of the ocean, on land which has been rescued from the sea and is guarded by dikes which were originally built by the Dutch, who held the colony for two centuries before the British seized it during the Napoleonic Wars.

The population of the country consists of something under 45% Negroes, a bit more than 45% people of East Indian origin or descent, whose forebears were brought into the colony as indentured servants after the Negroes abandoned the sugar plantations in the wake of emancipation. The remainder consists of a variety of people of British, Chinese, Portuguese, American Indian and mixed ancestry. Generally, the urban population is Negro, the countryfolk are East Indian.

Although sugar, which is sold principally to the British, is the country's main crop, there has been a considerable increase in rice production during recent years. Some farmers also grow garden crops. Some miles into the interior there are rich deposits of bauxite, which have been developed by Reynolds and Alcoa, and this product constitutes the second most important export.

Most of the Guianese are exceedingly poor. Until recent years most of the sugar workers lived in barracks-like houses originally built for indentured servants. The population has been increasing rapidly in recent years, and the economic development of the country has not kept up with the rising number of people. This situation has been made worse by the need to rationalize the country's sugar production, in order to keep British Guiana cane competitive in world markets, a process which has seriously reduced the number of workers employed in sugar.

However, the economic potentialities of the nation are great. In the virtually uninhabited interior, it has vast forest regions, tremendous hydro-electric resources, and virtually unexplored and unexploited mineral reserves. With adequate development of these resources, British

Guiana could undoubtedly support a population many times its present size.

During 1937-38 the revolt in British Guiana brought into existence a new trade-union organization with the unique name of the Man Power Citizens Association, which had its main strength among the sugar workers, who made up the largest work force of the colony and were predominantly of East Indian extraction. It was led by Ayude Edun, a colorful East Indian, and as long as he was alive the MPCA was a militant union and succeeded in making significant gains for the sugar workers. However, after his death in the mid 1940's the MPCA declined in militancy and popularity, and by the early 1950's was virtually a company union, a state from which it has been rescued only in very recent years.

Political Life

Meanwhile, the political life of the colony remained almost unchanged for a long time. The legislature contained only a minority of elected members, and the franchise for choosing these was very restricted. The nearest thing to political parties which existed were two loose organizations of citizens of East Indian and African descent, and racism was the chief ingredient of political discussion.

Then right after World War II there returned from schooling in the States a young East Indian dentist, Dr. Cheddi Jagan, bringing along with him his American wife, Janet, who had reportedly been a Young Communist League leader in Chicago in the late 1930's. Soon after his return, Jagan was elected to the colonial legislature, and thereafter he set about the task of organizing a real political party.

The upshot of his activities was the establishment in 1950 of the Peoples Progressive Party. In organization and name patterned after Norman Manley's Peoples National Party in Jamaica, it differed from the PNP in basic political orientation. However, it met with immediate success.

The PPP ignored the question of race. It included within its ranks Indians such as Jagan and Dr. Lachmansingh, but also had important younger leaders of the African community, such as lawyer L.F.S. Burnham and Ashton Chase, secretary general of the colony's oldest labor organization, the British Guiana Labor Union. It proclaimed its objective to be self-government for British Guiana, and announced that it was "independent Marxist" and "Socialist."

The Peoples Progressive Party immediately gained wide support. It was popular among the Indian sugar workers, probably because of Jagan's own Indian and plantation background. However, it also had the backing of most of the largely Negro workingclass of Georgetown and other urban centers. For a time at least, it put an end to the classic division of the country's political opinion along racial lines.

From the beginning, however, the pro-Communist orientation of the PPP was obvious. Cheddi Jagan himself was listed in those days as

the British Guiana representative of the World Federation of Trade Unions, and unions under PPP control belonged to the WFTU; the party's paper *Thunder* was unashamedly pro-Soviet and engaged (albeit in somewhat muted tones) in most of the international Communist propaganda campaigns of the period. A number of the then leaders of the party were frank to tell the writer in 1953 that in the world division between the Communists and the West, the PPP was with the former.

Nevertheless, the British went ahead with a program of extending self-government in the colony, and as a result of the first (and last) elections under a new constitution in 1953, the Peoples Progressive Party won an overwhelming victory. They took over the government in June 1953 and remained in power until October of the same year.

It is still not clear what motivated the British to overthrow the first PPP government. However, it is clear that the government undertook to introduce into the legislature a law patterned after the Wagner Act, which would undoubtedly have resulted in the elimination of the Man Power Citizens Association, which was controlled by anti-Jagan elements, and the substitution as the chief labor organization of the colony the PPP's own Guiana Workers Industrial Union. The British subsequently claimed that the PPP ministers were also trying to subvert the police and the armed forces, which as yet remained under the control of the British-appointed governor.

For whatever reasons, the British government in October 1953 landed troops in the colony, suspended the constitution and removed the Jagan government. For the next four years the colony was run by an appointed "interim" government, and during most of this period the PPP leaders suffered serious legal restrictions on their freedom of action. Some were jailed for short periods, and virtually all were put under a kind of "town arrest," being forbidden to leave their home areas.

Meanwhile, in January 1955 a split occurred within the PPP. This had been foreshadowed for some time. Even in 1953 there had been a struggle within the party over the leadership, with L.F.S. Burnham aspiring to unseat Cheddi Jagan as the principal figure in the PPP government. As a result of this, the party's assumption of power was postponed for almost two months after it had won the election. Jagan won out, and during the 1953 government was the recognized leader of the elected ministers.

With the separation of Burnham and others from the PPP to form the Peoples National Congress, the PNC leaders violently attacked the Jagans and their friends for their pro-Communist leanings. At the same time, they proclaimed themselves to be democratic Socialists, and formed more or less close links with other democratic Socialist groups in the Caribbean, such as the Peoples National Party of Jamaica.

At about the same time, the PPP suffered another split, this time to the left. A small group of predominantly African leaders withdrew, charging that Jagan was not sufficiently pushing the Communist line in the colony, and was being too compromising with the British and with

other political elements in the country. Sydney King, a member of the 1953 cabinet, was the chief figure in this group, most of whose members soon abandoned their overt Communist sympathies.

In spite of these setbacks, the PPP triumphed again when elections were called once more in 1957. Their victory was by a narrower margin, and they lost in Georgetown and other urban centers, but their support was solid among the East Indian sugar workers, as well as among many East Indian middle class elements in the towns.

Pressure for Independence

The PPP has been in charge of the government since its victory in 1957. There is little doubt that Jagan and his friends have had the hardest time faced by any pro-Communist group which has had power in any country in recent decades. They have not had charge of the police and armed forces. They have not even enjoyed the sympathy of much of the civil service, which is largely of Negro extraction. As a result, there has been no opportunity to establish a dictatorship. At the same time, the economic situation of the colony has not been such as to allow the government to engage in any spectacular economic development program which might generate widespread backing. Although Jagan has constantly proclaimed his desire to encourage foreign investment, fear of what he will do once foreign investors have come into the country has hampered his attempts to bring in new enterprises.

Throughout his period in power, Jagan has continued to press the British on the question of independence for British Guiana. He made several trips to London to discuss the matter, and although the British reiterated their intention ultimately to give complete sovereignty to the colony, they were exceedingly reluctant about fixing a final date for independence.

The August 1961 election was looked upon generally as a prelude to independence. Jagan made it clear that if his party won, he would go to London for "final" negotiations. The British, however, continued to be non-committal.

The PPP won for the third time in 1961. However, this time its majority was greatly reduced. The Jaganites received about 42% of the total vote, Burnham and the Peoples National Congress received approximately 41%, with the rest going to a new party organized a few months before the election, the United Force, headed by a well-to-do businessman of Portuguese origins, Peter Daguier. However, in spite of Jagan's pre-election protests that the British had gerrymandered election districts to the disadvantage of his party, the PPP won a majority of nineteen of the thirty-five members of the legislature.

With his new victory, Jagan was officially recognized as Premier of the government of British Guiana, the British explaining that "premier" would be converted into "prime minister" when the colony received its independence constitution. Soon after the legislature met, the government introduced a motion urging "immediate independence," a move

supported by the Peoples National Congress members. At the same time Jagan announced that it was his objective to preserve political democracy in the country, and that upon achieving independence British Guiana would remain part of the Commonwealth, and would join the Organization of American States.

A few months after the 1961 election, Cheddi Jagan visited the United States and Canada, seeking financial aid for the economic development of the country. He discussed this problem not only with government officials of the two northern nations, but likewise with businessmen who might be interested in investing in British Guiana. He returned home with a glowing report on possibilities of foreign help, possibilities which have so far not become certainties.

However, in spite of Jagan's optimism, British Guiana still appears to be some distance from full independence. And at this point it is not at all certain that Cheddi Jagan and the PPP will be the ones to pilot it into the sea of complete sovereignty. Events within the country and continued British procrastination explain the slow pace of developments.

Ever since the election, the country has been characterized by mounting political tension. This is due in large part to the clear racial delineation which became evident in the 1961 poll. In spite of the presence of a considerable number of Negroes in the leadership of the PPP, the party's strength was confined almost completely to the East Indian rural areas. At the same time, the Peoples National Congress received almost complete support of the Negro workingclass in the cities and towns, while the United Force won principally in urban middle class constituencies. Thus, the old evil of British Guianese politics—racism—was revived in full force.

Tension reached the point of explosion in February 1962, when serious riots broke out in Georgetown, during which much of the commercial part of the city was burned to the ground. The immediate cause of the insurrection was a new tax program of the Jagan government, which involved not only excess profits levies but increased imposts on small incomes as well. However, there is no doubt that racism tinged the riots, some of the principal victims being the East Indian merchants of the capital.

It is not clear to this day who was responsible for the riots. The government claimed that it was elements of the opposition, the latter accused members of the PPP. One strange aspect of the riots which confuses the picture is the fact that only about a week before, most of the Indian merchants in the center of town took out riot insurance.

The riots seriously imperilled the Jagan government. The premier was forced to call in British troops to save his regime. At the same time, he also had to drop his tax plans, with the result that the government has been faced with a rising deficit.

The effects of the riot have been adverse for the PPP. First, they entailed a full-fledged investigation by a British commission, which did not enhance the prestige of the Jagan government. Second, the riots

gave the British authorities a chance to opine once again that independence remained "somewhat in the future," which observation brought forth a bitter denunciation by Jagan and a statement that he was now dubious about whether British Guiana would remain in the Commonwealth once it had achieved independence.

Even more serious from the PPP point of view, however, is the fact that the riots seem to have provoked a split in the solid ranks of the East Indian supporters of Jagan and the PPP. Since the February events, the middle class and wealthy Indian traders have become increasingly dubious of the government party. East Indian solidarity has become less important in their eyes than the pro-Communist position of the PPP and its leader.

The Indian middle and upper class people will certainly not join the Peoples National Congress, dominated as it is by the Negroes. However, it is not impossible that they may join with Peter Daguier's United Force to form a group which would have the balance of power in the country's politics. Only a relatively slight shift of Indian voters would deprive the Peoples Progressive Party of its majority.

All this has already created a precarious situation for the Jagan government in the legislature. The PPP has expelled one of its East Indian ministers from his post and the party, and his joining the opposition has reduced the PPP to a majority of only two. The desertion of two more PPP members would result in the fall of the Jagan government, and a new election. Under the circumstances, the PPP would have no assurance of victory at the polls.

Democracy or Totalitarianism?

Thus, the future of British Guiana remains somewhat obscure. If Jagan remains in power, the British will probably continue to procrastinate as long as possible about granting independence to the colony. If Jagan is able to work this procrastination up into a popular issue, he may be able to save the political position of his party. However, in spite of pro-independence declarations of Burnham, there is something less than enthusiasm for complete sovereignty for the colony among the Negroes (and perhaps among the more well-to-do Indians) so long as Jagan remains in control. So, it seems highly doubtful that the PPP will be able by an anti-British campaign to recapture the ground which they have lost.

If Jagan should fall, a general election would probably not give a clear majority to any party. In this case, a coalition government would be necessary. The possibility of this would depend on the ability of Burnham to curb the Negro racist elements who support him, and to reach an agreement with the United Force and the more conservative Indian elements. If a stable coalition regime could be established, the British would probably find their way clear to grant the independence they have promised for so long.

Whatever government guides British Guiana during the next few

years is going to face grave difficulties. Unemployment is rising, and relatively little progress has been made in developing the country's economic resources. A great deal of capital is going to be needed for this endeavor, and this capital is going to be hard to obtain. A British Guiana with a democratic government which was part of the OAS might be able to get some help from the Alliance for Progress, as well as from the British. A government with a frank Communist leadership might be able to get some aid from the Soviet Union and its satellites.

In any case, the future of British Guiana is of great importance to all of its American neighbors. It shares the problems of the Latin American republics and of the countries newly emerging to independence. At the same time, its common borders with Venezuela and Brazil and its nearness to the European colonies and ex-colonies, gives it considerable strategic importance. A full-fledged Communist victory in British Guiana might potentially be of much greater significance to the hemisphere than the advent of the Castro regime in Cuba. Here, as elsewhere in America, the great question is whether economic development and rising living standards can be achieved while democratic liberties are preserved, or whether the people will turn in desperation to totalitarianism.

Laura Randall

A DIALOGUE OF THE DEAF:

The United States and Latin America

"The Mexican tells lies because he delights in fantasy, or because he is desperate, or because he wants to rise above the sordid facts of his life; the North American does not tell lies, but he substitutes social truth for the real truth, which is always disagreeable. . . .

"What is the origin of such contradictory attitudes? It seems to me that North Americans consider the world to be something that can be perfected, and that we consider it to be something that can be redeemed. . . ."—OCTAVIO PAZ

"The trouble is, you Americans always want to castrate us," said the Mexican nationalist who wore American shoes. "Take Cuba: its assertion of national sovereignty is like kicking you in the balls; our sovereignty is as important as our virility; after all, national sovereignty is national sex; you'd like to make a state out of Cuba—castrate the country, just the way you castrated Puerto Rico."

The psychosexual theory of international relations probably doesn't quite account for *all* of the difficulties between "anglo-saxons" and "latins." Yet the insistent use of forceful language by men who so openly identify their personal with their political power—to the amusement and dismay of the "puritans" who largely control the hemisphere's destiny—points to a major failure in communications between North and Latin Americans.

Consider first some simple matters of national style. Most North Americans become uncomfortable when another person edges within two feet of them. But many Latin Americans are used to standing closer than that to any person with whom they are interested in talking. The result is the tragicomic dance so often observed in the cities of this hemisphere, a dance in which the North American backs nervously away, while the Latin American pushes aggressively forward, the one annoyed by an unwanted physical intrusion, the other by a snobbish coldness.

There is more to a dance than motion. There is tempo. Spanish is usually spoken more rapidly than English. It is light and decorous, but capable of being a sharply wielded weapon. Five minutes of brilliant Spanish may take fifteen minutes in English translation. What in Spanish

is a civilized attention to form may appear in English an absence of substance, as well as snobbish and undemocratic. Conversely, sober meaty English may translate as uninspired Spanish. It may fall heavily; it may be a crashing bore, with a directness and informality that appear uncultivated and boorish.

Further, the form of expression favored by Latin Americans is often overwhelmingly moral; the form favored by North Americans is clearly technical. Worse, what is moral in Spanish may seem moralistic in English. For example, Latin pleas based on the "*moral imperative of change*," and on "*just price*" may strike us as vague, imprecise, and possibly hostile. The North American business man squirms uneasily: "Wha' d'ya mean, a *just price*?" "You mean you want more?" "How much more?" "How do you measure it?" "Why don't you say what you mean?" The North American official—or intellectual—will groan inwardly: "Change, sure." "Who knows what's moral?" "Let's be practical." "Pragmatic." "Compromise." "Too much change too soon encourages extremists of the left as well as of the right." "Of the left." "Of the left." "Of the left."

"Sovereignty Is Not Obsolete!"

It is but a short step to misunderstandings about substantive political problems. Spanish is an "easy" language to learn; so many Spanish words look like English words, and the bilingual dictionaries tell us they are cognates. Gone are the days when Alfred Korzybski could recommend the study of semantics as an antidote to everything from toothache to Communism, yet there *are* words, ostensibly identical in the two languages, which are in fact used in very different ways. These divergent usages reflect disparate conditions in the two societies. Certain key words and phrases take on symbolic value, elicit stock responses, and achieve a life of their own, making rational exchange of views difficult.

In Latin America, perhaps the most emotionally charged word of all is "sovereignty." North Americans are widely accused of caring for no sovereignty save their own. They *do* guard their own sovereignty, but they don't usually think about it under that name, which makes them even less likely to comprehend the widespread Latin American obsession with the concept. For the educated North American, "sovereignty" recalls the somewhat embarrassing posturing and foreign adventures of the 1850s or 1890s, or the wholly embarrassing senators from the sovereign State of South Carolina. In response to Latin assertions of sovereignty North Americans reply: "Let's send a little man down there to get rid of Castro." "But of course sovereignty is a joke left over from the last century. We have the power, don't we?", and "To the extent their societies differ from ours, theirs are inferior; for their own good, let's do something about it!" These phrases, left over from the days of Teddy Roosevelt, crop up in North American discussions about what, if anything, we ought to do about Latin America. Nor are such ideas confined to reactionary circles; many liberal North Americans believe that absolute non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations is an obsolete

ideal, that non-interference is often the cruelest form of interference, that it is far from moral to non-interfere with a drowning child, and that Latin America, at best, is a drowning adolescent.

Latin Americans appear to be less than certain that they want anything done to them. Eduardo Haedo, a former President of Uruguay's National Council of Government, has said

In international policy, we must prefer to be without dollars and even face misery while holding high the sovereignty and independence of the nation. Small countries must be more vigilant of their sovereignty. The large countries have economic resources, guns, and bullets to defend themselves, but Uruguay has no other defense than the juridical norm and acknowledges no other empire than that of the law. If Uruguay should fail this norm, we would be handing over the future of the republic because the large nations could dispose of our national destiny on the pretext that our precedent made us the first to violate that norm.

United States policy towards Cuba, following actions of Castro that clearly violated North American legal precepts, illustrates Haedo's point neatly. For Latin Americans, national sovereignty is not an echo from the past but a present necessity, a first line of defense against a foreign colossus that has intervened in a majority of Latin American republics within living memory. And in Latin America, "sovereignty" often has a left-wing connotation, since North Americans have almost always violated their sovereignty by intervening on behalf of conservatives. (When Kennedy sent the Navy late in 1961 to protect left-centrists in the Dominican Republic against the resurgent Trujillos, many Latin American nationalists were strangely silent; Castro was able to resume screaming only by pretending that the Navy sought to protect center-rightists against real leftists.)

"But We Live in a Two-Class Society!"

Liberal intellectuals in this country are often surprised that their Latin American counterparts so often lack a specific commitment to free elections, the rights of political opposition, free speech and press, procedural rights for arrested persons, social democracy, free trade unions, a variety of welfare measures. There is probably not much quarrel with such liberal ideals, but these ideals are not always the object of serious political action.

And with good reason. Such values are important in prosperous societies with large middle classes, as refinements of an essentially healthy and just society. Healthy and just societies are rare in Latin America, so that the intellectual is more apt to be a revolutionary than a reformer. He lives not in a relatively homogeneous society, but in a sharply polarized two-class world. His aim is not to modify or to tinker, but to overthrow the existing ruling class, overturn the social structure and build it anew. In such a society, for a man with a revolutionary program, North American "liberal" ideas are often irrelevant. In a revolutionary situation, "freedom" for your allies, such as the trade unions, may mean

the dispersion of your slender and desperately embattled forces; "freedom" for oppositionists may mean that they can organize quicker and deadlier counterblows. Welfare programs, except for your own clamorous supporters who must be paid off, may be unrealistically expensive in a country whose poverty brought on the revolution in the first place.

North American liberals often assume that Latin American nationalists are pro-labor, in which case contacts made through labor channels should be especially well-received. The AFL-CIO sponsors an inter-American labor organization (Organizacion Regional Internacional de Trabajo known as ORIT) which, among other things, organizes an exchange of North and Latin American union personnel. ORIT, however, both by its regional character and by the apparent cordiality of its relations with the State Department, has been frequently attacked as a paid agent of the United States government. Unless the government were to be composed of union officials, or of representatives of political parties dominated by unions, the spectacle of a labor union on good terms with the government might well appear a sell-out to union members in Latin America who often assume that unless the revolution has already taken place, the interests of labor and of the regime must be irreconcilably hostile. Clear evidence for such a generalization are the Cuban unions (sell-outs) that supported Batista, or the newly formed railroad unions in Mexico (not sell-outs), whose leaders are in jail at least partly because of the anti-government nature of their political activities.

Worse still, when Latin American leaders learn to talk the language of the Yankees they have difficulty at home. By the time they have "matured" enough to become acceptable to the State Department, they are no longer wholly acceptable to the younger members of their own party. Two famous examples are Betancourt of Venezuela and Haya de la Torre of Peru, much admired by academic specialists in Latin American affairs, the leadership of the AFL-CIO and liberal Democrats in Washington. Both reject the simplistic anti-Americanism of their leftist opponents, both have been forced to conciliate local rightists. Betancourt grows less and less radical, carries out land reform less rapidly than his rural supporters demand, does not seem able to alleviate urban unemployment, and becomes more dependent on the military. Haya de la Torre develops more centrist policies. The next steps are predictable. New groups—the Unión Republicana Democrática in Venezuela and the Acción Popular in Peru—fill the vacuum on the left. Soon afterwards, younger and more fiery groups within the traditional radical parties split off—the "Ars" from Betancourt's Acción Democrática, and APRA Rebelde from Haya de la Torre's APRA—leaving the formerly heroic leaders with a smaller following of aging moderates from the past, and in the case of Betancourt, no resort but to rule by repression.

"Democracy? Viva la Revolution."

"Democracy" in North America not only denotes a specific political system which allows for a wide degree of participation through elections,

congresses or parliaments, and parties, but it also connotes a prosperous, industrialized, and relatively egalitarian society, unhampered by major class rigidities, with large areas of agreement between all significant social groups, i.e., a somewhat idealized version of countries such as the United States or Canada. In such a society, the economic and political independence of the citizen allows governmental institutions to function with a minimum of corruption and a maximum of representation of popular wishes.

To many Latin Americans "democracy" signifies *only* an electoral process. In frequent Spanish usage, a country is a democracy if it has elections, even if the country is so poverty-stricken that buying votes is an inexpensive transaction, or even if the qualifications for voting limit the voters to the dominant social class. A country is a democracy if it has a parliament, even if the parliament is a gentlemen's club which occasionally gathers for the purpose of blocking all change, or even if it is more or less a rubber stamp for a reactionary strong man. Oligarchic Colombia and Chile at the beginning of the century were thus "democracies." There is no necessary connection between "democracy" and the will or welfare of the people. Social justice is linked in their minds not with "democracy" but with quite another concept: revolution!

North Americans think of a revolution as a putsch, a civil war, a bloodbath; Latin Americans are more apt to regard it as a long-term *process*. Recently, a four-volume publication entitled *Mexico, Fifty Years of Revolution* was published in honor of the Mexican Revolution which began in 1910. The revolution appears as not only a simple seizure of power, but also a continuous (if often uneven) process in which a relatively static, semi-"feudal" society is shattered and a new society is constructed. The old upper classes had to be dispossessed, the Roman Catholic Church had to be crushed, land, wealth, and income had to be distributed, education and social mobility had to be granted to the masses, a modern economy had to be constructed. These changes did not occur the year the fighting stopped. The end of the fighting made these changes possible. But they took place—and will take place—as a process of accretion over several years. In nationalist terms, these changes were inherent in the ideology of the revolution, but it took time to turn them into reality. As long as poverty and inequality exist, the revolution cannot end. In a Latin American country today, to say the revolution is finished is to say that the revolution has failed.

"What Do We Need Communists for? Our Own Nationalists Are Better!"

While adherence to a strict Party line is impossible for Latin Americans who aspire to intellectual leadership in their countries, the Party's simple slogans that seem to solve the most pressing social questions are quite attractive to many students and workers who demand hard definite answers rather than the amorphous complexities of "balanced" North American views. More important, the Communists focus on two problems central to Latin America: grinding poverty and frustratingly

limited social mobility. And joining the Communists is not yet too dangerous a way of annoying the United States. At first glance it seems surprising that Communists play so minor a role in almost every Latin American scene. But the Communists' lot is not a happy one!" When Communism reached Latin America in the twenties and thirties, it entered an arena of long-established nationalist and left-wing political movements. In most cases the Communists were too late to found the first mass party. In other cases they cast away their opportunities by rigidly adhering to a number of Stalin's policies that were of little relevance to Latin America. Local Communists supported the United States from Russia's entry into World War II, and so Perón was able to capture the leftist, nationalist, anti-North American masses of Argentina. When a genuine social revolution took place in Bolivia, the Communists opposed it on the (erroneous) grounds that it was Trotskyite! When Castro took to the mountains, the Communists maintained their working agreement with Batista—and it has taken an extraordinary combination of circumstances to let them recover from that blunder. Unresponsive to their environment, often too late, and often unlucky, the Communist parties of Latin America have failed to capture the allegiance of the masses, which usually support xenophobic left-wing movements instead.

The Latin Americans disregard of "the Communist danger" appears irresponsible to most Yankees. When North Americans insist, both early and often, on asking about Communism in his host's or guest's country, the Latin American will be irritated, not only because he can think of a dozen things more important on his own political scene (or more flattering), but because the North American falls so dismally into the boring stereotype: persistence in talking about all Latin American problems in terms of "anti-Communism" only betrays to Latin Americans the North Americans' parochial refusal to pay any real attention to Latin America! Small wonder that when Communism is mentioned, either all communication ceases, or the only response is a derisive: "What do we need to import Communists for? *Our own* nationalists are better."

"Nationalists Instead of Nationalism."

Yet the presence of nationalists is not an indication of a nationalism that elicits cooperative behavior from divergent groups. Rather, it is an indication of almost irreconcilably deep divisions within society. In an attempt to explain this to a North American audience, Jânio Quadros wrote that

There are two moments in the life of nations when complete freedom is permitted in the expression of what might be called a national ideology: when they are undergoing dire poverty, as the sole romantic consolation left to the people; and when they are thriving in abundance, as a duty imposed upon the nation by the multitude of interests asserted but never entirely satisfied.

"We have no right to dream. Rather it is our duty to work."*

Clearly, Latin American ideology—nationalism—arises from the first of Quadros' conditions, United States ideology from the second. Even when language is similar, the dissimilarity of the situations language reflects effectively prevents communication from taking place. Worse, attempts to placate allies in terms appropriate to international relations may have disastrous repercussions on domestic politics. The most recent example of a leader trapped by the diametrically opposed requirements of domestic and foreign politics is deposed President Arturo Frondizi of Argentina. Elected in 1958, Frondizi was faced with the twin tasks of establishing wide areas of national consensus and fostering economic growth. The injection of controversial international issues, such as Cuba and Communism, into domestic politics by calling the Punta del Este conference predictably sharpened the divisions within Argentine society and weakened Frondizi's government. Frondizi's domestic difficulties stemmed from the fact that although he campaigned on a highly nationalistic platform, he adopted after his election economic policies which required massive foreign assistance. He successfully obtained the money from foreign private investors, governments, and international organizations, but under conditions requiring a degree of economic austerity and an encouragement of foreign capital that bore little resemblance to his nationalist, statist, and pro-labor campaign promises. Frondizi's claim that his new policies were necessary "to save the country" did not convince the leftists who had elected him. Increased national welfare does not necessarily increase the *relative* benefits of any one group within society. In a country where relative shares of wealth and power often appear more important than absolute levels of either, a failure to increase the share of his original supporters was predictably considered by them to be a sell-out. At the same time, Frondizi's policies did not unify the remainder of popular opinion, or gain Frondizi a majority of votes for his Party.

Since attention to substance did not resolve continuing political difficulties, Frondizi hoped that changing the form in which the problems were posed might lead to their resolution. Just before the 1962 Argentine Congressional elections, he attacked the form of his opponents' charges directly:

This mentality which is opposed to our national plan belongs to the past which is gone. It is a mentality which speaks of sovereignty and independence without recognizing that these are theoretical concepts which are not based on the reality of a nation united in its great spiritual ideals, and which, in the material field, uses its natural resources to promote a solid economic structure which defends that nation against the pressures of foreign domination.

This mentality has been left behind by the progressive forces of the nation. . . .

* *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1961.

Unfortunately, these paragraphs were no more than desperately wishful thinking.

Argentine society, one of the richest in Latin America, is deeply divided. Even more so are the majority of Latin American nations. At this time, when the creation of wide areas of consensus was probably the most pressing domestic concern in almost all Latin American countries, the United States chose to introduce the issue of Communism, and the emotional problems of self-determination and sovereignty into the domestic politics of all Latin American countries by calling the Punta del Este conference to deal with Castro's Cuba. The conference evidently was called in hopes of convincing the United States Congress of the anti-Communist, anti-Castro worthiness of Latin American countries to receive aid under the Alliance for Progress. That is to say, an international conference was called because of domestic United States needs, and an agenda was set up in terms appropriate to domestic United States politics.

Yet, because the United States is the strongest nation in the hemisphere, in matters of form it should have been the most flexible. United States intransigence in calling for open condemnation of Cuba had a disastrous effect on Argentina. Perhaps in part because it had earlier advised against calling the Punta del Este meeting, Argentina abstained from voting to condemn Castro's Cuba. This angered the Army into forcing Frondizi to break diplomatic relations with Cuba. The break with Cuba, and the too-close-to-elections timing of the announcement of economic aid to Argentina, are two actions for which the United States bears much responsibility. These acts in part explain the poor showing of Frondizi in the March elections, and the suspension of formal democracy when the army overthrew and imprisoned him almost immediately thereafter.

If United States foreign policy is to succeed, the United States must acquire a more flexible and sympathetic understanding of radical or revolutionary programs and language. The dialogue of the deaf that has gone on for at least the last fifteen years should be transformed into a mutually intelligible conversation. Until this happens, the United States will continue to attack Latin American dreams and images, to no avail, because, like the rest of us, Latin Americans identify with their faults and fantasies; United States' programs that run counter to either will probably fail.

The Young Radicals

Editors:

It is unfortunate that in summarizing the symposium of "The Young Radicals" [Winter, 1962], Mr. Lewis Coser could not resist the temptation to pass out grades. At least one of his "pupils" is inspired to question not only the analysis but the motivations of the "teacher."

His basic complaint seems to be that the Young Radicals lack a sense of history, and that many of the symposium responses are self-centered to the exclusion of political considerations. The few Young Radicals who are aware of the history of radicalism in the U. S. have obviously read the wrong books, according to Mr. Coser, for they do not seem to properly appreciate the role of his (Mr. Coser's) radical contemporaries during their heyday.

What Mr. Coser will not face, understandably, is the fact that in terms of political achievement the Left Wing in the United States has failed absolutely.

The existence of a few commendable publications like *DISSENT*, and organizations like the Committee of Correspondence and *SANE*, do not alter this truth. Mr. Coser correctly asserts that "the socialists of the thirties are by no means dead," but they might as well be so far as the American political scene is concerned. It is no easy thing to confess that the dedicated political work of one's youth and early manhood have come to nought in one's middle age, but there it is, and unless the Senior Radicals face it they will continue to bathe in the nostalgia of the past while deluding themselves that they are playing an effective role in the American present.

Where were we, Mr. Coser wonders, when he and *DISSENT* were fighting the whole pack of Right-turning intellectuals during the McCarthy period. If anyone is interested in passing out medals for fighting lost causes, which is silly, he should tell Mr. Coser that most of the so-called Young Radicals were hardly out of high school and no more than faces in the crowd at rallies and on picket lines. A few of us took the trouble to read all of the documents of the Rosenberg Case, and

concluded that there was at least enough available evidence to warrant their not being executed in the hysterical anti-Red atmosphere then current in the U. S., while others (of the mild and gentle socialist Left) took the view that because the Communist Party was playing a leading role in the case they would have none of it.

This brings us to a peculiar omission in Mr. Coser's summary. The major thesis of my article was that one of the reasons for the absence of a meaningful Left today was that it allowed itself to be destroyed during the McCarthy years because it abandoned the Communist Party and the extreme Left during the height of the persecution, in an attempt to prove that while radical it was not subject to any subversive influences from the Soviet Union; and that this stance did not satisfy the reigning reactionary machine which continued to destroy *Pink* as well as *Red* organizations. I know there is nothing original about this idea, but one wonders why Mr. Coser did not deal with it in his summary.

Instead, he chose to be distressed at my "undifferentiated response" in voicing support of Nkrumah, Touré, Nasser and Castro." It does not, of course, make any difference to these leaders what Mr. Coser or I think of political trends in their countries. But in his comment he, as a radical, comes dangerously close to the political insularity I suggested was characteristic of the American scene as a whole. For what are we to make of his complaint that "Castro's men fraternize with Khrushchev and Mao; Nasser with Tito."

Has it never occurred to Mr. Coser that Castro and Nasser, being big boys now, may fraternize with whom they please, and that as leaders of nations involved in socialist revolutions, nothing is more natural than their associating with the leaders of the world's two greatest socialist nations.

When Mr. Coser suggests that I am pleading for a kind of "mindless activism, a know-nothing militancy," I don't know if he is referring to my support of Robert F. Williams in Monroe, N. C., last year or

to my observations about the importance of the Black Muslim Movement.

If it is the first instance, I should have expected Mr. Coser to support any group of men defending their families and homes against racist attack. The right of self-defense and to defend one's neighbor against criminal assault is inherent in American federal law, and in the legal code of nearly every state in the Union. It remains a mystery to me why white radicals should be so horrified that black men should organize to defend themselves, a right most white radicals take for granted.

If Mr. Coser's reference is to the second instance, it should be apparent to him that the rapid growth of the Black Muslim movement is glaring proof of the failure of the American Left to involve working-class black men in any significant political activity.

JULIAN MAYFIELD
Accra, Ghana

Suburbia

Editors:

The deathless criticisms of life and hard times in suburbia, typified by the recent contribution of Bensman and Rosenberg [Summer, 1962], have reached a degree of stylization and predictability equalled only by their smugness. Their utterances concerning the unhappy situation of the cultural producers and cultural consumers manage only to create, at least for this unhappy reader, considerable apprehension about the possible situation of the cultural middlemen.

The very manner in which culture is used and consumed in suburbia, they caution us, threatens to consume the sources of culture. What suburbia they are talking about remains something of a mystery. Their suburbia remains anonymous well beyond the obligation that serious journalism has to its informants; no names, no facts, uncorrupted by confusing statistics there is not even the epitomizing quotations that a dedicated *Time* contributor might produce for just such an occasion.

That indeed such a suburbia exists I am more than willing to trust to their intuition; the crucial question remains as to whether such a suburbia exists past the sociological shadow cast by Manhattan's

skyline. Does it exist in the suburbias of more provincial urban centers? Does it exist in the almost countless cities small enough to make the use of the term suburbia suggest pretension? Does it, in effect, exist for suburban areas that do not send their breadwinners to Madison Avenue or The New School?

Suburbia, I suspect, is far too dependent a concept to carry the oppressive weight that has been placed upon it. There is, at best, uncertain evidence that it represents or creates a special environment of its own. There is no evidence to suggest that suburbanites differ radically from the non-suburbanite of *comparable social characteristics*. To the contrary, there is some evidence that all that changes is the rhetoric of the social critic unable to resist the temptation of an overworked cliché.

The unfortunate aspect of this type of analysis is that in fixing upon suburbia as being causal in some mystic way we tend to neglect some of the more basic social processes. Not least of these is the effects upon cultural life of the increasing productivity of our educational institutions and the corresponding transformation of these institutions. And, not too surprisingly, we really don't know very much about the effects and uses of contemporary education. Whether the effect upon culture will be a negative one is far from fully determined. Obviously a great deal depends upon the quality of the "Commodities" that are placed upon this new cultural market. A great deal also rests upon the larger social and political issues that face our society and, to which, despite the impression created by the Bensmans and Rosenbergs, even our suburban areas have not developed an immunity.

Rarely, if ever, has the relationship between the producers and consumers of culture been either a direct or complementary one. Admittedly, the dynamics by which the cultural market-place transforms the newest possession of the avant-garde into blander, more salable commodities move more swiftly, and the strain is felt by the communities existing on both sides of the relationship. A more immediately effective and disturbing analysis, however, remains to be done on the community of producers; an analysis that,

I suspect, will fail to generate comparable smugness, if only because we are all implicated and to varying extents to be found guilty.

WILLIAM SIMON
Chicago

BENSMAN and ROSENBERG reply:

The article that disturbs Mr. Simon was written by two men who grew up, respectively, in Two Rivers, Wisconsin and Detroit, Michigan. Their prolonged exposure to the provinces did not make them smug; it made them uneasy. In the fullness of time, they became residents of New York, by profession sociologists who devoted part of their lives to politics and some to social criticism. Recognizing how deeply implicated we all are, they often found fault with their own culture. Others, like our correspondent, apparently did not. Which of us, the complacent or the dissatisfied, is to be charged with insufferable smugness?

Mr. Simon seems to be upset by the omission of numbers, tables, graphs, names and quotations, the familiar panoply of "science" which even *Time* offers in greater abundance than the writers. Perhaps they can partly rectify their fault by supplying one quote—of themselves—from their frankly impressionistic essay: "Any answer would at present be premature. Suburbs are too new and too various—despite a certain sameness—for us to do more than speculate about them."

One of us is a suburbanite who gathered his data by participant observation in a non-Madison Avenue suburb. Also, incidental to buying a house, he conducted a "survey" of many suburbs in and around New York. Using an unscientific sample, he learned much about homes in the \$20,000 to \$30,000 range without benefit of a specific questionnaire or any other "research instrument." The findings would not be suitable for publication in a scholarly journal.

Are they at all typical? Apparently Mr. Vincent Price was commissioned this year to buy a large number of original paintings for Sears Roebuck. They will be included in next year's catalog—for *exclusive* distribution in the provinces. Mr. Simon might also benefit from reading "The Quality of Culture" by A. Toffler in

Fortune Magazine, Nov. 1961, particularly page 125.

A final point: there are of course upper class, middle class and even working class suburbs—and each tends to be homogeneous. Our article indicates that middle class suburbanites are very much like their counterparts in the city. There also appears to be a major difference between them. This consists simply in the fact that an urban environment (even that of Chicago!) is less conducive to cultural segregation than a suburban enclave like Crestwood Heights or Levittown—or Highland Park.

Editor's Choice?

Editors:

I think I should set straight the facts behind the note by Paul Goodman prefacing his article "Format and Anxiety" in your summer issue.

Mr. Goodman's reportage was indeed commissioned by *Show* magazine. It was rejected not by Huntington Hartford, the President, but by me, the Publisher. I am too shy to accept the label of decision-maker that Mr. Goodman reserves for people who veto his work. I am, however, a working editor; I have been a working editor for a good bit of my life, and, although also the Publisher of *Show*, I am responsible for its editorial content and I direct this.

The reason, incidentally, that I turned down the Goodman piece was that I felt it was not very good. I think our society will be worse than "a dull and dangerous monolith" if every rejection on ample editorial grounds is regarded as part of some massive ideological assault on the writer.

I hope Mr. Goodman will write better pieces than this in the future, as he has in the past; and when I see better ones, I shall be only too happy to print them in *Show*.

Very truly yours,

FRANK B. GIBNEY

PAUL GOODMAN replies:

Hartford Gibney, Gibney Hartford. I was told Hartford. Oh, it's a most fine, an excellent article, a surpassingly nuggetty article. Why don't Publishers and Presidents stick to their own business, signing the checks and all that?

Which Side?

Editors:

In Henry Pachter's review of Kirchheimer's *Political Justice*, there appears a sentiment which seems out of place in *DISSENT*. Speaking of a West German labor leader who was a Stalinist stooge, Pachter says: "... It (an 'open, democratic society') obviously is entitled to apply to a conspirator the same harsh law of repression that he threatens to use in case of success."

Completely aside from questions of the real content of democratic forms in such societies as West Germany, there are many obvious objections to this formulation. To cite but a few: how much repression may this open democratic society apply and remain open and democratic; in a class society, does "society" apply such repression; who decides who is a "conspirator"; how is the "harsh law of repression" which our conspirator might use in case of success determined?

This theory is of course the precise justification of the McCarran Act; it was also the justification for the imprisonment of Debs. In Albany, Ga., Dr. King is such a "conspirator"; in Utah, union organizers; in Great Britain, members of the Committee of 100. Which side are we on?

IAN McMAHAN

HENRY PACTHER replies:

Frankly, I fail to understand Mr. McMahan—I tried to suggest that everybody should be measured by his own rod; those advocating dictatorship have no right to complain if their recipe for government is used by others. I have not tried to justify the McCarran Act and I have not confused the Rev. King with political terrorists. Mr. McMahan does, and I feel sorry for him.

IN OUR NEXT ISSUE:

A provocative article by Lewis Coser: "Problems of the New Nations."

"C. Wright Mills: A Memoir," by Harvey Swados.

"The New Peace Movement," by Roy Finch.

"Lichtheim on Marxism," by S. Lipset.

Other articles—plus book reviews and letters that had to be held from this issue.

RESERVE THE EVENING OF

November 16

to celebrate with us the
start of *DISSENT*'s
tenth anniversary
at a special dinner . . .

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